US v. State of Ga.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
• Citation: US v. State of Ga., 702 F. Supp. 1577 (M.D. Ga. 1989)
• Decision Date: 12 January 1989
• Docket Number: Civ A. No. 2771-MAC (WDO).
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, Charlie Ridley, et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. STATE OF GEORGIA, et al. (Grady, Hart, Irwin, Jasper, Macon, Mitchell, Monroe, Morgan, and Peach Counties), Defendants.

702 F. Supp. 1577

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff Charlie Ridley, et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. STATE OF GEORGIA, et al. (Grady, Hart, Irwin, Jasper, Macon, Mitchell, Monroe, Morgan, and Peach Counties), Defendants.

Civ A. No. 2771-MAC (WDO).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division.

January 12, 1989.

Norman Chachkin, NAACP-Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York City, Thomas M. Jackson, Macon, Ga., for plaintiff-intervenor.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., State of Ga., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant State of Ga.

Pauline Miller, Nathaniel Douglas, Civil Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S.

Charles R. Adams, Jr., Ft. Valley, Ga., for Peach County.

W. Edward Meeks, Jr., Ocilla, Ga., for Irwin County.

Thomas Ledford, Camilla, Ga., for Mitchell County.

W. Ashley Hawkins, Forsyth, Ga., for Monroe County.

Thomas L. Lehman, Cairo, Ga., for Grady County.

Walter S. Chew, Jr., Oglethorpe, Ga., for Macon County.

E.R. Lambert, Madison, Ga., for Morgan County.

Roy R. Kelly, Monticello, Ga., for Jasper County.

Phillip L. Hartley, Harben & Hartley, Gainesville, Ga., for Hart County.

ORDER

OWENS, Chief Judge.

In August of 1969 and in reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States as plaintiff initiated this action against the State of Georgia, et al., to desegregate numerous Georgia school districts. Shortly thereafter, Charlie Ridley, et al., were permitted to intervene in this matter as plaintiff-intervenors,¹ and they have remained involved during the long history of this case. Among other things, this case resulted in the issuance of a consent order in 1974 which imposed a permanent injunction upon the school boards of Grady, Hart, Irwin, Jasper, Macon, Mitchell, Monroe, Morgan, and Peach Counties. See United States v. State of Georgia, 691 F.Supp. 1440 (M.D.Ga.1988) (order contains relevant portions of the 1974 consent order).

After many years of relative inactivity, the above-referenced action is before the court on the United States' motion to ascertain whether the nine school districts have achieved "unitary status." If the court determines that some or all of these school districts have achieved unitary status, an assumption which the United States seems inclined to make but a fact which this court is not yet prepared to find, then the United States further asks that this court dismiss this case so far as it concerns those school districts which have achieved such status.

The nine school districts originally joined the United States in motions "to have this case dismissed since these parties agree that defendants have achieved and maintained a unitary status in all respects for several years...." Motions to have stipulation approved, p. 1.² Plaintiff-intervenors, however, refused to stipulate that any of the above-named school districts had achieved unitary status. Similarly, all of the school districts have retreated from their earlier position, and they have joined the plaintiff-intervenors in requesting that this court instead dismiss the case without resolving the issue of unitary status and retain in effect the permanent injunction mandating the desegregation along with that injunction's implementing and enforcing mechanisms. Such action would both remove the case from the government's files and retain in force the benefits included in existing court orders. In its place, the government has expressed its concern about the validity of a dismissal without a finding of unitary status³, and it has questioned the authority of this court to dismiss the case while retaining in effect the permanent injunction.⁴

In a previous order, this court summed up the situation as follows:

Viewed overall, in spite of the agreement of plaintiff-intervenors and these inactive defendant school boards to dismiss this school desegregation civil action leaving the 1974 permanent injunction in effect and in spite of the fact that neither the plaintiff-intervenors nor any defendant school board desires this court to determine whether or not either of the defendant school systems has achieved unitary status, the United States as plaintiff-movant continues to insist that this court has the duty and responsibility of determining whether or not each defendant school system has achieved unitary status. The fact that the extensive discovery and evidentiary hearing required for such a determination will cause each of these small county school boards to collect taxes from their local property owners to pay necessary attorneys fees and litigation expenses, seems to be of no concern to the United States, but, of course, is the paramount concern of each of these school boards to whom this is an unnecessary exercise.

