US v. York

Decision Date09 March 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-40309.,09-40309.
Citation600 F.3d 347
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy Lee YORK, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tracey M. Batson, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Plano, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Gerard Arrambide (argued), Fed. Pub. Def., Frisco, TX, Amy R. Blalock, Fed. Pub. Def., Tyler, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

The Government indicted Timothy Lee York (York) on three counts: arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) (count one); carrying a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(b) (count two); and possession of a firearm not registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (count three). He was convicted of these offenses following the jury's verdict of guilty on all three counts, and in February 2009 was sentenced to 497 months' imprisonment.

York appeals his conviction and sentence on multiple grounds. First, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. Second, that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for mistrial based on juror misconduct. Third, that inadmissible extrinsic offense evidence was admitted. Fourth, that the trial court erroneously excluded relevant evidence. And fifth, that the sentence imposed was neither procedurally nor substantively reasonable. For the reasons stated below, we affirm York's conviction and sentence.

BACKGROUND

As Jeremy Carroll and his father-in-law, Walter Vickers, drove home from church on the evening of February 21, 2006, they saw a fire at the Cooke County Courthouse in Gainesville, Texas. It was two to three feet high burning at a courthouse window. At the time, the courthouse was being renovated, so the window where the fire burned had been boarded up with plywood. They stopped their car, called 911, and approached the courthouse. When Carroll saw a broken bottle at the base of the fire, he kicked it away. He testified that after kicking away the bottle, the flames died down somewhat, but continued to burn around the bottle. Vickers testified that he saw liquid inside the bottle. When firefighters arrived, they attempted to put out the fire. The captain of the fire department testified that a Molotov cocktail caused the fire. A chemist for the state conducted a gas chromatography test which revealed gasoline residue in the glass bottle discovered at the courthouse. The firefighters discovered a checkbook at the scene. The Fire Marshall testified the checkbook was somewhat intact after it had been rolled up and used as a wick for the Molotov cocktail.

The checkbook had printed on or in it York's name and address in Irving, Texas. Investigators went to the address, but found that York's parents lived there. York's mother informed investigators that York's father had taken him to Gainesville for a forfeiture hearing. Investigators learned that York stayed at a Ramada Inn, two blocks away from the courthouse, while he was in Gainesville. Using information from his parents, and further investigation into his activities in Gainesville, investigators discovered that York had moved into a girlfriend's house after staying at the Ramada Inn. The girlfriend gave investigators consent to search her home. They found a duffel bag that belonged to York. It contained an order signed by Texas district judge Janelle Haverkamp for a scheduling conference in a forfeiture suit of York's property. Judge Haverkamp presided over this suit and had chambers in the Cooke County Courthouse. The bag also had in it a document with Judge Haverkamp's home phone number and an incorrect home address for her. Investigators also found in the bag high resolution maps of the home that York apparently believed to be Judge Haverkamp's, a photo of the judge, and notes of research into the security of the courthouse.

York's then-girlfriend, Brenda Finch, also told investigators that York had borrowed her car and driven to Oklahoma, where he was arrested on criminal charges. The Fire Marshall and another agent traveled to Oklahoma to interview York who was in custody there. During the interview, York admitted that he was very angry about a prior forfeiture proceeding against him. Incident to an arrest on July 16, 2005, forfeiture proceedings had been brought by the State of Texas against the York's vehicle and about $865 cash that they found in that vehicle. York admitted that, out of anger, he purchased gasoline, bought a bottle of Jack Daniels Liquor, and created the Molotov cocktail by pouring the gasoline in the bottle and using his checkbook as a wick. York also admitted to lighting the checkbook and throwing this Molotov cocktail against the boarded window at the courthouse. When the investigators questioned York about the information he had about Judge Haverkamp and the courthouse, York became visibly agitated and refused to answer questions.

