USA. v. Lakatos
| Citation | 241 F.3d 690 |
| Decision Date | 08 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-50079,00-50079 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN LAKATOS, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Richard Novak, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant.
Michael J. Raphael, United States Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David W. Williams, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.CR-99-00782-DWW-01
Before: Stephen S. Trott, Sidney R. Thomas, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Trott; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Thomas
Appellant John Lakatos challenges the United States District Court of the Central District of California's requirement that he pay his past-due child support obligations in full as a condition of his supervised release. Lakatos advances two arguments supporting his position: (1) a condition of supervised release directing a defendant to pay off a child support debt constitutes a per se violation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("the USSG"); and (2) even if a district court can require a defendant to liquidate a child support debt as a condition of supervised release, it may not contravene the express terms of a preexisting state court judgment or order in so doing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
Lakatos was married to Deborah Peters ("Peters") from 1972 until 1979, at which time their marriage ended in divorce. During this marriage, Lakatos and Peters had two children. As a result of the divorce, Lakatos was ordered by an Idaho state court to pay child support of $150 per month, in addition to the children's medical insurance. Lakatos did not satisfy this obligation and successfully evaded Peters' attempts to collect child support for over a decade. With the help of a private investigator, Peters was able to locate Lakatos and, on January 20, 1995, obtain a judgment from an Idaho state court for $85,873.10 against him for past due child support. The case was subsequently transferred for reciprocal enforcement from Idaho to California due to Lakatos' residency in that state.
On September 18, 1995, Lakatos pleaded guilty in the District of Idaho to conspiring to provide kickbacks to an employee of a United States Prime Contractor in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371 and 41 U.S.C. SS 53, 54. Lakatos was sentenced in the District of Idaho to ten-months' imprisonment and three-years' supervised release. One condition of Lakatos' supervised release was that he "support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities." In August, 1999, the United States District Court for the Central District of California approved a transfer of jurisdiction over defendant's supervised release from the District of Idaho.
In December, 1999, acting at the behest of the supervising United States Probation officer, Judge Audrey B. Collins issued a bench warrant in the Central District of California for Lakatos for violating the conditions of his supervised release imposed in the Idaho case. The warrant alleged two violations: (1) Lakatos had committed a misdemeanor by driving a vehicle while his license was suspended; and (2) Lakatos had submitted numerous false Monthly Supervision Reports in which he made representations that he was unemployed when in fact he was employed, and that he was living with and being supported by his mother when in fact he lived in a home he later valued at approximately $650,000. Furthermore, Lakatos had failed to make payments on the child support debt owing to Peters, which by December, 1999, had grown to over $100,000.
In a preliminary revocation hearing before Judge Collins, Lakatos pleaded guilty to the above violations. The case was then transferred in the same district to Senior Judge David W. Williams for a sentencing hearing on January 31, 2000. At this hearing, the court revoked Lakatos' term of supervised release, and, pursuant to the wishes of the parties, imposed a term of imprisonment of one day and an additional thirty-five months of supervised release. Over the objection of Lakatos, however, the district court imposed an additional condition of supervised release requiring Lakatos to pay his outstanding child support debt in full at least six months prior to the expiration of his supervised release. Judge Williams imposed the above condition despite a court order issued just eighteen days earlier from the Superior Court of California requiring Lakatos to pay his outstanding child support payments in $500 monthly increments, with two lump sum payments of $5000. This appeal followed.
A district court's decision to impose a condition of supervised release is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1998). Whether a court is empowered to order payment of a child support obligation as a condition of supervised release, however, is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999).
A district court is authorized by 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d) to impose conditions of supervised release. This statute enumerates certain mandatory conditions of supervised release for federal offenders and permits a district court to impose any discretionary conditions of supervised release that "it considers to be appropriate," including those conditions listed in 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b)(1)-(10) and (b)(12)-(20). 18 U.S.C. S 3583(d) (2000). A discretionary condition, however, can only be imposed to the extent that it:
(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and
(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a). . . .
The above-referenced factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3553 include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a) (2000); see also United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1999). These factors parallel those advanced by the USSG. USSG Manual S 5D1.3(b) (1997).
Lakatos argues that this statutory framework prohibited the district court from requiring that he pay child support as a condition of his supervised release. Lakatos' argument fails for two reasons. First, a condition necessitating compliance with a court order that requires payment for the support and maintenance of a child is reasonably related to the factorsenunciated in S 3553(a). For instance, requiring Lakatos to liquidate his child support obligations is clearly related to Lakatos' history and characteristics, promotes Lakatos' respect for his legal obligation to pay Peters, deters criminal conduct by precluding Lakatos from continuing to be delinquent on his payments, and protects Peters' and Lakatos' children from further crimes by Lakatos. This conclusion is bolstered by 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b) and USSGS 5D1.3(c)(4), which expressly authorize a district court to require a defendant, as a condition of supervised release, to (1)"support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities," 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b)(1) (emphasis added), and (2) " comply with the terms of any court order or order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State, the District of Columbia, or any other possession or territory of the United States, requiring payments by the defendant for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living." 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b)(20) (emphasis added). The USSG describes these conditions as "standard conditions [that] are recommended for supervised release. " USSG S 5D1.3(c)(4). Thus, Lakatos' argument is fatally undermined by the clear and unambiguous statutory language of 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b) and USSG S 5D1.3(c)(4).
Second, the fact that Lakatos' attorney previously conceded that the district court could order compliance with the child support order militates against our acceptance of a contrary argument now. At the January 31, 2000, sentencing hearing before Judge Williams, Lakatos' attorney stated:
Mr. Lakatos is willing to agree that this court has the jurisdiction -and there's no doubt about that -to order Mr. Lakatos to comply with [the California Superior Court's order that Lakatos pay child sup port to Peters]. And if he doesn't comply with the court order, then the Probation Officer can allege that in a petition, and in fact the probation [sic] Offi cer could have alleged it in the instant petition. Cer tainly there's no dispute about that.
This statement is a correct representation of the law and accurately reflects the position of this court. We therefore reject Lakatos' argument that a district court cannot require a defendant to comply with a preexisting child support order as a condition of supervised release.
The crux of Lakatos' argument at his January 31 sentencing hearing, and his most persuasive argument on appeal,is that the district court...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Anderson
...to pay his child support obligations at a rate different from that previously established by a state court. United States v. Lakatos, 241 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir.2001). On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a reporting requirement for removal of an alien was not forbidde......
-
United States v. Rudd, 10–50254.
...review a district court's decision to impose a particular condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lakatos, 241 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.2001). The burden of establishing the necessity of any condition falls on the government. United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d ......
-
U.S. v. Barajas
...criminal conduct, to protect the public from future crimes, and to provide Defendant with needed medical care. See United States v. Lakatos, 241 F.3d 690, 693 (9th Cir.2001) (requiring child-support payments is related to several statutory factors). "District courts have broad discretion to......
-
U.S. v. Hugs
...district court's decision to impose a condition of supervised release is ... reviewed for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Lakatos, 241 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.2001). "A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law...."......