USA. v. Lawrence
| Decision Date | 07 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-10107,97-10107 |
| Citation | 189 F.3d 838 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 1999) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BILL LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Gary K. Dubcoff and Marcus S. Topel, Topel & Goodman, San Francisco, California, for the defendant-appellant.
Crandon Randell, Assistant United States Attorney, Anchorage, Alaska, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Charles A. Legge, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CR-94-00542-1-CAL.
Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Thomas G. Nelson, and Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge T.G. Nelson; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld
Defendant Bill Lawrence appeals both his convictions and his sentence for violations of 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 and 152(1), (3). We have jurisdiction over this timely filed appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. We reverse Lawrence's mail fraud conviction from the first trial, affirm his convictions following the second trial, and remand for resentencing.
Bill Lawrence was an Anchorage attorney and businessman, involved with numerous ventures in Alaska and throughout the northwestern United States. He declared bankruptcy in January 1991. On December 14, 1994, a nine-count felony indictment was returned against him, charging Lawrence with one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341, and eight counts of bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 152(1) and (3). A three-count superceding information was later filed, consolidating the seven false-statement claims under S 152(3) into a single count. Accordingly, the superceding information charged Lawrence with three counts: (1) mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341 ("count one"); (2) false-statements bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 152(3) ("count two"); and (3) concealment-ofassets bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 152(1) ("count three").
Lawrence was married to Jody Watkins, a Delta Airlines flight attendant. Their union was one of convenience--she gained tax benefits, and he got to fly for free on her airline as well as receive estate planning benefits. The couple lived apart, rarely saw one another, and dated other people.
Throughout the trial, the Government elicited testimony, over Lawrence's objections, which emphasized the unconventional nature of his relationship with Watkins. Lawrence's failure to disclose his married status to other women with whom he was romantically involved was addressed in the Government's closing argument. The Government referred to this as "the big lie," asking the jury whether they could Lawrence also objected to the Government's admission of testimony concerning Lawrence's planned lifestyle following bankruptcy, as well as his access to large amounts of money within three months of bankruptcy. These objections were overruled.
On May 24, 1995, the jury returned general guilty verdicts on counts one and two; it was unable to reach a verdict on count three. Lawrence then moved for a new trial. Pursuant to Supreme Court authority handed down in June 1995, United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), Lawrence argued that the materiality issue with respect to count two should have been decided by the jury. The district court agreed and granted a new trial on count two.
Prior to the second jury trial on counts two and three, Lawrence made a motion in limine seeking to prevent the Government from introducing evidence of his personal lifestyle. The district court held that while evidence of Lawrence's marriage was relevant as it related to property matters--"assets, liabilities, transfers of assets, things like that"--evidence concerning witnesses' knowledge of Lawrence's marital status and the circumstances surrounding it "sounds like [the Government was] throwing a little dirt in" and is not "a fair shot." With respect to the evidence regarding Lawrence's post bankruptcy financial status, the court held that the "availability of cash subsequent to the bankruptcy is relevant . . . what he was doing with money and property following the bankruptcy is relevant."
The second jury convicted Lawrence on counts two and three. As to count two, the jury found him guilty of making a false declaration by failing to set forth the existence of a bank account in the name of a former business, L'Image, Ltd., in his bankruptcy petition. The jury found him not guilty for allegedly making a false declaration that he owed a former partner $85,000 on a promissory note. The jury could not decide as to the remaining five alleged false declarations. As to count three, the jury found Lawrence guilty of concealing his ownership of Alaska Investment Group, but not guilty as to concealing an antique desk or his interest in Korlyn Broadcasting, Inc. The jury could not decide on the remaining three alleged concealments, which included shares in Photo Express Image Centers, Inc., a partnership interest in 60 Minute Photo Express and Investors Realty Trust, an account allegedly created as a trust for his children. Lawrence moved for judgment of acquittal challenging the sufficiency of the jury's verdict as to the concealment of Alaska Investment Group and Investors Realty Trust. The district court denied Lawrence's motion.
At the sentencing hearing, following briefing by the parties regarding relevant conduct and how it should be determined, the court valuated the loss at $574,700, without the assistance of an evidentiary hearing because it concluded that the evi-dence adduced at the trial was sufficient. Lawrence's motion for reconsideration was denied. Accordingly, the court sentenced him to fifty-one months in prison followed by a oneyear supervised release. In addition, Lawrence was ordered to pay restitution of $574,700 as well as a $150 special assessment. Lawrence then brought this timely appeal.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See EEOC v Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1997). Evidence is inadmissible if it is not relevant, Fed. R. Evid. 401, or "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The testimony elicited by the Government regarding Lawrence's marriage and the circumstances of that relationship was not probative of Lawrence's guilt or innocence of the crimes with which he was charged. Any relevance this testimony may have had is easily outweighed by the unfair prejudicial effect it had on the jury's ability to focus on the issues relevant to the charges. See United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1992) (). Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in allowing this testimony to be heard by the jury.
This is not the end of our inquiry; we must also consider whether the error in admitting the evidence of the marriage was harmless. See United States v. Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1996). We hold that the error was not harmless. Lawrence's only defense to the mail fraud charge was that he did not act with a fraudulent intent. The only evidence supporting this defense was Lawrence's testimony explaining that he made the purchases in good faith and at the time had every intention of fulfilling his obligations to his creditors. The improperly admitted testimony delivered a fatal blow to Lawrence's credibility, infecting the jury's ability to make an unbiased assessment of it. Accordingly, we reverse Lawrence's mail fraud conviction and remand for a new trial or other appropriate disposition.
Whether a district court's jury instructions adequately covered a defendant's proffered defense is reviewed de novo, See United States v. Amlani, 111 F.3d 705, 716 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997), as is the question of whether an instruction misstated an element of a statutory crime, See United States v. Loaiza-Diaz, 96 F.3d 1335, 1336 (9th Cir. 1996).
Lawrence argues that the jury instructions given by the district court failed to adequately address his theory of defense--namely that his actions were not accompanied by a fraudulent intent. The instructions included the statements that "[i]f you find that Mr. Lawrence acted in good faith, that is a complete defense to the charges in the superseding information because good faith on Mr. Lawrence's part would be inconsistent with an intent to defraud," and"[y]ou should consider all the evidence in the case bearing on Mr. Lawrence's acts and his state of mind." These instructions more than adequately covered Lawrence's defense theory. It is not error to "reject a theory-of-the-case instruction if the other instructions in their entirety cover the defense theory." United States v. Lopez, 885 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989). The district court's failure to give Lawrence's theory-of-defense instruction did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Lawrence's requested jury instruction concerning the validity of his marriage to Jody Watkins under Alaska law. As noted above, Lawrence's marriage to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co.
...which result from acts or conduct related to the scheme, but for which the `defendant was not convicted; cf. United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Hensley, 91 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir.1996); or 3) may be ordered for losses of a common scheme, even thoug......
-
US v. Andrews
...purposes of restitution, United States v. Baker, 25 F.3d 1452, 1455(9th Cir.1994) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir.1999), and of proving the amount of the loss, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)." Id. (citation omitted). "The government must provide the ......
-
United States v. Thomsen
...defendant has not been convicted of an offense having a conspiracy, scheme or pattern of conduct as an element. United States v. Lawrence , 189 F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir.1999). In addition, even under section 3663(a)(2)'s current expanded definition, a victim must be “directly harmed by the de......
-
Dang v. Cross
...in their entirety cover the [case] theory," Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir.1999)). Here, however, we conclude that the court's punitive damages instruction did not cover Dang's theory that Cross acted......