Uselmann v. Pop
| Decision Date | 15 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-13652 |
| Parties | Mirela USELMANN, d/b/a Sapphire Trucking, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Razvan POP, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Angela L. Baldwin, Keith D. Flynn, Bruce A. Miller, Miller Cohen, PLC, Detroit, MI, Melvin B. Hollowell, The Miller Law Firm, P.C., Rochester, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Raymond J. Carey, Gasiorek, Morgan, Greco, McCauley & Kotzian, P.C., Farmington Hills, MI, for Defendants.
The instant action arises out of a freight delivery contract dispute between Plaintiffs, various delivery drivers, and Defendants, the trucking company owners. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs include Mirela Uselmann, doing business as Sapphire Trucking Inc. ("Uselmann"), Gabriel Biclea, doing business as MB Trucking, Inc. ("Biclea"), Ion Gutu, doing business as GPA Trucking, Inc. ("Gutu"), and Dumitru Marius Rendenciuc, doing business as DMR Express, Inc. ("Rendenciuc"), on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Id. On December 11, 2019, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendants Razvan Pop, Maria Pop, R.S.P. Express, Inc. ("RSP Express"), and NA Truck Repair, LLC ("NA Truck Repair") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging civil RICO violations, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and conversion. Id.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed on January 21, 2020. ECF No. 10. Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition on February 11, 2020. ECF No. 12. Defendants filed their Reply on February 25, 2020. ECF No. 13.
A hearing on this matter was held on July 13, 2020. For the reasons that follow, the Court will DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II and DENY Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I, III-VI [#10].
Plaintiffs are each truck owner-operators who contracted with Defendant RSP Express to transport freight for third-party shippers. ECF No. 10-1, PageID.215; ECF No. 1, PageID.3. The parties entered into Agreements that named RSP Express as a Carrier and the Plaintiffs’ company, as well as their individual names, as a Contractor. See ECF No. 1, PageID.26. Pursuant to the sample Agreement provided by Plaintiffs, the Contractor agreed to utilize its own equipment and vehicles to exclusively transport freight on behalf of the Carrier. Id. Importantly, the Agreement also provided that the "Carrier shall pay to Contractor a sum equal to 80 (%) percent of the gross revenues (after allowable deductions as provided herein) received by Carrier from Carrier's customers for the transportation of any freight by Contractor." Id. RSP Express, therefore, was to receive twenty percent of the gross revenues paid by the third-party shipper for each load the Plaintiffs transported, while Plaintiffs were to receive eighty percent. ECF No. 10-1, PageID.216.
Once Plaintiffs transported the freight, the Defendants mailed Plaintiffs Driver/Contractor Settlement statements that purported to represent the gross revenue paid by the third-party shipper. ECF No. 1, PageID.34. Plaintiffs allege that these statements were falsified because "Defendants would skim a portion" of the 80% amount and "misrepresent[ ] the gross revenues that RSP had actually received." ECF No. 12, PageID.287. Plaintiffs claim this was a nearly decades-long scheme that was only discovered by Plaintiffs after a non-party driver filed a similar lawsuit in 2018. Id. The Agreements relevant to the present case existed between 2006 and 2015. ECF No. 1, PageID.3. The Agreements were terminated in 2015 and RSP Express subsequently entered into new agreements with select contractors. ECF No. 10-1, PageID.216.
Additionally, Defendant NA Truck Repair is a separate truck repair company owned by Defendant Maria Pop. ECF No. 10-1, PageID.215; ECF No. 12, PageID.288. NA Truck Repair works on vehicles for both RSP Express and third-party clients. ECF No. 12, PageID.288. Plaintiffs purport that NA Truck Repair unlawfully tampered with the emission control systems in RSP Express vehicles. Id. Defendants allegedly failed to report these services on invoices or tax returns. Id. In doing so, Plaintiffs claim, Defendants’ tampering "made it more difficult for Plaintiffs to compete with other truck drivers whose vehicles have been illegally modified." Id.
Ashley v. United States , 37 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1029 (W.D. Tenn. 1997). "A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Sweeton v. Brown , 27 F.3d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Siviglia , 686 F.2d 832, 835 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied , 461 U.S. 918, 103 S.Ct. 1902, 77 L.Ed.2d 289 (1983) ). When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty. , 847 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 2017). A defendant may properly challenge a plaintiff's standing to sue under Rule 12(b)(1). Lyshe v. Levy , 854 F. 3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2017) ).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the court to make an assessment as to whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Rule 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ); Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). To meet this standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–80, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ().
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of his factual allegations as true. Lambert v. Hartman , 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008). While courts are required to accept the factual allegations in a complaint as true, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, the presumption of truth does not apply to a claimant's legal conclusions, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's pleading for relief must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Defendants move to dismiss all six of Plaintiffs’ claims based on (1) lack of standing; (2) statute of limitations expiration; (3) preemption; and (4) failure to state viable claims. Plaintiffs’ claims include two violations of the civil RICO statute 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Counts I and II); breach of contract (Count III); unjust enrichment (Count IV); promissory estoppel (Count V); and conversion (Count VI). The Court will address each of Defendants’ arguments in turn.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that "[f]ederal courts have constitutional authority to decide only ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ " Crawford v. Dep't of Treasury , 868 F.3d 438, 452 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III § 2) (citing Muskrat v. United States , 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911) ). "And there is no case or controversy if a plaintiff lacks standing to sue." Duncan v. Muzyn , 885 F.3d 422, 427 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) ). "A claimant bears the burden of establishing standing and must show it ‘for each claim he seeks to press.’ " Hagy v. Demers & Adams , 882 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) ). If a claimant fails to establish standing, a court must dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Lyshe v. Levy , 854 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2017) ...
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