USA v. Rains

• Citation: 615 F.3d 589
• Decision Date: 23 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-50724.,09-50724.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Glyn RAINS; David Alan Aldridge, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

615 F.3d 589

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Michael Glyn RAINS; David Alan Aldridge, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 09-50724.

United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 23, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., San Antonio, TX, Austin Maxwell Berry, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Midland, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Thomas L. Wright (argued), El Paso, TX, for Rains.

Philip J. Lynch, Asst. Fed. Pub. Def. (argued), Henry Joseph Bemporad, Fed. Pub. Def., San Antonio, TX, for Aldridge.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Following a jury trial, Michael Rains and David Aldridge were found guilty of various crimes related to the manufacture and sale of methamphetamine. Rains challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding that he was in an agreement to manufacture methamphetamine, the weight involved, and his intent to distribute. Aldridge argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in enhancing his sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) based on a prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

I

Rains and Aldridge were members of a drug ring that manufactured, used, and sold methamphetamine in and around Odessa, Texas. They used a rudimentary chemical process commonly known as the “red P method” to manufacture methamphetamine. The red P method requires certain precursor chemicals, specifically, phosphorus, iodine, and pseudoephedrine, which can be produced using a variety of household items and legally available products, such as matchbooks, iodine, and over-the-counter decongestants.

In an effort to curb methamphetamine production, the federal government has implemented restrictions on the amount of decongestants containing pseudoephedrine, such as Sudafed, that can be purchased on a daily and monthly basis. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Pharmacies keep records of the sale of these decongestants and often require a purchaser to furnish identification and sign a dated receipt. In order to avoid the limits, Aldridge and Rains purchased decongestants at a variety of different pharmacies. ¹ Pharmacy records indicated that during the relevant period, Aldridge purchased 121.5 grams of pseudoephedrine and Rains purchased 193 grams. Other conspirators also purchased pseudoephedrine pills and exchanged them with the cookers for drugs or money. Because of the difficulty in acquiring pseudoephedrine, Aldridge and Rains cooked relatively small batches of methamphetamine two to three times a week, usually at Rains's house.

The conspirators also went to some length to acquire iodine. Because many stores that previously sold crystalized iodine had stopped doing so in response to its use in methamphetamine production, the conspirators turned to purchasing concentrated liquid iodine from a veterinary clinic in Andrews, Texas. Although they had to process the liquid iodine in order to use it, the conspirators purchased numerous bottles from the clinic. ²

The conspirators worked together to ready the precursors and cook the methamphetamine. A grand jury indicted several members of the conspiracy in late 2008, and the police executed a series of coordinated arrests. Over the next few months, several of the indicted conspirators pled guilty and agreed to testify against Rains and Aldridge. The grand jury subsequently issued a superceding indictment, charging Rains, Aldridge, two other named persons, and persons known and unknown with conspiring to manufacture in excess of fifty grams of methamphetamine. It further charged both Rains and Aldridge with possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute ³ and a variety of counts of purchasing more than nine grams of pseudoephedrine within a thirty-day period. Aldridge was also charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine-manufacturing equipment-charges stemming from the traffic stop. Aldridge moved to suppress the evidence from the stop and his subsequent arrest, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car. After holding a hearing, the district court denied the motion.

Rains and Aldridge were tried together before a jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict against both men on all counts of the superceding indictment. As discussed below, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement that resulted in a mandatory life sentence for Aldridge. ⁴ This appeal followed.

II

A

Rains challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions on three grounds. Specifically, he contends there was insufficient evidence that (1) he was involved in a conspiracy with any of the co-conspirators named in the indictment; (2) the conspiracy involved more than fifty grams of methamphetamine; and (3) he possessed the 15.84 grams with intent to deliver.

When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we view the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, and determine whether a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir.1998). “The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Clayton, 506 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir.2007).

Evidence presented to the jury supports a conclusion that Rains conspired with other named and unnamed co-conspirators. ⁵ Misty Crow testified that she purchased pseudoephedrine pills for Rains so that he could manufacture methamphetamine. Crow testified that she and others would aggregate their pills for Rains to cook methamphetamine at Rains's house in Odessa, Texas. Rains admitted to police that Crow bought pills for him to manufacture methamphetamine, and that he gave her methamphetamine in return. Crow further testified that Aldridge and Rains manufactured methamphetamine together, usually at Rains's house. Crow explained that Aldridge performed the same tasks as she did, such as crushing pills and cutting up matches, in order to cook methamphetamine at Rains's house. Randi Mutter and Michelle Preston also testified that they gave Rains pills in exchange for money and drugs and helped him crush pills and strip match boxes to ready the cooking ingredients. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Rains was involved in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with Aldridge, who was named in the superceding indictment, and various unnamed other persons. See United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 386-87 (5th Cir.2007). ⁶

Regarding the weight of drugs involved, the testimony of the state's expert chemist and the records of Rains's pseudoephedrine purchases are sufficient to support the jury's finding that more than fifty grams of methamphetamine were involved. The chemist testified that an average methamphetamine cook could obtain a yield of “somewhere between 45 and 70 percent,” or 4.5 to 7 grams of methamphetamine from every 10 grams of pseudoephedrine. Records from various pharmacies established that Rains purchased approximately 193 grams of pseudoephedrine. Even using the low end of the average methamphetamine cook's potential yield and only the pseudoephedrine Rains himself purchased, the jury could reasonably have concluded the conspiracy involved more than fifty grams of methamphetamine. ⁷ Thus, the evidence on weight was sufficient to support the verdict.

[4] There was also sufficient evidence of intent to sell. When Rains was arrested, he had 15.84 grams of methamphetamine in his possession, along with approximately $3,000 cash in a pouch around his neck. The methamphetamine was relatively impure, which a police expert testified was indicative of distribution rather than personal use because a cooker would not dilute the product he was using. See United States v. Gonzalez, 339 Fed.Appx. 400, 403 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam). Moreover, there was testimony from which the jury could infer that 15.84 grams is much more than a normal amount for daily personal use, thus negating Rains's defense theory. See United States v. Torres, 212 Fed.Appx. 361, 366-67 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam). Based on the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably conclude Rains possessed the drugs with the intent to sell. See id.

In conclusion, we find the evidence sufficient to support Rains's convictions.

B

Aldridge argues that an investigatory vehicle stop that led to his arrest and the seizure of several items related to the manufacture of methamphetamine was made without the necessary reasonable suspicion. According to Aldridge, since the stop was illegal, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence as fruit of the poisoned stop.

In reviewing the district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir.2009). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court. See United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir.2000). “The reasonableness of an investigatory stop ... is reviewed de novo.” See United States v. Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We analyze the reasonableness of traffic stops and investigative detentions of motorists who are suspected of criminal activity under the framework established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct....