USA. v. Pregent, 98-6309

Decision Date04 May 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-6309,CR-90-65,98-6309
Citation190 F.3d 279
Parties(4th Cir. 1999) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE LLOYD PREGENT, Defendant-Appellant. () Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge; W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge.

COUNSEL ARGUED: George Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jane J. Jackson, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William Arthur Webb, Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in which Judge Michael and Judge Motz joined.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

George Pregent filed a motion under 18 U.S.C.A.§ 3583(e) (West Supp. 1999) in the district court requesting a reduction in his term of supervised release on the ground that the sentencing court had misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines, and, as a result, Pregent remained in custody for up to thirty-two months too long. The Government conceded error in the calculation of the sentence. The district court ruled that incarceration and supervised release serve significantly different societal purposes, and that in light of Pregent's extensive criminal history, the interest of justice would be served if Pregent finished his term of supervised release. Pregent appealed.

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pregent's motion under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) because the district court properly considered both Pregent's conduct and the interest of justice before denying the motion on the basis of Pregent's conduct. Further, even if Pregent's motion were construed as one for habeas relief, we determine that relief under 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2255 (West Supp. 1999) is not available to Pregent because the motion was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations. As a result, we affirm.

I.

On August 14, 1990, a grand jury in the Eastern District of North Carolina returned a twenty-seven count indictment against Pregent. The indictment charged that Pregent falsely represented Social Security numbers with the intent to deceive in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 408(g)(2) (West 1989), redesignated as 42 U.S.C.A. § 408(a)(7) (West Supp. 1999), counterfeited social security cards in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 408(g)(3) (West 1989), redesignated as 42 U.S.C.A. § 408(a)(7) (West Supp. 1999), unlawfully possessed blank, counterfeit social security cards in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 408(g)(3) (West 1989), redesignated as 42 U.S.C.A. § 408(a)(7) (West Supp. 1999), knowingly presented unauthorized United States identification documents

in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999), knowingly produced false identification documents in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999), possessed document-making implements in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(5) (West Supp. 1999), and possessed false identification that had the appearance of official United States documents in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(6) (West Supp. 1999).

On September 25, 1991, Pregent pleaded guilty to two counts of the indictment. On January 2, 1992, the district court sentenced Pregent to serve thirty-seven months in prison on each of the two counts. The two sentences were to be served concurrently with each other and with a ten-year sentence Pregent received for a 1989 North Carolina conviction for obtaining property by false pretense, forgery, and uttering. The district court also sentenced Pregent to a thirty-six-month term of supervised release following his imprisonment. Pregent did not appeal his sentence.

After sentencing in the district court, Pregent was returned to the custody of the North Carolina Department of Corrections to serve out the remainder of his ten-year sentence for the 1989 conviction and to begin his concurrent federal sentence. He remained in the North Carolina prison system until May 14, 1994, at which time he was transferred to the federal prison system to complete his thirty-seven-month term. He remained in federal custody until September 9, 1994. After Pregent's release from federal custody, he was transferred to New Hampshire to serve a twoto four-year sentence that he was required to serve consecutively to the North Carolina and federal sentences.

Pregent was released from New Hampshire prison into the custody of a federal halfway house on October 19, 1996, where he remained for six months pursuant to the terms of his supervised release as handed down at his January 2, 1992, sentencing hearing. He was released from the halfway house on April 27, 1997, and remains on supervised release.

II.

On November 24, 1997, Pregent filed a motion for modification of his supervised release in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.1 The motion was filed pursuant to the authority granted in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West Supp. 1999), which authorizes the sentencing court to terminate, extend, or revoke terms of supervised release upon consideration of certain factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West Supp. 1999). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e).

In his motion, Pregent urged the district court to terminate his supervised release because his initial sentence had been miscalculated. Specifically, Pregent noted that two prior convictions were erroneously assigned criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines when those convictions encompassed activity that was already included as part of the relevant offense conduct. Pregent also asserted that because those same state offenses formed the basis of his 1989 North Carolina conviction and were part of the same course of conduct as his federal conviction, the district court should have credited him for the time already served in the North Carolina prison system pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (1991). As a result of these miscalculations, Pregent stated that he had remained in prison for thirty-two months longer than he would have under a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence. For purposes of Pregent's motion, the Government conceded sentencing error.2

After reviewing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e), the district court determined that it would not order Pregent's supervised release to be terminated. Although the district court did not foreclose the possibility of reducing an individual's supervised release time as the result of a sentencing error, it ruled that in Pregent's case such an action was inappropriate. Specifically, the court noted that Pregent had a long criminal background, including a pattern of escape and flight from incarceration, and also had a history of drug abuse. Therefore, the district court concluded that it would be in Pregent's interest and in the interest of justice that he continue the rehabilitative regimen facilitated by supervised release.

Pregent noted this appeal.

III.

On appeal, Pregent argues that the district court erred when it failed to terminate his period of supervised release because he had remained in prison for several months longer than he should have if the sentencing court had properly calculated his sentence. Pregent asserts that as a matter of law and equity he is entitled to have his supervised release period tabulated from the time that he should have been released from prison, rather than from the date he was actually released from prison. In support of his argument, Pregent points to what he characterizes as two competing statutory provisions: 18 U.S.C.A.§ 3624(a) (West Supp. 1999) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(e) (West Supp. 1999). Section 3624(e) states that an individual begins serving his term of supervised release on the day he is released from prison. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(e). Section 3624(a) provides that a"prisoner shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration of the prisoner's term of imprisonment." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(a). Pregent asserts that in his case § 3624(a) was violated because the sentencing court sentenced him incorrectly, and, therefore, he was held in prison unlawfully for a period of months. Thus, he argues that he should be considered released pursuant to § 3624(e) on the date his sentence should have expired, and that the excess time spent in prison thereby should be credited to his supervised release time.

We review a district court's decision whether to terminate an individual's term of supervised release before the expiration of the term under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) under the narrow abuse of discretion standard. Cf. United States v. Wesley, 81 F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1996) (reviewing conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion); United States v. Lowenstein, 108 F.3d 80, 85-86 (6th Cir. 1997) (reviewing revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion).

Section 3583 is the general section instructing district courts on the parameters of supervised release. The relevant text of § 3583(e) provides:

(e) Modification of conditions or revocation.--The court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6)--

(1) terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation, if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice . . . .

18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e). The plain language of the statute...

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