USA v. Singleton

• Decision Date: 25 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-3053,99-3053
• Citation: 337 U.S. App. D.C. 96,182 F.3d 7
• Parties: (D.C. Cir. 1999) United States of America,Appellant v. Carlos T. Singleton, Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 7

182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

United States of America,Appellant v. Carlos T. Singleton, Appellee

No. 99-3053

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued June 3, 1999

Decided June 25, 1999

On Consideration of Appellant's Memorandum of Law and Fact Concerning Pretrial Detention, the Memorandum of Law and Fact filed by Amicus Curiae, and the Reply Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,(No. 99cr00119-01)

Barbara A. Grewe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellant, With her on the memorandum and reply were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and John Crabb, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

L. Barrett Boss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause as amicus curiae on behalf of appellee. With him on the memorandum were A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender.

Billy L. Ponds, counsel for appellee, adopted the memorandum of amicus curiae.

Before: Sentelle, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge:

The United States appeals from a district court order concluding that convicted felons who possess firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (1994) have not by that act alone committed a crime of violence warranting pretrial detention. We affirm, holding that the plain meaning of the BailReform Act excludes felon-in-possession offenses from the category of violent crimes that trigger detention hearings.

I.

A one count indictment charges appellee Carlos Singleton with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).¹ After a hearing, a magistrate ordered Singleton detained pending trial because he was charged with a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. 3142(f)(1)(A), and factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3142(g) warranted detention rather than conditional release. Relying on its previous decision in United States v. Gloster, 969 F. Supp. 92, 94-96 (D.D.C. 1997), the district court concluded that a felon-in-possession offense under 922(g) is not a crime of violence authorizing pretrial detention, and therefore conditionally released Singleton pending trial. The United States sought an emergency stay of the order in this court, which the court denied. This appeal followed. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3145(c), 3731.

Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3141 et seq., a person awaiting trial on a federal offense may either be released on personal recognizance or bond, conditionally released, or detained. See 18 U.S.C. 3142(a). The Act establishes procedures for each form of release, as well as for temporary and pretrial detention. Detention until trial is relatively difficult to impose. First, a judicial officer must find one of six circumstances triggering a detention hearing. See 18 U.S.C. 3142(f). Absent one of these circumstances, detention is not an option. See, e.g., United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1988). Second, assuming a hearing is appropriate, the judicial officer must consider several enumerated factors to determine whether conditions short of detention will "reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. 3142(g). The judicial officer may order detention if these factors weigh against release.

The 3142(g) factors are not at issue in the instant appeal, and only one of the triggering circumstances is relevant. Specifically, the government contends, and Singleton disputes, that a felon-in-possession charge under 922(g) alleges a "crime of violence," which under 3142(f)(1)(A) triggers a detention hearing.²

Congress has defined "crime of violence" in the Bail Reform Act in three parts, as follows:

the term "crime of violence" means --

(A) an offense that has as an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another;

(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense; or

(C) any felony under chapter 109A [18 U.S.C.A. 2241 et seq.], 110 [18 U.S.C.A. 2251 et seq.], or 117 [18 U.S.C.A. 2421 et seq.].

18 U.S.C. 3156(a)(4). Subpart C is irrelevant here, as is subpart A because, as the government concedes, use of a firearm is not an element of 922(g), which encompasses mere possession. Compare 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995). The open question is whether the "nature" of an offense under 922(g) is such that a "substantial risk" of violence arises "in the course of committing the offense." We first address a threshold issue regarding the methodology for reaching the conclusion that triggers a detention hearing, and then turn to the government's contention that a felon-in-possession charge under 922(g) is categorically a crime of violence within the meaning of 3142(f).

II.

The threshold issue is whether the Bail Reform Act requires courts to identify crimes of violence on a categorical or case-by-case basis. The government, while expressing a preference for the categorical approach, suggests that the court may also review the specific facts of each 922(g) charge to determine whether a particular defendant has committed the offense in a violent manner warranting detention. By contrast, amicus (the Federal Public Defender) joined by Singleton, maintains that the statute contemplates a categorical rule that would treat all felon-in-possession offenses alike, and label them "crimes of violence" only if the offense by its general nature satisfies 3142(f).

The weight of authority endorses a categorical approach. With one exception,³ published district court opinions ex- pressly considering the choice between a categorical and caseby-case approach to defining crimes of violence under 3142(f) have opted for the categorical rule. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 996 F. Supp. 260, 261-62 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Gloster, 969 F. Supp. 92, 94 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Washington, 907 F. Supp. 476, 484 (D.D.C. 1995); United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855, 856 (D. Md. 1991); United States v. Marzullo, 780 F. Supp. 658, 662 n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1991); United States v. Phillips, 732 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D. Mass. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (E.D. Mich. 1988). Although no court of appeals has expressly addressed this question in the context of 3142(f),⁴ all three circuits reviewing the identical definition of crimes of violence in 18 U.S.C. 16 (1994), outside the sentencing context,⁵ have also applied a categorical approach. See United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (11th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977, 979 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying categorical approach to "crime of violence" definition in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)). Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-01 (1990).

Weight of authority aside, we conclude from the plain meaning of 3156 that a categorical approach is required. Each of the three prongs of the statutory definition identify a fixed category of offenses that does not expand or contract based on the factual peculiarities of a particular case. Section 3156(a)(4)(A) applies only to offenses that have "as an element of the offense" aspects of physical force. The term of art "element of the offense" makes clear that a court need look no further than the statute creating the offense to decide whether it describes a crime of violence. Likewise, 3156(a)(4)(C) applies only to three specifically enumerated statutes, and requires no factual analysis.

Section 3156(a)(4)(B) is a bit more ambiguous than its neighbors, encompassing offenses that do not include violence as an element, but by their "nature" entail a substantial risk of violence. The word "nature" has no plain meaning standing on its own, and might therefore be amenable to conflicting interpretations. However, the word in context, see generally Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993), must be read with the preceding "its," which refers back to "offense," which in the preceding sentence refers to the statutory provision creating a crime rather than the factual incident constituting the crime. Unless the meaning of "offense" metamorphoses from one sentence to the next, which is implausible,⁶ the use of the word "nature" refers to a legal charge rather than its factual predicate.

This conclusion is consistent with the language of 3142(g)(1), which permits a judicial officer during a detention hearing to consider the "nature and circumstances of the offense charged" for the purpose of determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the return of the person and the safety of others. The distinction between "nature" and "circumstances" clarifies that the former refers to the generic offense while the latter encompass-es the manner in which the defendant committed it. Case-specific facts are thus relevant at a detention hearing, see 3142(g), but not when considering the government's motion under 3142(f)(1)(A) to hold such a hearing.

The alternative, case-by-case, approach would collapse the distinction between the holding that triggers a detention hearing and the factors relevant at the hearing, which are enumerated in 3142(g). Section 3142(f) entitles defendants to a prompt detention hearing, either immediately at the defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer, or within days thereafter. In recognition of the fact that defendants remain incarcerated between the time the court determines a hearing is necessary and the time the hearing occurs, see 3142(f), Congress strictly limited the...