USA. v. Cotton
Decision Date | 04 April 2001 |
Docket Number | N,No. 99-4164,No. 99-4162,No. 99-4189,No. 99-4191,99-4162,99-4164,99-4189,99-4191 |
Parties | (4th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARD COTTON, a/k/a Cooch, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARLENE GREEN, a/k/a Sprinkles, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARQUETTE HALL, a/k/a Butt Naked, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAMONT THOMAS, a/k/a Tree, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATILDA HALL,Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOVAN POWELL, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESUS HALL, a/k/a Weedy, a/k/a Jesse Hall, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY HALL, JR., a/k/a Boonie, Defendant-Appellant. o. 99-4163,o. 99-4175,o. 99-4190,o. 99-4197 Argued: |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL ARGUED: Thomas J. Saunders, Baltimore, Maryland; Arthur Samuel Cheslock, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Christine Manuelian, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John D. Ash, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Jesus Hall; Timothy J. Sullivan, SULLIVAN & SULLIVAN, College Park, Maryland, for Appellant Thomas; Walter McCord, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Green; David R. Solomon, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Matilda Hall; William H. Klumpp, Fallston, Maryland, for Appellant Powell; Stanley H. Needleman, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Stanley Hall. Stephen M. Schenning, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and LUTTIG and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge Luttig wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory joined. Chief Judge Wilkinson wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Stanley Hall, Jr. and seven other members of a drug organization (collectively "appellants") were convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.SS 841(a)(1) and 846. Appellants raise a number of challenges to their convictions and sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions, and vacate and remand for resentencing.
Stanley Hall, Jr. ("Hall, Jr."), the leader of a vast drug organization, was the principal supplier of drugs in the 200 block of North Duncan Street in Baltimore, Maryland. According to testimony adduced at trial, Hall, Jr., with the assistance of a number of the other appellants, obtained a supply of cocaine in kilogram quantities from a dealer in New York City, and then "cooked" the cocaine into crack and "bagged" it for distribution. Hall, Jr. would then distribute the drugs to his dealers, including the other appellants, who would, in turn, sell cocaine and crack to their customers.
In October 1997, federal authorities obtained search warrants for the residences utilized by the appellants for their drug trade. Following the seizure of drugs, drug paraphernalia, currency, and weapons, appellants were arrested and charged with a single count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base. J.A. 86.
Appellants were convicted by a jury of the sole count of the indictment.1 The district court sentenced Hall, Jr., Leonard Cotton, Lamont Thomas, and Marquette and Jesus Hall to life imprisonment upon finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that over 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base was attributable to each from their participation in the conspiracy. J.A. 822-23 (Hall, Jr.); J.A. 573-74 (Thomas); J.A. 507 (Cotton); J.A. 723 (Jesus Hall); J.A. 505 (Marquette Hall). Based on the same finding regarding drug quantity, the district court sentenced Jovan Powell to 30 years imprisonment. J.A. 769-70. Matilda Hall also received 30 years imprisonment based on the district court's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was responsible for more than 500 grams, but less than 1.5 kilograms, of cocaine base from her participation in the conspiracy. J.A. 667-68. Finally, Darlene Green was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment based upon the district court's attribution of more limited quantities of cocaine base to her. J.A. 541.
Following sentencing, appellants filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, and this appeal was stayed pending the district court's resolution of that motion. The district court subsequently denied the motion.
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it sentenced them based upon its findings regarding the quantity of a drug -cocaine base -carrying a potentially higher statutory penalty, because the jury's verdict was ambiguous with regard to which drug was the object of the conspiracy. Thus, they contend that pursuant to our decision in United States v. Rhynes , 196 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated in part on other grounds, 218 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), the lack of a special jury verdict form requiring the jury to determine specifically whether the conspiracy involved cocaine hydrochloride, cocaine base, or both, constrained the district court to sentence appellants based on the drug carrying the lower statutory penalty.
In Rhynes, the jury was instructed that it could find defendants guilty if they distributed or possessed with intent to distribute any of the drugs charged as part of the conspiracy, which included marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or cocaine base. 196 F.3d at 237. Because the jury returned a general verdict of guilty, we held that the district court's instruction created ambiguity as to whether the jury found a conspiracy to distribute all the drugs, a single drug, or some combination thereof. See id. at 238. As a result of such ambiguity, we held that the district court could not impose a "sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for the least-punished object on which the conspiracy conviction could have been based." Id.
In the present case, there is no Rhynes error because the jury was unambiguously instructed that a conspiracy conviction could be based only upon a finding -as charged by the government in the indictment -that appellants conspired to distribute or possessed with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base.2 S.A. 8 () (emphasis added); S.A. 13 () (emphasis added). Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient in this case -if not overwhelming -to support a"construction" of the verdict that the jury found a conspiracy with regard to cocaine base and cocaine hydrocholoride where, inter alia, approximately 380 grams of cocaine base and 85 grams of cocaine hydrochloride were actually seized from the various conspirators and "stash houses." See United States v. Green, 180 F.3d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 1999) ( ); United States v. Watts, 950 F.2d 508, 515 (8th Cir. 1991) ( ).
Accordingly, we are "more than confident, that the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that both cocaine[hydrochloride] and [cocaine base] were involved" and that appellants were convicted of a single multi-drug conspiracy. Green , 180 F.3d at 226. Because we can discern no ambiguity in this jury verdict, we conclude that the district court did not err in sentencing appellants based upon the relevant penalty provisions for cocaine base.
Appellants (except Darlene Green, who was sentenced to a term of less than 20 years imprisonment)3 also contend that their sentences are invalid under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because a specific threshold drug quantity was neither alleged in the indictment nor proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Because appellants failed to raise this argument before the district court, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).
In United States v. Promise, No. 99-4737, 255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. June 29, 2001), this court, sitting en banc, held that because drug quantity "must be treated as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense" under 21 U.S.C. S 841, Promise, 255 F.3d at 156, the failure to charge a specific threshold drug quantity in the indictment and to submit the quantity issue to the jury constitutes plain error, see id. at *7. We further concluded that such error affects defendants' substantial rights where, as here, the defendants are sentenced to...
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