US v. Storey
Decision Date | 04 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 96-40018-01-DES.,96-40018-01-DES. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Gregory STOREY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Charles M. Rogers, Wyrsch, Atwell, Mirakian, Lee & Hobbs, Kansas City, MO, Thomas J. Bath, Jr., Bryan Cave LLP, Overland Park, KS, for defendant.
Thomas G. Luedke, Office of United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, for the U.S.
This matter is before the court on the defendant's Motion for Continuance (Doc. 21) and Motion for Waiver of Speedy Trial (Doc. 30).
On March 14, 1996, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Gregory Storey. Count 1 charges that the defendant, with premeditation and malice aforethought, did unlawfully kill Charles Leger, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Count 2 charges that the defendant, while unlawfully and knowingly in possession of a dangerous weapon within the confines of a federal facility, did intentionally and unlawfully kill Charles Leger, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 930(c). The government has advised the court that it intends to seek the death penalty in this case. On April 4, 1996, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3005 governing counsel in capital cases, the Magistrate Judge appointed two counsel to represent the defendant: Charles Rogers and Tom Bath.
Mr. Storey's pretrial motions were due June 3, and a hearing on the motions is set for July 1. On May 2, 1996, the defendant filed a motion to continue the due date for his motions until September 13, 1996. On May 23, 1996, the defendant filed a motion to waive his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
18 U.S.C. § 1361(c)(1) provides as follows:
The trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
Mr. Storey represents that his counsel have advised him of his right pursuant to § 3161(c)(1). The defendant submits, however, that it would be in his best interest to waive his right to a speedy trial, and that a continuance of the due date for his pretrial motions is necessary in the best interests of justice.
S.Rep. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1979), reprinted in A. Partridge, Legislative History of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 182 (Federal Judicial Ctr.1980). The Act therefore imposes upon the court the obligation to reject a defendant's offer to waive his right to a speedy trial. Pringle, 751 F.2d at 434. See also United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 964, 113 S.Ct. 2940, 124 L.Ed.2d 689 (1993) ( ); Committee on the Admin. of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as Amended 63 (1984) ("It would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to permit a defendant, through a purported `waiver,' to relieve the court" of its duty to determine that the importance of extending a deadline "outweighs the interests of both the public and the...
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...a waiver is not necessary to exclude time under § 3161(h)(8)(A), see Zedner [547 U.S. at 500–01, 126 S.Ct. 1976]; United States v. Storey, 927 F.Supp. 414, 415–16 (D.Kan.1996), the purported waiver had no impact on the speedy trial calculations.”). Section 3161(h)(8)(A) provides that a cont......
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