USA v. Jones Jr.

Decision Date31 March 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-2359,99-2359
Citation208 F.3d 603
Parties(7th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JONES, JR., Defendant-Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division. No. 98-30027--Richard Mills, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Bauer, Diane P. Wood and Evans, Circuit Judges.

Bauer, Circuit Judge.

Anthony Jones, Jr. ("Jones") was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Central District of Illinois for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec.922(g). After the District Court denied his request for a Franks hearing and his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, Jones entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denials of those motions. He was sentenced to a term of 60 months imprisonment, to be followed by a three year term of supervised release, and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. Jones appeals, claiming that the search warrant was facially invalid, not supported by probable cause and that its execution was unreasonable because the police did not knock and announce their presence before bursting into his home. We affirm the District Court rulings finding the warrant and its execution valid.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 25, 1998, police officers obtained and executed a search warrant for Jones' home at 2268 South 9th Street, in Springfield, Illinois. Based upon information from a confidential informant, they suspected that Jones was dealing marijuana and was illegally in possession of a handgun. During their search they seized several bags of what they suspected to be marijuana, along with a 9mm semi-automatic handgun, a shotgun and several thousand dollars in cash.

"Jane Doe", the confidential source, told Springfield Police Department Officer Steven Welsh and averred in an affidavit in support of the complaint for search warrant, that she had gone to Jones' house at "2269 S. 9th Street"1 on the afternoon of January 24th, 1998 to purchase marijuana. It was not her first buy from Jones. She stated that she had purchased approximately twelve pounds of marijuana from him on at least three previous occasions. On this afternoon, she paid Jones $1,100.00 for a pound of marijuana that Jones had "fronted" her and received another pound of marijuana which she agreed to pay for in a few days. As she was leaving, Doe saw an additional pound of marijuana on the kitchen table. Doe also stated that Jones told her that he kept a pistol at the house to protect his drug supply and that he had been in jail in the past, but he did not say for what crime.

To corroborate this information, Officer Welsh, accompanied by Jane Doe, drove by the residence at 2268 S. 9th Street at 11:30 pm on January 24, 1998. Doe identified it as Jones' house, and Officer Welsh observed two vehicles parked in the driveway. Officer Welsh later confirmed that one of the vehicles was registered to Anthony Jones at 2268 S. 9th Street.

Officer Welsh also verified Doe's story by checking Jones' criminal history, which showed that Jones had been arrested 27 times, with 8 convictions. Two of the convictions were for homicides, one was for armed robbery and five were for dangerous drugs.

Officer Welsh presented these facts in an affidavit and complaint for search warrant to the judge. Jane Doe also executed an affidavit, which was attached to and incorporated into Officer Welsh's warrant affidavit. She appeared with Officer Welsh before the issuing judge and swore to the truth of the information in her affidavit. Based on all of this, the judge issued a warrant to search the property at:

2268 S. 9th St., Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois. The residence on the property is a two story single family dwelling, that is light green in color. The residence is the second structure north of Princeton street, on the east side of 9th street. The front door faces north. The numbers 2268 are affixed to the front of the residence. There is a chainlink [sic] fence that surrounds the back yard.

The warrant was executed during the early morning hours of January 25, 1998. The marijuana, cash and weapons were seized. Jones was then charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.

After his indictment, Jones requested a Franks hearing. He initially challenged only the adequacy of the search warrant, claiming that it was fatally defective because it was based on false information provided by Jane Doe. After that motion failed, Jones filed a second motion attacking not only the adequacy of the search warrant but also the manner of its execution. His second motion asserted, among other things, that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and that the officers executing the warrant neither knocked nor announced prior to entering and seizing the evidence. Both motions were referred to the Magistrate Judge and the Magistrate recommended that the motions be denied. The District Court undertook a de novo consideration of the motions and adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the District Court's denial of Jones' request for a Franks hearing for clear error. United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 688 (7th Cir. 1999). A clear error standard is also used to review the District Court's ruling on the motion to suppress, but we must keep in mind that "our inquiry is factually based and requires that we give particular deference to the district court that had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses." United States v. Williams, 945 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1991), quoting United States v. Edwards, 898 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir. 1990). Any legal determinations that factor into the court's ruling, however, are subject to de novo review. United States v. Adames, 56 F.3d 737, 747 (7th Cir. 1995).

A. Jones' Request For A Franks Hearing

Jones contends that the District Court erred by denying his request for a Franks hearing and finding that he did not produce sufficient evidence to make the "substantial preliminary showing" required for a hearing. He asks this Court to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing on his Franks allegations. We believe that Jones has utterly failed to establish by a "substantial preliminary showing" that the search warrant affidavit contained material misrepresentations that were necessary to the finding of probable cause. We thus affirm the District Court's denial of the request for a Franks hearing.

In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing into the truthfulness of an allegation contained in an affidavit supporting an application for a search warrant "where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause." 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (emphasis added). Franks makes it clear that affidavits supporting a search warrant are presumed valid, and that the "substantial preliminary showing" that must be made to entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing must focus on the state of mind of the warrant affiant, that is the police officer who sought the search warrant. 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684. The defendant must offer evidence showing either that the warrant affiant lied or that the warrant affiant recklessly disregarded the truth because he "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his allegations" or had "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the allegations." United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984), quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Jones' request for a Franks hearing rests on his assertion that Jane Doe provided false information in her affidavit. He claims that he could not have sold marijuana to Doe in Springfield on January 24, 1998, as she alleges, because he was at his sister's apartment in Chicago with his father and his father's girlfriend at the time. He presents affidavits from his wife, sister, father and his father's girlfriend in support of his alibi and argument. His argument is, however, misdirected. "[T]he fact that a third party lied to the affiant, who in turn included the lies in a warrant affidavit, does not constitute a Franks violation. A Franks violation occurs only if the affiant knew the third party was lying, or if the affiant proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth." United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1984). Since Jones' first motion challenged only the veracity of statements made by Doe, not statements made by warrant affiant Officer Steven Welsh, Jones' first motion for a Franks hearing was properly denied.

In his second motion, Jones questioned whether Officer Welsh was reckless in incorporating Jane Doe's allegations into his affidavit without first doing more to corroborate them. He opines, for instance, that Officer Welsh could have set up a controlled buy or conducted surveillance of his home to verify the veracity of Jane Doe's statements.

The fact that Jones can point out additional things which could have been done but were not does not in any way detract from what was done. The District Court meticulously recounted all of the actions that were taken by Officer Welsh before he sought the search warrant. These included driving Jane Doe to the area and having her identify which house was the defendant's, conducting a vehicle registration check on the cars that...

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