USA v. Nerber

Decision Date10 March 2000
Docket NumberBETANCOURT-RODRIGUE,No. 99-30161,D,99-30161
Citation222 F.3d 597
Parties(9th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALPHONSO NERBER; EDUARDO ALVAREZ; ALBERTO BETANCOURT; RAMONefendants-Appellees. Office of the Circuit Executive
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Annette L. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Seattle, Washington, for the appellant.

Paula Semmes Deutsch, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Seattle, Washington; Robert Goldsmith, Seattle, Washington, for the appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding; D.C. No. CR-98-00756-TSZ

Before: James R. Browning, Betty B. Fletcher, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

BROWNING, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals an order of the district court suppressing evidence derived from video surveillance of a hotel room. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

On December 24, 1998, defendants Nerber and Betancourt- Rodriguez went to La Quinta Inn in Seattle to conduct a narcotics transaction with confidential informants. The informants brought defendants to Room 303. The FBI and the King County Police had rented the room for the operation and installed a hidden video camera without first obtaining a warrant. The parties entered the room at 9:54 a.m., the informants gave defendants one kilogram of sample cocaine, and the defendants briefly "flashed" money in a briefcase. The informants left the room at 10:00 a.m., telling defendants they would return to deliver 24 more kilograms of cocaine. They did not return, however, because they believed defendants intended to rob them. For three hours thereafter, law enforcement agents used the surveillance equipment to monitor defendants' activities in the hotel room. They observed the other two defendants--Betancourt and Alvarez--enter the room, and watched as the defendants brandished weapons and sampled cocaine. All four defendants left the hotel at approximately 1:00 p.m. and were arrested shortly thereafter.

A grand jury returned an indictment charging all four defendants with narcotics offenses and two with possessing a firearm during the commission of a narcotics offense. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence derived from the video surveillance. The district court originally denied the motion, and later denied a motion for reconsideration, on the theory that defendants had "no legitimate expectation of privacy in a motel room used purely for a drug transaction, for a short period of time." However, the court granted a second motion for reconsideration and suppressed "all evidence obtained from the portion of the video surveillance which occurred after the confidential informants left Room 303 . . . ." The court ruled that although the video surveillance which took place in the presence of the informants was admissible based on their consent, defendants nonetheless "had a reasonable expectation that they would not be subject to video surveillance while in Room 303 after the confidential informants left the room." The government appeals this ruling.

II

The Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, but "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are. " Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). To invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment, a person must show he had a "legitimate expectation of privacy." To establish a "legitimate" expectation of privacy, he must demonstrate a subjective expectation that his activities would be private, and he must show that his expectation was " `one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' " Bond v. United States, _______ U.S. _______, _______, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 1465 (2000) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978).1

We review for clear error the district court's underlying factual findings, and we review de novo the lawfulness of a search and seizure. See United States v. Hudson , 100 F.3d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1996). Whether a citizen's expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable is a question of law reviewed de novo. See United States v. Fultz, 146 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1998).

III

In finding for defendants, the district court distinguished Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), in which the Supreme Court held that the defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy in another person's apartment which they entered for a brief period to conduct a narcotics transaction. The district court held that Carter was not controlling because the governmental intrusion in this case (the use of a hidden surveillance camera) was far more egregious than the intrusion in Carter (visual observation through a ground-floor apartment window).2

The government responds that the severity of the intrusion is irrelevant to whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a particular place. Once the severity of the intrusion is removed from the equation, the government argues, this case is indistinguishable from Carter, which compels a ruling that the defendants may not invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

We reject the government's broad argument that a court may never consider the severity of the governmental intrusion in determining whether a citizen has a legitimate expectation of privacy. To adopt the government's position would be to ignore a substantial body of Supreme Court and appellate case law, including the recent Supreme Court decision in Bond v. United States, _______ U.S. _______, 120 S.Ct. 1462 (2000). Furthermore, after considering the totality of the circumstances of this case, including but not limited to the nature of the governmental intrusion, we conclude that the defendants had a legitimate expectation to be free from secret video surveillance once the informants left the room.

A.

In Carter, a police officer investigating a tip from a confidential informant looked into the window of a ground-floor apartment through a gap in the blinds and observed people putting white powder into bags. 525 U.S. at 85. The defendants, who did not live in the apartment but had come to engage in the narcotics transaction, moved to suppress the evidence derived from the officer's observations. The Court ruled they could not invoke the Fourth Amendment:

If we regard the overnight guest . . . as typifying those who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the home of another, and one merely "legitimately on the premises" as typifying those who may not do so, the present case is obviously somewhere in between. But the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder, all lead us to conclude that respondents' situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We therefore hold that any search which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.

Id. at 91. The Court went on to state that because the nonresident defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, there was no need to decide whether the officer's observations constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See id.

The government urges us to read Carter as holding that when a court assesses the legitimacy of a citizen's privacy expectation, it may never take into account the severity of the governmental intrusion. But numerous Supreme Court and appellate decisions--handed down before and after Carter-suggest a contrary principle: the legitimacy of a citizen's expectation of privacy in a particular place may be affected by the nature of the intrusion that occurs.

This principle was first articulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which gave rise to the "legitimate expectation of privacy" requirement. In Katz , the Supreme Court suppressed evidence of the defendant's end of telephone conversations overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a public phone booth:

[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected . . . . The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been had he remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye --it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52. Thus, a person in a glass phone booth had a legitimate expectation that his phone conversation would not be intercepted, even though he could not legitimately expect that his activities within the booth would not be observed.

The Court applied the same principle in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), in which it held that a citizen has no legitimate expectation to be free from having his luggage subjected to a "canine sniff" by a narcotics detection dog. The Court recognized that "a person possesses a privacy interest in luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment," but held that because a canine sniff "is much less intrusive than a typical search," a citizen may not invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment to suppress narcotics discovered by that means. Id. at 707.

In Bond, the Court reaffirmed the general principle that the nature of...

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