USA v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe

• Decision Date: 13 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-35960,99-35960
• Citation: 235 F.3d 429
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, and PUYALLUP INDIAN TRIBE; SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE; SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY, Intervenor-Plaintiffs/ Petitioners-Appellees, v. MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE, Intervenor-Plaintiff/ Respondent-Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 429

235 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 2000)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, and PUYALLUP INDIAN TRIBE; SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE; SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY, Intervenor-Plaintiffs/ Petitioners-Appellees, v. MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE, Intervenor-Plaintiff/ Respondent-Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants.

No. 99-35960

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted September 12, 2000

Filed December 13, 2000

Annette Klapstein (argued), Law offices of the Puyallup Indian Tribe, Tacoma, Washington, for intervenor-plaintiff/ petitioner-appellee Puyallup Indian Tribe.

Scott W. Wheat (argued), Office of Tribal Attorney of the Suquamish Indian Tribe, Suquamish, Washington, for intervenor-plaintiff/petitioner-appellee Suquamish Indian Tribe.

Alix Foster, Office of the Tribal Attorney of the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, LaConner, Washington, for intervenor-plaintiff/petitioner-appellee Swinomish Indian Tribe.

Mason D. Morisset, Morisset, Schlosser, Ayer & Jozwiak, Seattle, Washington, for intervenor-plaintiff/appellee Tulalip Tribes of Washington.

Gregory M. O'Leary (argued), Seattle, Washington, for intervenor-plaintiff/respondent-appellant Muckleshoot Indian Tribe.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Barbara J. Rothstein, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.CV-70-09213-BJR

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Robert R. Beezer, and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns the limits of the Muckleshoot Tribe's saltwater usual and accustomed fishing area under the Boldt Decision. Because we agree with the district court that the Muckleshoot's saltwater usual and accustomed fishing area, as found by Judge Boldt, was limited to Elliott Bay, we affirm the grant of summary judgment for the Puyallup, Suquamish, and Swinomish Tribes.

Background and Procedural History

This case centers on the interpretation of a lengthy and detailed district court opinion published in 1974 after an extensive trial involving a voluminous record. In United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) ("the Boldt Decision"), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), Judge Boldt adjudicated the treaty-reserved fishing rights of several tribes in Washington state, including the parties to this dispute. Central to this case is Finding of Fact 76 ("Finding 76") of the opinion, which states:

Prior to and during treaty times, the Indian ancestors of the present day Muckleshoot Indians had the usual and accustomed fishing places primarily at locations on the upper Puyallup, the Carbon, Stuck, White, Green, Cedar, and Black Rivers, the tributaries to these rivers (including Soos Creek, Burns Creek and Newaukum Creek) and Lake Washington, and secondarily in the saltwater of Puget Sound. Villages and their weir sites were often located together. [FPTO 3-53; Ex. USA-20, p. 38; Ex. USA-27b, pp. 7-16; Ex. PL-23, pp. 11-12]

Id. at 367 (emphasis added) (brackets in original). After the decision was issued, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe ("the Muckleshoot") opened commercial fisheries in some of the areas designated in Finding 76.

Judge Boldt's decision did not explicitly address shellfish entitlements; rather, it concerned the rights to fin fish. The individual tribes' entitlements to shellfish, which are not at issue here, were addressed in a subsequent case, United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1994) ("Washington II"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998).

After Washington II, the Muckleshoot sought to open fisheries in Area 11 of Puget Sound. Area 11 is a geographically defined region of Puget Sound located to the west of the City of Seattle. Area 11, as a fishing zone, was not defined at the time of Boldt Decision; it was subsequently established by state regulation. In response to this action by the Muckleshoot, the Puyallup Indian Tribe ("the Puyallup") filed a Request for Determination in district court. The Request sought a determination that the Muckleshoot's usual and accustomed ("U&A") saltwater fishing area, as determined by Finding 76 of the Boldt Decision, does not include any areas outside Elliott Bay (now known as Area 10A, like Area 11 a fishing region created by state regulation). With the court's permission, the Suquamish Indian Tribe ("the Suquamish") and the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community ("the Swinomish") filed a Cross-Request for Determination seeking a similar ruling.

In January 1998, the Muckleshoot filed a Motion to Dismiss the Request and the Tribes (the Puyallup, Suquamish, Swinomish) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on their Requests for Determination. On August 5, 1998, the district court granted the Muckleshoot's motion to dismiss with respect to the Tribes' claims that the Muckleshoot had no saltwater fishing rights outside Areas 9, 10, and 11. The court reasoned that it did not have jurisdiction over areas other than Areas 9, 10, and 11 because the Muckleshoot had not manifested an intent to conduct saltwater fishing in Areas other than 9, 10, and 11. The court then denied the Tribes' motion for summary judgment and ordered an evidentiary hearing onwhether Areas 9, 10, and 11 were part of the Muckleshoot's U&A under Finding 76 of the Boldt Decision.

Both parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. On September 10, 1999, the district court held that the Muckleshoot's U&A under Finding 76 was limited to Elliott Bay (Area 10A) and enjoining the Muckleshoot from fishing in Areas 9, 10, and 11. The Muckleshoot appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 1292(a)(1).¹

Standard of Review

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 375 (1999). This court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellants, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. See, e.g., Berry v. Valence Tech., Inc., 175 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 528 (1999). The court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter; rather, the court only decides whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1998).

Analysis

I. Ambiguity in Finding 76

This case turns on the interpretation of the phrase "secondarily in the waters of Puget Sound" as used by Judge Boldt in Finding 76. The case, therefore, resembles one of statutory construction, with the Boldt Decision serving as the instrument to be interpreted. The Muckleshoot's argument is essentially one of plain meaning. According to the Muckleshoot, the text of Finding 76 is unambiguous because "Puget Sound" has a well-understood, common geographical meaning. If Judge Boldt, who was intimately familiar with the geography of the region and its relevance to the case, meant to confine the Muckleshoot's saltwater U&A to inner Elliott Bay, the Muckleshoot contend Judge Boldt could have expressly done so in Finding 76.

The Tribes counter that the phrase is ambiguous when examined in the context of the evidence before Judge Boldt. Given the evidence that Judge Boldt relied upon and other Findings of Fact and Law in the opinion, the Tribes argue that Judge Boldt could not have intended to include the expansive area claimed by the Muckleshoot as part of their saltwater U&A. Cf. Children's Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Belshe, 188 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999) ("To determine the plain meaning of a statutory provision, we examine not only the specific provision at issue, but also the structure of the statute as a whole, including its object and policy.").

The parallels between this case and one of statutory construction should not be overemphasized. There are important distinctions between interpreting a judicial opinion and a statute. First, the documents and the evidence the court relied upon, which are the rough equivalent of legislative history, play a much larger and more definitive role in interpreting the judicial text than do the traditional components of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Finding 76 specifically cites the supporting documents used as the bases for its conclusions. There is no question, then, that the court relied upon this information in reaching its decision. Moreover, in referencing the documents cited in Finding 76, Judge Boldt said, "The court finds that in specific facts, the reports of Dr. Barbara Lane, Exhibits USA-20 to 30 and USA-53, have been exceptionally well researched and reported and are established by a preponderance of the evidence. They are found to be authoritative and reliable summaries of relevant aspects of Indian life in the case area at and prior to the time of the treaties . . . ." Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 350.

More importantly, judicial opinions are simply not statutes and the rules governing the interpretation of the two reflect this. In general, there are no canons of construction for theinterpretation of opinions, reflecting the fact that textual precision, while a highly valued judicial quality, is at the very center of statutory interpretation. See, e.g. , United States v. Partlow, 159 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 1998) (where the terms of a statute are unambiguous, its plain meaning must control).

Opinions, unlike statutes, are not usually written with the knowledge or expectation that each and every word may be the subject of searching analysis. Acknowledging this fact, this court held long ago that the "language of the court must be read in the light of the facts before it." Julian Petroleum Co. v. Courtney Petroleum Co., 22 F.2d 360, 362 (9th Cir. 1927); see also Marshall v. Andrew F. Mahony Co. , 56 F.2d 74, 78 (9th Cir. 1932) ("[T]he language of all cases must be taken and understood in light of the...