USEEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., No. 92 C 7330.
Decision Date | 07 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92 C 7330. |
Citation | 823 F. Supp. 571 |
Parties | U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and Charles H. Wessel, Plaintiff, v. AIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, LTD.; AIC International, Ltd., and Ruth Vrdolyak, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Jean P. Kamp, Supervisory Trial Atty., Allison J. Nichol, Elaine M. Chaney, Trial Attys. and John C. Hendrickson, Regional Atty., for E.E.O.C.
Edward Glennon, Thomas E. Glennon and Deborah Regan of Lindquist and Vennum, Minneapolis, MN, for Charles H. Wessel.
James B. Sherman and Frank A. Gumina of Wessels and Pautsch, Milwaukee, WI, for AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd. and Ruth Vrdolyak.
Pending is plaintiffs' U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and Charles H. Wessel's ("Wessel") motion for entry of judgment on the jury verdict of March 18, 1993. This motion is made pursuant to Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 58. At the court's suggestion the parties have submitted briefs not only on the issue of the injunctive relief being sought by the plaintiffs, but also on the issues of the limitations on punitive and compensatory damages contained in governing statutes. For the reasons listed below this motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This action is brought pursuant to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The EEOC and the Intervening Plaintiff, Charles Wessel ("Wessel"), alleged that AIC discriminated against Wessel on the basis of his disability, terminal cancer, by discharging him from his position as Executive Director at AIC.
Following eight days of testimony, the jury found that defendants AIC Security Investigations, Ltd. ("AIC") and Ruth Vrdolyak ("Vrdolyak"), discharged Wessel because of his terminal cancer, despite the fact that he remained able to perform the essential functions of his position as Executive Director of AIC. The jury then awarded Wessel $22,000.00 in backpay; $50,000.00 in compensatory damages; $250,000.00 in punitive damages against AIC; and $250,000.00 in punitive damages against Vrdolyak.
Plaintiffs have moved for entry of judgment requesting that judgment be entered in favor of the EEOC and Wessel as follows:
Defendants have objected to paragraph (2) of plaintiffs' proposed judgment because the jury award of $50,000.00 in compensatory damages is excessive and against the weight of the evidence at trial. Defendants further object to paragraph (2) of plaintiffs' proposed judgment because it impermissibly fails to aggregate "the sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded and the amount of punitive damages awarded" for purposes of the statutory caps on such damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
Defendants have objected to paragraphs three (3) and four (4) of plaintiffs' proposed judgment because plaintiffs failed to aggregate "the sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded and the amount of punitive damages awarded" for purposes of the statutory caps on such damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Defendants similarly claim that the award of punitive damages as listed in paragraphs three (3) and four (4) is excessive. Defendants further object to paragraph four (4) arguing that it wholly ignores 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) which states that the total compensatory and punitive damages recoverable by Wessel "shall not exceed" $200,000.00.1 In addition, defendants argue that plaintiffs have incorrectly concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 places no cap on the compensatory or punitive damages awarded against Ruth Vrdolyak.
As to paragraphs five (5) through (10) defendants object to the requested injunctive relief arguing that it is punitive in its effect and would not serve any principles of equity. In addition, defendants object to the proposed three year period and the posting of the EEOC's Notice at the property of AIC's clients arguing that it is intrusive, would cause the loss of such clients, and would serve no equitable purpose in light of the massive media attention and publicity given to this action since its inception.
Finally, defendants claim that the injunctive relief is nonsensical in that it would apply to "any person" filing a charge, opposing an unlawful practice under the ADA. Defendants point out that they already prohibited by lay from retaliating against AIC's employees of applicants in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
Defendants first contend that the jury's award of $50,000.00 in compensatory damages is excessive and goes against the manifest weight of the evidence at trial. In support of this argument defendants point out that the jury did not award full back pay through the date of the trial. Rather, the backpay award of $22,000.00 is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Petras who testified in court that Wessel was medically unfit to work as AIC's Executive Director beyond the time he experienced seizures in November and December of 1992. Here, where the jury awarded roughly four months in backpay, its award of compensatory damages was speculative and excessive.
In response to this argument, plaintiffs contend that the evidence in this case overwhelmingly indicated that, for Wessel, work was the dominant force in his life. His accomplishments as a acknowledged leader in his field demonstrated his dedication to work. Further, his achievements at AIC, in presiding over the division as it more than tripled in guard hours contracted and in profits is testimony that he always worked long hours, except when actually receiving medical treatment.
The standard for reviewing the dollar amount of this type of jury award has recently undergone some change. Fleming v. County of Kane, State of Ill., 898 F.2d 553, 561 (7th Cir.1990). Under our traditional standard, only in those circumstances where the jury damage award is "monstrously excessive," a product of passion and prejudice, or if there is no rational connection between it and the evidence, may the trial court disturb it. Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 847 (7th Cir.1989). As an additional consideration, however, the courts have now further noted that we must also examine compatibility among such awards — i.e. whether the award is out of line with other awards in similar cases. Id. at 848. The defendant who challenges a jury's award of compensatory or punitive damages based on the claim of insufficient evidence bears a heavy burden. The jury is the trier of fact, charged with determining the credibility of witnesses, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. Its findings are traditionally given great weight. Littlefield v....
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