At trial, York recanted his confession, stating that he only admitted to using the Molotov cocktail because he wanted to get out of Oklahoma state jail. The Government corroborated York's confession with testimony from York's co-workers and Finch who heard the defendant threaten to blow up the courthouse. In response to the Government's evidence, York called multiple witnesses, including his father and himself. After the Government's rebuttal evidence, instructions and arguments from both sides, the jury found York guilty on all three counts.

DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of Evidence

York argues that the evidence is legally insufficient on each count. On the arson count, York argues that there is no sufficient evidence that he acted "maliciously" or that a federal nexus for the offense existed. Because the second count is predicated on the arson count, York argues that this court should reverse on the second count too. Finally, he argues that the Government lacked legally sufficient evidence on the third count to prove that York possessed a firearm.

This court reviews de novo a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir.2003).

"We will affirm the jury's verdict if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the verdict. Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence does not include a review of the weight of the evidence or of the credibility of the witnesses."

Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.1997)).

A. Count One

The Government first charged York with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1):

"Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property in whole or in part owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or any institution or organization receiving Federal financial assistance, shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both."

18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1).

First, York objects that the evidence does not show that he acted "maliciously" in this respect. We have interpreted maliciously to include wanton and willful burnings without justification or excuse when interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565, 571 (5th Cir.1997); see also St. Tammany Parish ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 320 (5th Cir.2009) ("As a matter of statutory interpretation, in determining the meaning of a particular statutory provision, it is helpful to consider the interpretation of other statutory provisions that employ the same or similar language.") (quoting Flowers v. S. Regional Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001)). The defendant acts maliciously if he acts in willful disregard of the likelihood of damaging a building. United States v. Monroe, 178 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir.1999). Intent is sufficient, but not necessary. Id.

There is sufficient evidence of York's intent. For example, the Fire Marshall who investigated this fire testified that the evidence clearly suggested that the fire was intentionally set. In United States v. Patel, the First Circuit found sufficient evidence of intent when two fire investigators testified that the fire was intentionally set. 370 F.3d 108, 111-12 (1st Cir.2004). Some courts have looked at motive as evidence of malice. E.g., United States v. Gardner, 211 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hans, 332 Fed. Appx. 116, 124 (4th Cir.2009) (unpublished). In this case, the evidence shows that York was very angry at the judge in his prior forfeiture case. York made statements that he intended to kill the judge. He also told several people he wanted to blow up the courthouse. Finally, evidence of preparation for the offense may be evidence of intent. See United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 766-67 (8th Cir.2009). The Government produced evidence that York knew how to make Molotov cocktails and had demonstrated making a Molotov cocktail to others, the evidence showed that research related to the security of the courthouse was in York's duffel bag. There was evidence that York had a photograph and the personal address and phone number of the judge in his prior state court forfeiture case. The Fire Marshall testified that York told him that, before he acted, he had made the decision to burn down the Courthouse by throwing a Molotov cocktail.

York also argues that there is not legally sufficient evidence of a federal nexus for the arson count. The statute requires that the damaged building,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
40 cases
  • United States v. Montgomery
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • March 1, 2023
    ...United States v. Elliott, 684 Fed.Appx. 685 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Davis, 98 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. York, 600 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2010)).)[5] Finally, the Government contests the first part of Defendant's argument that the PBP is not an “institution,” contendi......
  • Kors v. Hernandez Int'l Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • October 27, 2016
    ...in 2000 to prevent litigants "from offering expert testimony as lay opinion and circumventing discovery rules." United States v. York, 600 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing FED. R. EVID. 701 Advisory Committee's note to 2000 amendment). Under Rule 701, "a lay opinion must be based on pe......
  • United States v. Lee
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 14, 2020
    ...deliberation. Premature deliberations threaten a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. United States v. York , 600 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2010). We nevertheless presume a jury was impartial unless the defendant proves otherwise. Id. at 358. And because the distri......
  • United States v. Pendleton
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • February 21, 2019
    ...and for a new trial, including those based on juror bias or misconduct, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. York, 600 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1999)); United States v. Villalobos, 601 F. App'x 274, 277 (......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT