USA v. Williams
| Decision Date | 07 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-2599,99-2599 |
| Citation | 198 F.3d 988 |
| Parties | (7th Cir. 1999) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andre L. Williams, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 98-CR-151--Lynn Adelman, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Bauer, Flaum and Easterbrook, Circuit Judges.
Andre Williams appeals his sentence entered after a guilty plea to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1), and two counts of providing false information on an application to purchase a firearm, 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(a)(6). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
On April 9, 1998, and again on July 22, 1998, Andre Williams filled out applications to obtain firearms from a licensed dealer. On those applications he knowingly made false statements concerning his status as a convicted felon. On April 14, 1998, and again on July 24, 1998, Williams obtained firearms from a licensed dealer as a result of the false statements made on his applications. On August 18, 1998, an indictment was returned against Williams charging him with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(a)(6), for making a false written statement intended to deceive a lawful firearms dealer with respect to a fact material to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm ("False Statement"), and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1), for being a felon in possession of a firearm ("Felon in Possession").
On October 16, 1998, Williams entered into a plea agreement with the government ("Agreement"). During the negotiations, Williams requested that the two Felon in Possession counts be dropped so that they would not count against him for armed career criminal status, but the government refused. At this time no party thought Williams was eligible to be sentenced as an armed career criminal, and it was assumed that the additional counts would not affect the length of his sentence. Both the government and Williams conducted the plea negotiations with the understanding that Williams' maximum sentence for the four counts was the statutory maximum of ten years. This understanding was reflected in the language of the plea agreement which stated:
"4. The parties understand and agree that the offenses to which the defendant will plead guilty, carry the following maximum terms of imprisonment and fines:
Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4: Imprisonment for up to ten years, . . . ."
The Agreement also contained language stating that the sentencing judge was not a party to the Agreement and would sentence Williams according to the applicable Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") and statutes "up to the maximum penalties set forth in paragraph 4 above."
In the Agreement, Williams promised to cooperate with the government to the full extent of his ability and to plead guilty to the four counts of the indictment. In return, the government promised to recommend a three-level decrease in Williams' Sentencing Guideline level for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. sec. 3E1.1 and to make a motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. sec. 5K1.1 for substantial assistance to the government. If the judge agreed to apply these decreases, all parties thought Williams' sentencing range would be 57-71 months. Also in the Agreement, Williams waived his right to see the presentencing report ("PSR") prior to sentencing.
After signing the agreement, Williams provided information regarding criminal activity to the government at two interviews and testified at a grand jury proceeding. On October 20, 1998, Williams entered a guilty plea to all four counts of the indictment against him. The probation officer then revealed that the PSR indicated Williams was an armed career criminal because a 1982 juvenile conviction for armed robbery was for four counts, and each count was considered separately for purposes of determining armed career criminal status. See U.S.S.G. sec. 4B1.4 and commentary. Because Williams was considered an armed career criminal, his sentence was elevated to fifteen years to life under the Guidelines, instead of the assumed maximum ten years upon which the plea agreement was based.
Because all parties had signed the Agreement under a mutual mistake of fact, the district court concluded that the contract was voidable and permitted Williams to withdraw his guilty pleas. Williams, however, pointed out that since he had already helped the government, letting him withdraw his plea did him no good because he no longer had any bargaining power to renegotiate a new deal. He let his plea stand. On a motion by the government under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. sec. 5K1.1, the district court departed downward from the fifteen year minimum sentence by three levels for substantial assistance. Williams requested that the district court also use its discretion to adjust his criminal history category downward under U.S.S.G. sec. 4A1.3. The district court declined and sentenced Williams to 130 months (ten years, ten months) on each of the four counts to run concurrently. Williams now appeals.
Williams argues that the district court erred when it: 1) sentenced him to more than the maximum statutory penalty for the False Information counts, 2) gave him a harsher sentence than the one indicated as the maximum penalty in his plea agreement for all four counts, and 3) declined to adjust his criminal history category downward. We discuss each of these claims in turn.
Williams and the government agree that under 18 U.S.C. sec.sec. 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2) the maximum sentence for providing false information on an application to procure a firearm from a lawfully authorized dealer is ten years. This reading of these statutes is correct, and Williams' status as an armed career criminal does not affect his sentence for this crime. U.S.S.G. sec. 4B1.4. Because the district court erred in sentencing Williams to ten years and ten months on these counts, we remand this case to the district court to impose a sentence for the False Information counts consistent with the applicable statutes and Guidelines.
Williams contends that the prosecutor in this case breached the promise that she made in Williams' plea agreement and that the district court did not provide the appropriate remedy for this breach. A plea agreement is a contract. United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992); Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281 (7th Cir. 1983). Contract interpretation is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. Ingram, 979 F.2d at 1184. However, disputed terms in a plea agreement are matters of fact that are determined by the district court and will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fields, 766 F.2d 1161, 1168 (7th Cir. 1985). The district court's findings are clearly erroneous only where "the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
Williams argues that the prosecutor in this case promised him a maximum sentence of ten years in exchange for the cooperation he contracted to provide as part of the Agreement. Williams asserts that he lived up to his end of the bargain by providing helpful information to the government and pleading guilty to the four counts of the indictment, but that the government breached its promise because Williams' sentence was greater than ten years.
Plea bargaining is "an essential component of the administration of justice" that is to be encouraged. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). In order to ensure the continued use of the plea bargaining process, all parties must have confidence that the agreements are fairly reached and will be enforced against all signatories. Id. at 260-61. Therefore, "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262. However, we read the terms of the government's promise according to their natural meaning and will not require the government to do more than it intended. See Brooks, 708 F.2d at 1282 (). But see United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 855 (7th Cir. 1978) (). Although "the government's promise need not be explicit to be enforceable," more than an "unfounded and unilateral belief" is required to support the defendant's assertion that the government made a particular promise in exchange for his cooperation. United States v. O'Brien, 853 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1988). In general, we do not interpret the government's promise to take certain actions with respect to the defendant's sentencing as a guarantee that a specific sentence will be the result. See id. at 525-26 (); see also United States v. Jimenez, 992 F.2d 131, 135- 36 (7th Cir. 1993) (...
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