US v. Shonubi, No. CR 92-0007.
| Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York) |
| Writing for the Court | David G. Secular, New York City, for defendant |
| Citation | 895 F. Supp. 460 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Charles O. SHONUBI, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 04 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 92-0007. |
895 F. Supp. 460
UNITED STATES of America,
v.
Charles O. SHONUBI, Defendant.
No. CR 92-0007.
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
August 4, 1995.
895 F. Supp. 461
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED895 F. Supp. 462
Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY (Karen A. Popp, Assistant U.S. Attorney, of counsel), for U.S
David G. Secular, New York City, for defendant.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT
WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge.
CONTENTS
I. Introduction ................................................................ 464
II. Facts ....................................................................... 465
III. Procedural History .......................................................... 466
895 F. Supp. 463A. Aborted plea bargain ..................................................... 466 B. Trial .................................................................... 466 C. Sentencing ............................................................... 466 D. Appeal ................................................................... 467 E. Proceedings on remand utilizing Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence ................................................................. 468 F. Summary of arguments on remand ........................................... 468 G. Statement of the issue before the court .................................. 469 IV. Sentencing Law .............................................................. 470 A. Burden of proof .......................................................... 470 1. Generally ............................................................. 470 2. Burden of proof at sentencing ......................................... 471 B. Operation of the Guidelines .............................................. 472 1. Drug cases ............................................................ 473 2. Non-drug cases ........................................................ 474 C. Caselaw on estimation and specific evidence .............................. 475 1. Estimation ............................................................ 475 2. Estimates based on extrapolation ...................................... 477 3. Specific evidence ..................................................... 478 V. Available Sources of Information ............................................ 479 A. Background knowledge ..................................................... 479 B. Knowledge of the drug trade .............................................. 480 C. Demeanor ................................................................. 480 1. How judges use demeanor ............................................... 481 2. Demeanor and appellate review ......................................... 481 D. Assumptions about criminal behavior ...................................... 481 VI. How Decision-Makers Learn and Decide ........................................ 482 A. Inferences based on prior information and training ....................... 482 B. Methods of reaching conclusions .......................................... 483 1. Classical step-by-step analysis ....................................... 483 2. Bayesian and statistical analysis ..................................... 484 3. Biases ................................................................ 486 4. Storytelling .......................................................... 487 VII. Application of Law to Facts on Original Sentence ............................ 488 A. Evidence from trial ...................................................... 488 B. Demeanor and character ................................................... 489 C. Knowledge of the drug trade: the trip effect ............................. 490 D. Storytelling analysis .................................................... 491 VIII. Desirability of Further Analysis ............................................ 492 IX. The General Federal Rule Favoring Admissibility Of and Reliance on All Helpful Evidence ............................................................ 492 A. Mechanistic rules versus flexible general principles ..................... 493 B. Development of twentieth century conceptions of evidence codes ........... 494 C. Model Code of Evidence ................................................... 496 D. Federal Rules of Evidence ................................................ 497 E. Recent developments ...................................................... 499 X. Additional Material Available to Sentencing Judge On Remand ................. 499 A. Experts' reports ......................................................... 499 1. Government expert ..................................................... 499 2. Defense expert ........................................................ 504 3. Rule 706 Panel ........................................................ 505 a. Use of fictions .................................................... 505 b. Problems with government's assumptions ............................. 506 c. Comments on defendant's report ..................................... 506
895 F. Supp. 464d. Non-statistical analysis ........................................... 506 e. Statistical analysis ............................................... 507 f. Simulations accounting for trip effect ............................. 508 g. Conclusion ......................................................... 510 B. Survey of the Eastern District bench ..................................... 511 C. Testimony on economics of heroin smuggling ............................... 511 XI. Law Applicable to Statistical and Other Information Supplied After Remand ... 513 A. Admissibility of probabilistic evidence .................................. 513 B. Use of bare statistics ................................................... 516 1. Generally ............................................................. 516 2. Criminal cases ........................................................ 518 XII. Application of Law to Facts After Remand .................................... 518 A. Conclusions about experts' reports ....................................... 519 B. Random versus non-random sampling ........................................ 520 C. Use of statistics to illustrate non-statistical decision-making .......... 521 D. Conclusions on proper role of statistics in this case .................... 523 E. Cross-checking ........................................................... 523 F. Conclusion in light of statistics and other information provided on remand ................................................................. 524 XIII. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement .......................................... 524 A. Purposes of sentencing and of § 3C1.1 ............................... 524 B. Double-counting .......................................................... 525 C. Discretion to enhance under Dunnigan ..................................... 526 D. Unconstitutionality of automatic enhancement ............................. 527 E. Particularized finding of perjury ........................................ 527 F. Conclusion ............................................................... 528 XIV. Additional Sentencing Considerations ........................................ 528 A. "Penalty" for going to trial ............................................. 528 B. Sentencing within prescribed Guidelines range ............................ 529 C. Added time in prison required by Guidelines system ....................... 530 XV. Conclusion .................................................................. 530
I. Introduction
The defendant was caught entering the country with 427.4 grams of heroin in his digestive tract. It is believed that he made seven prior drug smuggling trips, but not how much he carried on those trips. The court is required, under the Sentencing Guidelines, to estimate the total quantity of heroin imported.
At the original sentence, the court multiplied 427.4 by eight, arriving at a total of 3419.2 grams. The sentence was 151 months in prison, the low end of the Guidelines range for importation of 3,000 grams of heroin or more. See United States v. Shonubi, 802 F.Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y.1992) Shonubi I, conviction affirmed, sentence reversed, 998 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.1993) Shonubi II.
The court of appeals rejected this solution and remanded. On reconsideration, the trial court now concludes that the defendant should be sentenced for importing between 1,000 and 3,000 grams of heroin. For reasons indicated in Parts XIII, XIV, and XV, infra, the term of imprisonment is unchanged.
This memorandum is largely devoted to explaining how a sentencing judge — and a trier of fact generally — reaches a decision. The case presents an opportunity to observe, explain, and discuss forensic decision-making. The absence of exclusionary rules of evidence at sentencing, the availability of statistics against which to "check" non-statistical proof, and the assistance of skilled experts have permitted the court to examine the decision-making process more fully than circumstances usually permit.
It should come as no surprise that in addition to rational analysis, the forensic factfinder
895 F. Supp. 465
depends upon assumptions and methods of thinking that may introduce biases and errors. Articulating the assumptions used in this case may provide valuable perspectives on decision-making practice and theory.
Because the sentencing judge found the problems raised by this case difficult, he issued a draft memorandum before resentencing and circulated it for comment. The parties and a number of scholars responded. These responses are on file with the court. The sentencing judge also posed questions to his colleagues on the court; their responses are described below. The final memorandum...
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32 practice notes
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Guzman v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., No. 98-2710.
..."beyond a reasonable doubt standard" "ranged from 76 to 90 percent, with 85 percent the modal response." See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (survey reported in United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1......
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Dia v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2460.
...explains that credibility determinations may be based on such knowledge even though it is not in the record. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 479 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citation Page 263 Professor Uviller has provided a useful description of the process used by a fact finder in deciding ......
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Orena v. U.S., No. 96 CV 1474.
...Their theory would have provided the jury with a "story" of the Ocera homicide to rival the government's. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 487-88 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (trier's use of story-line to draw inferences), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085(2d To raise an inference tha......
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, No. 98 CV 3287.
...a reasonable degree of certainty whether any particular individual's injury was caused by tobacco use. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("In mass torts, proof of causation often requires the use of statistically based epidemiological proof."); In re "Agent ......
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31 cases
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Guzman v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., No. 98-2710.
..."beyond a reasonable doubt standard" "ranged from 76 to 90 percent, with 85 percent the modal response." See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (survey reported in United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1......
-
Orena v. U.S., No. 96 CV 1474.
...Their theory would have provided the jury with a "story" of the Ocera homicide to rival the government's. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 487-88 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (trier's use of story-line to draw inferences), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 1085(2d To raise an inference tha......
-
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, No. 98 CV 3287.
...a reasonable degree of certainty whether any particular individual's injury was caused by tobacco use. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("In mass torts, proof of causation often requires the use of statistically based epidemiological proof."); In re "Agent ......
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Ganzy v. Allen Christian School, No. 96-CV-5254.
...and conclusions as to the facts, differences in experience and outlook might well make a difference. Cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 482-83 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (discussing decision-maker's use of inferences based on prior information and training), vacated on other grounds, 103 F.......
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