USA v. Brown et al.

• Decision Date: 27 April 2001
• Docket Number: Nos. 99-5687,99-5613,s. 99-5687
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2002) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl Brown (99-5613); Carl Scruggs (99-5687), Defendants-Appellants. Argued and Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 211

276 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 2002)

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl Brown (99-5613); Carl Scruggs (99-5687), Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 99-5687, 99-5613

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted: April 27, 2001

Decided and Filed: January 7, 2002

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis., No. 98-20015--Jon Phipps McCalla, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Thomas L. Parker (argued and briefed), ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Kevin M. Schad (argued and briefed), SCHAD & COOK, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Before: NELSON and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; FEIKENS, District Judge.^*

OPINION

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

In their separate appeals, Defendants Carl Brown and Carl Scruggs raise identical challenges to their convictions on a single count of aiding and abetting in the attempt to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, and we will therefore dispose of the two appeals in one opinion. Both defendants claim that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear the case and further erred by refusing to allow into evidence testimony from a similar state proceeding, failing to hold a hearing to investigate claims of prosecutorial misconduct, permitting the government to present the testimony of a witness who agreed to testify in exchange for a sentence reduction, permitting the scope of re-direct examination to exceed matters raised on cross-examination and providing a jury instruction that required a finding of guilt. Defendant Scruggs also appeals his sentence, claiming that the court erred by applying sentencing enhancements. We will affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

A federal grand jury indicted Carl Scruggs and Carl Brown on one count of aiding and abetting in the attempt to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 (2001), and 18 U.S.C. 2 (2001). Shortly thereafter, the grand jury returned a superceding indictment adding Yolanda Franklin ("Franklin") as a third co-defendant. Franklin agreed to plead guilty; Scruggs and Brown each pled not guilty. The government filed a motion in limine to prevent Scruggs and Brown from attempting to raise before the jury any mention of the charges pending against them in state court arising out of the same set of facts. The court granted this motion. Brown filed a motion in limine to exclude Franklin's testimony on the ground that she had received something of value, namely a sentence reduction, in exchange for it. The court denied this motion. Brown and Scruggs went to trial and were found guilty by the jury. Scruggs moved for a new trial; this motion was denied. Prior to sentencing, Scruggs discharged his counsel and proceeded pro se. The court sentenced him to 329 months in prison, to be followed by eight years of supervised release. Brown was sentenced to 360 months in prison, to be followed by eight years of supervised release. Both defendants filed timely appeals.

Brown and Scruggs were apprehended while attempting to remove 3.7 kilograms of cocaine from a home in Memphis, Tennessee. Yolanda Franklin had informed Brown that Franklin's sister, Karon White (who had allegedly been romantically involved with Brown) had cocaine hidden in her home. The cocaine had been stashed there by Renard Rice, a convicted drug-dealer and acquaintance of Karon White. Brown and Scruggs agreed to attempt to rob White's home and split the proceeds from the sale of any cocaine they might find. While visiting White's residence--at a time when White apparently was not at home--Franklin loaned her car to White's 16-year-old daughter, Nastassia Crump. Crump took her younger sisters and her aunt (Tritobia White) to the store, leaving Franklin alone in the house to search for the cocaine. She found it in a plastic garbage bag hidden in an attic access panel in the hallway. She did not disturb the cocaine, but reported her findings to Brown.

That afternoon, Brown and Scruggs, wearing ski masks and gloves and carrying guns, entered the White residence. They found four children, one of whom had been able to dial 911 prior to being discovered, and Tritobia White; they restrained all five with duct tape. When the police arrived, they apprehended Brown as he was leaving through the back door of the home. After freeing the children and learning from them that the robbery had been committed by two men carrying guns, the officers found Scruggs hiding in the basement behind a washer/dryer. The officers asked Scruggs where the weapons were, and he indicated a box from which the officers recovered two handguns. Brown admitted to a Drug Enforcement Agency agent that he and Scruggs had heard about the cocaine from Franklin, and had gone to the White residence to steal the drugs.

II. Jurisdiction

Both Scruggs and Brown argue that the federal government lacks jurisdiction to prosecute them. We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Nash, 175 F.3d 440, 442 (6th Cir. 1999).

The defendants claim that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), prohibits Congress from extending the reach of its authority to drug crimes that occur solely intrastate. This view has been soundly rejected by this circuit as well as every other circuit to address the issue. United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1139 (6th Cir. 1996). See United States v. Brown, No. 97-1618, 2000 WL 876382, at *13 (6th Cir. June 20, 2000) ("Indeed, every circuit to consider post-Lopez challenges to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act has upheld the Act as a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause."); see also, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 907 (1998); United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996, 1009 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1369 (D.C.Cir.1996); United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir.1996); United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1338 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d 582, 584-85 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1475 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, 1166 (5th Cir.1995), vacated on other grounds, 519 U .S. 802 (1996); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir.1995).

The defendants also claim that federal jurisdiction is lacking because the government failed to prove that Brown and Scruggs intended to possess the cocaine, and that the chief government witness (Franklin) lacked credibility. These are not challenges to jurisdiction, but rather challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, and the credibility of Franklin and the government's ability to prove defendants' intent does not call into doubt federal jurisdiction.

Treating these arguments as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that they still fail. The record is replete with evidence that Brown and Scruggs intended to steal cocaine from Karon White's house and distribute it. This evidence includes Franklin's testimony that she entered into an agreement with Brown to steal the cocaine, and that Brown and Scruggs went to the home at her direction with the intention of finding the cocaine, selling it and splitting the proceeds with her. The jury weighed this evidence and determined that the defendants had intended to possess the cocaine. The defendants were free to attack the credibility of the government's witnesses, and in fact did so. Unfortunately for Brown and Scruggs, the jury believed Franklin.

The defendants' claim that the federal government lacks jurisdiction to prosecute this case is wholly without merit. Further, even addressing these claims as arguments against the sufficiency of the evidence, we hold that they are entirely without merit.

III. Exclusion of evidence from State proceedings

The defendants claim that the district court erred by granting the government's motion in limine, which prevented them from using the testimony of the government's witnesses from the state court aggravated robbery proceedings to impeach the testimony of those same witnesses in the trial in federal court. They claim as well that the trial court prevented them from introducing a tape of the state court preliminary hearing which, they argue, would have demonstrated that the testimony of government witnesses at their trial was inconsistent with statements made by witnesses during the state proceedings. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, and we must sustain those rulings unless they are manifestly erroneous. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 1993).

The district court found that the state charges were irrelevant to the federal prosecution. The defendants point to no specific testimony from the state court proceedings that would support their claim that the prior statements of these witnesses were inconsistent with their testimony in this trial. Neither have the defendants demonstrated how the prior testimony would have been relevant. Finally, the record reflects that the government timely provided the tape from the state court preliminary hearing to the defendants, but the defendants neither sought to introduce it at trial nor to obtain any ruling from the court on its admissibility or use for impeachment purposes. We do not find that the district judge's granting of the motion in limine was manifestly erroneous.

IV. The court's supplemental jury instructions

The defendants next claim that the court erred in responding to a legal question posed by the jury. The trial court is entitled to exercise its sound discretion in deciding how best to respond to inquiries made by the jury during its deliberations. United States v. Nunez, 889...