United States v. State of Georgia, 691 F.Supp. at 1444.

In light of the situation as described above, this court recognized the propriety of determining at some point the issue of unitary status⁵ but ruled that the costs of such a determination should be borne by the plaintiff United States. The court stated as follows:

In this court's best judgment the United States, as plaintiff, has the right to move this court for a finding of unitary status as to each of these school systems, provided that as the moving party it assumes the entire burden of proving — factually and legally — that each school system is in a unitary status. The entire burden includes the responsibility of representing each school board without expense to the school board in all discovery, pretrial and trial matters, so long as each school board does not desire, at its own expense, to be represented by its own counsel. Any other approach would be inequitable to these innocent bystander school boards.

Id. at 1444. Consequently, the court ordered plaintiff United States to inform the court within sixty days whether it agreed to proceed under the court's proposal. Id. at 1445.

Plaintiff United States responded by letter dated October 21, 1988, a copy of which is attached as an appendix, and therein the United States agreed to shoulder certain of the defendant school districts' costs. This response, however, illuminates the fact that the United States' position in this matter is riddled with inherent conflicts. Based upon the voluminous reports which these school districts have filed over the years, the United States has "determined" that these school districts have reached unitary status. Thus, the government has moved for a judicial finding to that effect and requested the dismissal of this case and the vacation of the existing injunction. The government has become the unasked for and seemingly unwanted surrogate for the defendant school districts, a surrogate that in good faith and in an attempt to comply with this court's directive has agreed to pay a large portion of the defendants' costs. But the United States is the plaintiff in this case. The United States initiated this action to correct past wrongs, and in this court's best judgment, the government continues to have an obligation both to the minority children and to the quality of education in these nine counties. That responsibility is recognized in the government's letter of October 21, in which the government states:

We also stress, however, that as lawyers for the United States we can represent only the United States. Accordingly, if in the course of attempting to demonstrate that a particular school district has achieved unitary status, we determine that it has not, then we will cease to seek unitary status, and indeed will seek instead to reactivate the case to achieve additional relief, as is necessary. As we have repeatedly pointed out in our earlier filings, while we think the law requires dismissal once unitary status has been achieved, we do not wish to see any school district released from judicial supervision that has not achieved unitary status.

(emphasis in original).

This court agrees with the government's above recognition that the United States' function in this proceeding is to investigate thoroughly the conduct of the nine defendant school districts and to represent zealously those interests which it first undertook to represent nearly twenty years ago.⁶ After such investigation, and after sharing gathered information with and conferring with fellow plaintiffs, intervenors Charles Ridley, et al., the United States is, of course, free to take a position on the question of the unitary status of any of the defendant school districts.⁷ This court is not implying that the government should take an unyielding adversarial position nor is it encouraging the government to litigate needlessly. The court is merely requiring that the government fulfill its obligation to the children of the nine counties in question. With this obligation in mind, to permit the government to initiate this time-consuming and expensive process presuming at the outset one thing — that the defendants have achieved unitary status — only to be prepared to change horses in the middle of the stream is to invite confusion and to risk injustice.

In conclusion, this court determines that plaintiff United States can make and has made a proper motion to bring before the court the issue of the unitary status of the nine defendant school districts. The facts leading to the resolution of that issue can best be ascertained through the thorough investigation and complete airing of views which are the hallmarks of the adversarial process. Thus, this court accepts the government's proposal in so far as that proposal offers to shoulder the identified costs of the defendant school districts. This court also accepts the government's offer to coordinate the investigation in the interests of efficiency and economy. In addition, the court directs the government to cooperate with and share information with plaintiff-intervenors. In the same spirit of cooperation, the court encourages p...