USA v. Williams
Decision Date | 06 August 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 08-4630.,08-4630. |
Citation | 615 F.3d 657 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas W. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
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ARGUED: Michael J. Hunter, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Kevin Michael Schad, Federal Public Defender's Office, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael J. Hunter, Kevin W. Kelley, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Laura E. Byrum, Federal Public Defender's Office, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: MOORE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; RUSSELL, Chief District Judge. *
On October 12, 2004, Columbus police officers Robert Vass and T. Pappas pulled up in a police cruiser to a group of people standing outside an affordable-housing complex owned by Community Properties of Ohio (“CPO”). Upon exiting the vehicle and moving toward the group, Vass recognized one of its members, Thomas W. Williams, who was standing on the sidewalk and leaning against a car. Vass immediately told Williams that he was “again trespassing on CPO property.” In the ensuing interaction, Williams acknowledged in response to questions that there might be a warrant out for his arrest and that he was carrying a gun. The officers arrested Williams, who was later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
On Williams's motion, the district court ruled that Williams had been illegally seized, and the court suppressed the physical evidence and Williams's statements during the encounter. The government now appeals, making three arguments: (1) Williams was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Vass first spoke to him; (2) if Williams was seized, Vass had reasonable suspicion to detain him; and (3) even if Vass lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Williams, the emergence of information that Williams was wanted on an arrest warrant constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of the unlawful seizure.
After careful review, we AFFIRM. Williams was seized: a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave upon being approached by two uniformed officers in a marked car, singled out of a group, and immediately accused of a crime. The seizure was unlawful: Williams was not trespassing or committing any other crime when the officers approached, and the fact that others in his group were drinking publicly and might have been trespassing did not constitute reasonable suspicion that Williams himself had recently committed a crime or was about to commit one. Finally, there was no attenuation: Williams's statement about the outstanding warrant, made in response to a question posed by Vass at the outset of the seizure, was not “the product of a free will.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Thus, the incriminating evidence was “come at by exploitation of th[e] illegality” of the seizure, not “by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
We accept the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Martin, 289 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir.2002). The district court found the following facts, which the parties do not dispute on appeal:
second time, the nonresident's name and picture or other identifying information will be entered into the CPO's trespass logbook, a record of all individuals who have been given trespass warnings. (Martin Test. p. 11; Vass Test. p. 37.) If a nonresident trespasses on CPO property after having his or her name entered in the logbook, the nonresident is arrested for criminal trespass and taken to jail. (Vass Test. p. 37.) The special duty officers, however, have discretion to address situations on a case-by-case basis, and do not have to go through the process of issuing warnings before arresting an individual for criminal trespass. ( Id. p. 38-39.)
United States v. Williams, No. 2:08-cr-62, 2008 WL 4758683, at *1-2 (S.D.Ohio Oct.27, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (footnote omitted).
A grand jury indicted Williams on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Williams filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence and statements he made during the encounter, which the government opposed. Following an evidentiary hearing on June 25, 2008 and supplemental briefing, the district court issued a written opinion granting the motion on October 27, 2008. The government timely appealed, and the district court stayed the case pending appeal.
We review de novo a district court's legal conclusions in granting a motion to suppress. United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896, 898 (6th Cir.2007). “Where the district court grants a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.” United States v. Bailey, 302 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir.2002).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection, however, applies only if a person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 821 (6th Cir.2005). The government contends that Officers Vass and Pappas never seized Williams.
“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests...
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