Usletten v. City of Brookings
Decision Date | 17 February 1932 |
Docket Number | 6975. |
Parties | USLETTEN v. CITY OF BROOKINGS et al. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Brookings County; W. W. Knight, Judge.
On rehearing.
Judgment affirmed.
For former opinion, see 235 N.W. 705.
Cheever Collins & Cheever, of Brookings, and Bogue & Bogue, of Parker, for appellants.
Hall & Eidem, of Brookings, for respondent.
The decision of this court on a former appeal, reported in 53 S.D. 644, 222 N.W. 268, sustained the order of the trial court overruling demurrer to the complaint. After trial in the circuit court on the merits and decision on appeal in this court, 235 N.W. 705, the defendants made application for rehearing, which was granted.
This action was instituted for the recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Upon the occasion in question the plaintiff met a friend, Ben Togsed and they stopped to converse. Plaintiff leaned back against an iron railing which was intended to protect an opening in and along the inner side of a public sidewalk in the city of Brookings which afforded access to a cellar. The railing gave way at the point where it had been broken and fastened with wire, and plaintiff was precipitated into the opening and injured. On cross-examination, plaintiff testified:
Defendants at the close of plaintiff's case, as well as at the conclusion of the evidence, moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. Counsel for the defendants assert that the testimony of the plaintiff conclusively shows that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that a verdict should have been directed by the trial court in favor of the defendants. It is their contention that, if the plaintiff had used his faculties, he would have discovered not only the fact that the flange which supported the end of the rail which gave way was broken, but he would have discovered that the wire which had been used to bind the guard rail to the broken bracket on the iron post was loose, and that, if plaintiff had used his eyes for his own safety and preservation, he would never have been precipitated into the opening. Counsel urge that plaintiff's conduct did not conform to the required standard of care and prudence recently enunciated by this court in the cases of Descombaz v. Klock, 235 N.W. 502, 504, and Taecker v. Pickus et al., 235 N.W. 504, 505. The circumstances are entirely different. What is ordinary care under one state of facts may not constitute the same care under another or different state of facts. In other words, a careful and prudent person must make such observation as the circumstances reasonably require. The greater and more imminent the danger, the greater must be the care to be exercised.
In each of the cases referred to and relied upon by the defendants, the plaintiff sought the recovery of damages for injuries received in an automobile accident. In the first case cited, Descombaz v. Klock, the plaintiff, repairing a tire on the highway in front of a standing automobile, was held contributorily negligent in failing to step to the edge of the highway when he saw that a rear end collision with an approaching automobile was imminent. Under the circumstances the plaintiff was required to be alert for his own safety and to watch for the approach of automobiles. We quote from the opinion:
In Taecker v. Pickus et al., the plaintiff, driving an automobile, failed...
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