Uscienski v. National Sugar Refining Co.

• Court: New Jersey Court of Common Pleas
• Writing for the Court: Weber, C. P. J.
• Citation: Uscienski v. National Sugar Refining Co., 19 N.J.Misc. 240, 18 A.2d 611 (N.J. Ct. Com. Pl. 1941)
• Decision Date: 17 February 1941
• Parties: HENRY USCIENSKI, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v. NATIONAL SUGAR REFINING CO., SUCCESSOR TO WARNER SUGAR REFINING CO., RESPONDENT-APPELLEE

18 A.2d 611

19 N.J.Misc. 240

USCIENSKI

v. NATIONAL SUGAR REFINING CO.

Court of Common Pleas of New Jersey, Bergen County.

Feb. 17, 1941.

Appeal from Workmen's Compensation Bureau.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Henry Uscienski, claimant, opposed by the National Sugar Refining Company, successor to the Warner Sugar Refining Company, to recover compensation for the death of his father. At a hearing before one of the deputy commissioners of the Compensation Bureau, the petition was dismissed, and the claimant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Nicholas A. Carella, of Lyndhurst, for petitioner-appellant.

McCarter, English & Egner, of Newark, for respondent-appellee.

WEBER, President Judge.

One Eronislaw Uscienski was employed by the Warner Sugar Refining Company, now known as the National Sugar Refining Company, at its Edgewater Plant and, on January 29th, 1918, while so employed, was injured as the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. As a result of said injury, the employee died on February 4th, 1918, leaving him surviving his widow and an infant son, who was then five weeks old. The employer paid compensation payments to the widow for a period of approximately 300 weeks. After the son, the petitioner herein, became of age, he filed this claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

At a hearing before one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Compensation Bureau of this State, the petition was dismissed, because of the following reasons specified in the order of the Deputy Commissioner: "It was not filed with the Bureau within two years after the date on which the accident, alleged in the petition, occurred or within two years after the failure of the respondent to make payment pursuant to the terms of any agreement, or within two years after the last payment of any compensation and that the claim for compensation on account of the death of the employee, as alleged in the petition, was barred by reason of the failure to file the petition within the time required by law".

The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911, as amended by the Laws of 1913, was, at the time of the happening of the accident, in full force and effect and any remedies and rights, which the petitioner herein may have, must be based upon the law as it was in effect at the time of the happening of the accident. The 1911 Act, P.L. p. 144, § 23, as amended by the 1913 Act, P.L. p. 314, § 8, N.J.S.A. 34:15-41, provides: "In case of personal injuries or death all claims for compensation on account thereof shall be forever barred unless within one year after the accident the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under this act, or unless within one year after the accident one of the parties shall have filed a petition for adjudication of compensation as provided herein".

The same act § 21, as amended by P.L. 1913, p. 310, § 6, N.J.S.A. 34:15-27, further provides: "An agreement or award of compensation may be modified at any time by a subsequent agreement, or at any time after one year from the time when the same became operative, it may be reviewed upon the application of either party on the ground that the incapacity of the injured employee has subsequently increased or diminished."

The petitioner claims, first, that he was an infant at the time of the injury to his father; that he was under such disability that he was unable to protect his rights; and that the statute of limitation provided by the act did not run against him during the period of his infancy. And, he further contends, that inasmuch as the respondent paid to his mother compensation for a period of approximately 300 weeks, such payment, under the provisions of the 1913 act, removed any and all limitation of time upon the filing of a petition by the petitioner.

The term "limitation" has been defined to mean, "The time which is prescribed by authority of the law, at the end of which, no action at law or suit in, equity can be maintained". By the common law there was no fixed time for the bringing of actions. Limitations are creatures of statute and derive their authority from statutes. "The exemptions from the operation of statutes of limitations commonly granted to infants do not rest upon any fundamental doctrine of the law, but upon the legislative will expressed in the statutes; infants could be put upon the same footing as adults in this respect, and unless excepted they so stand". 37 Corpus Juris, p. 1918, sec. 423. "No exception can be claimed in favor of minors in a statutory provision limiting the time for commencing actions given by such statute, unless they are expressly mentioned by the statute as excepted. Thus a statute which contains a saving clause in favor of infants 'in any of the personal actions before mentioned' applies only to actions mentioned in such statutes. And where requirement as to time is a condition to the existence of liability in a statute making no exception, infancy is no excuse for noncompliance with the requirement". 37 Corpus Juris, p. 1021, sec. 424.

In Gelewski v. Cudile, 4 A.2d 9, 17 N.J. Misc. on page 49, the referee decided that the Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 et seq, is in derogation of the common law, and that all such statutes must be strictly construed. He further said that in the Compensation Act there is a provision for the prosecution of a minor's claim by a next friend or other representative; that the act provides that petitions for claims shall be filed within two years of the date of the alleged accident or the date of the last payment made by agreement; and, that as the petition in that case was filed on October 27th, 1938, for injuries sustained on February 9th, 1936, and, that as no payment has been made by the respondents, the petition should be dismissed.

Our Court of Errors and Appeals, in Gillette v. D, L. & W. R. R. Co., 91 N.J.L. 220, 102 A. 673, decided that under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq, suits for injuries must be begun within two years after the day when the cause of action accrued and, therefore, held that infancy was no excuse for failing to bring suit within two years after the injury was sustained. Justice Parker, on page 221 of 91 N.J.L, on page 673 of 102 A, said: "Our statute of limitations contains a provision that infants entitled to any of the actions previously specified in that act shall have the respective periods of limitation after majority in which to bring suit. * * * This, however, is on its face inapplicable to the federal act, which, as we have already said, lays down the conditions under which suits may be brought under it".

In Bankers' Trust Company of Detroit v. Tatti et al, 258 Mich. 357, 242 N.W. 777, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that, as the statute (Workmen's Compensation Act) contained no exception in the case of minors or persons under any physical or mental incapacity, in the case of dependents, as to the time within which claims on their behalf should be filed, such claims would be barred unless filed within the period provided by the statute.

"Where no exception is provided by statute, the requirement for the filing of a claim within a specified time applies to a minor dependent of an employee, whose...