US v. Ta, 96-CR-71 W.
Decision Date | 03 September 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 96-CR-71 W.,96-CR-71 W. |
Citation | 938 F. Supp. 762 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Wayne TA, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Jeffrey Breinholt, Matthew Howell, Asst. U.S. Attys., Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff.
Paul T. Moxley, Robert E. Mansfield, Moxley Jones & Campbell L.C., Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant.
The United States has made a motion to disqualify attorneys Gordon Campbell, Paul T. Moxley and their partners and associates from representing defendant Wayne Ta. Mr. Campbell has never represented Mr. Ta in an attorney/client relationship and has made it clear to the court that he will not represent Mr. Ta. Therefore, the issue is whether Paul T. Moxley and the law firm of Moxley, Jones and Campbell, L.C. should be disqualified from representing Ta who is charged in a four count indictment with offenses under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (tax perjury).
Mr. Gordon Campbell was an assistant United States Attorney for the District of Utah until April 15, 1996 when he left the office to go into private law practice with the firm of Moxley, Jones and Campbell. The indictment in this case was returned on April 10, 1996 and Campbell was not listed as Government counsel on the indictment. He did not participate in the actual screening of the case for prosecution. The Government contends, however, that Campbell has an apparent or actual conflict of interest that requires the disqualification of all defense counsel. In order to resolve this matter, the court held an evidentiary hearing and took testimony from material witnesses.
Campbell was an assistant United States Attorney in the District of Utah from 1979 to 1981 and again from 1987 to 1996. At the time relevant to this case, before Campbell's departure from the United States Attorney's office in Utah, he was in charge of prosecutions involving tax fraud, environmental crimes, bank fraud and like matters. Campbell was aware of the pending Ta prosecution.1 Campbell had opened a file in 1995 on the Ta case upon receiving the investigation but had not reviewed the file. Campbell assigned the case to Jeffery A. Breinholt, a designated assistant in the Utah United States Attorney's office and senior trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, Tax Division.
Later Breinholt had a conversation with Campbell about the Ta case, preliminary to it being submitted to the grand jury. Brienholt told Campbell about what the case involved and discussed whether money laundering charges of structuring ought to be joined with possible tax violations. Campbell advised against it and said the case was otherwise a strong one and evidence relating to structuring would be admissible on the tax charges in any event. The case of Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) was also discussed as to its application in principle to the prosecution of Ta. Campbell also had a brief passing conversation with Scott Matheson, the United States Attorney, about the case. Matheson was also informed by Breinholt of Campbell's assessment. Breinholt had one more brief conversation with Campbell about the case. Breinholt thereafter prepared and submitted the case to the grand jury. Campbell's assessment played a substantial role in Breinholt's decision not to submit money structuring counts in the request for the indictment. Campbell played no role in drafting the indictment or presenting the case to the grand jury. After the indictment, Campbell left the United States Attorney's office.
Thereafter, defendant Ta came to Campbell's private law office. Campbell had never spoken to Ta when Campbell was a Government attorney. Ta had a copy of the indictment. He was represented by an attorney but wanted other counsel.2 Campbell was sensitive to his representing Ta and said there could be problems and refused to undertake the case. Campbell then referred Ta to attorney Moxley and Campbell has had no further involvement with the case and will receive no part of the any fee that Ta would pay for Moxley's representation if Ta is represented by Moxley.
Defendant Ta has filed an affidavit indicating he is aware of all ramifications from any representation by Moxley and requests the continued representation of Moxley. Ta has waived any conflict of interest. At hearing on this matter, Ta testified under oath that his choice for his lawyer is Paul Moxley. Ta said that any conflicts have been discussed with Moxley and Ta still wants Moxley to represent him. He affirmatively waived any conflict, both in his testimony and by affidavit.
There is no evidence that Campbell has any confidential information about the case. He did not read the prosecution reports in the United States Attorney's file that provided the basis of the determination to prosecute. His conversation with Breinholt did not involve detailed facts and were general and about the legal issues involved in the decision to prosecute. Breinholt prepared the screening memorandum on the case. Campbell had no contact with the Internal Revenue Service case agent who conducted the investigation of Ta. The United States has adopted an open file policy with regard to the facts in the prosecution's possession. All information in the files is available to the defense. In addition the Moxley law firm has screened Campbell out of any involvement direct or incidental with the case.
in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) the court recognized that an accused's right to counsel of his choice was not absolute. The choice of counsel may be denied in appropriate circumstances where chosen counsel has an actual conflict of interest or where there is a serious potential for such a conflict. The court said where there is an actual conflict of interest, defendant's waiver of a conflict may be declined. The district court has substantial latitude in refusing a waiver in actual conflict situations, and "in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists ..." Id. at p. 163, 108 S.Ct. at 1699. The trial court has discretion. Id. at p. 164, 108 S.Ct. at p. 1699. However, the Supreme Court also observed:
The Court did say the "District Court must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner's counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious potential conflict." Id. at p. 164, 108 S.Ct. at 1699. The facts and circumstances in each case are to be determined by the district court.
Two circumstances in this case are at variance with the facts of Wheat. First, the direct conflict existing because of Campbell's prior representation has been resolved because of Campbell's proper conduct in refusing to represent Ta. Had Campbell entered into an attorney/client relationship with Ta, disqualification would be required. United States v. Brothers, 856 F.Supp. 370 (D.M.D.Tenn.1992) ( ). In this case, there is no longer any direct conflict of interest if Moxley represents Ta.
Ethical considerations must be evaluated. The Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility have been adopted by this court in D. Utah Rule 103-1(h), March 1, 1993 which provides:3
(h) Standards of Professional Conduct. All attorneys practicing before this court, whether admitted as members of the bar of this court, admitted pro hac vice, or otherwise as ordered by this court, shall be governed by and shall comply with the rules of practice adopted by this court, and unless otherwise provided by these rules, with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, as revised and amended and as interpreted by this court.
Rule 1.11 Utah Rules of Professional Conduct applies to situations involving successive Government and private employment. Subsections (a) and (b) provide:
In this case Campbell was substantially involved in the case4 and would be personally disqualified. Of course mere appearance of impropriety is not sufficient for disqualification, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2nd Cir.1980) (en banc), but in this case...
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