USSALEP v. DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, 00-AA-1467.
Decision Date | 07 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 00-AA-1467.,00-AA-1467. |
Citation | 809 A.2d 1184 |
Parties | UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICA LEADERSHIP EXCHANGE PROGRAM, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Jason C. Schwartz, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Michael A. Milwee, for respondent.
Before FARRELL and REID, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.
Petitioner United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP) appeals a final decision of the Department of Employment Services Office of Appeals and Review (DOES) affirming the appeals examiner's decision to hold it liable for unemployment benefits previously paid to Dr. Richard Betz without notice to petitioner. This case presents the question whether the final decision of DOES— that claimant was discharged through no fault of his own—was made in accordance with law.1 We reverse.
Dr. Betz was hired by the United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP) as a Project Manager for a specific project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USSALEP and Dr. Betz entered into an employment contract in 1994. The contract did not specify a termination date; however, it was understood by the parties that the expiration of the USAID funding agreement would end his responsibilities under the project agreement. Dr. Betz and USSALEP signed a new employment contract, dated October 1, 1996, reducing the number of days required to be worked each year. Dr. Betz worked until the termination of the USAID contract on June 28, 1997.
Dr. Betz applied for and received unemployment benefits from DOES. USSALEP did not receive notice that Dr. Betz applied for benefits, until they were billed by the DOES tax office for unemployment benefits that had already been disbursed. USSALEP, a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, had elected to "opt out" of unemployment insurance coverage under District of Columbia law. Hence it would be required to reimburse the Department for the amount of the award if Dr. Betz was entitled to benefits.
USSALEP contested the award of unemployment benefits and DOES granted a hearing to determine the employment relationship that existed between Dr. Betz and USSALEP. The lack of notice was cured by the hearing. During the hearing, testimony was elicited from Dr. Betz and Robert Hoen, the Executive Director of USSALEP. Dr. Betz testified that he neither quit nor was fired, and that he knew in advance that the end of the project would terminate his employment. Mr. Hoen testified that claimant left voluntarily at the end of the contract. The hearing examiner found that "the record shows that claimant was discharged due to the project ending," hence that Dr. Betz "remain[ed] eligible for receipt of unemployment compensation benefits." DOES affirmed the appeals examiner's decision stating:
While findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are binding on a reviewing court, and deference to the responsible administrator as to statutory interpretation is a must for such a court, questions of law are for the court. See Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Labor, 409 A.2d 164, 169 (D.C.1979)
(). Under the facts of this case, we review the final decision of DOES—that claimant was discharged through no fault of his own—as a matter of faulty application of law.
Petitioner argues that an employee whose termination occurs pursuant to mutually agreed terms of an employment contract voluntarily terminates his employment so as to be ineligible for unemployment compensation. Voluntariness means "voluntary in fact, within the ordinary meaning of that term" and voluntariness is "determined by reference to whether the employee's action was compelled by the employer rather than based on the employee's volition." Hockaday v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 443 A.2d 8, 10 (D.C.1982) (internal quotation and citation omitted). While a presumption that an employee leaves involuntarily is a matter of relevance in most cases, under the circumstances of this case, the presumption is not applicable since the relationship was mutually created with a third party funding source for a specific project. Voluntariness is addressed by the court on a case by case basis. See Cervantes v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 177 Conn. 132, 411 A.2d 921, 923 (1979)
().
The question whether Dr. Betz was "discharged" or "separated" through no fault of his own—hence an involuntary separation—depends on the understanding of the parties at the inception of the employment. In this case, the employment relationship was a trilateral relationship between Dr. Betz, USSALEP and USAID. It was understood that the employment was temporary, for a specific project, and only for the period during which funding was provided by USAID. At the hearing, Dr. Betz testified in response to the hearing examiner's questions, as follows:
Robert Hoen, testifying for USSALEP, made the following remarks:
A. But, now, keep in mind that the contract that ended was one that we originally built the whole—our employment contract on. It was understood at the beginning, of course, that [Dr. Betz] was hired specifically to work on this USAID contract that we were doing and work only until the [expiration] date of that contract, which was June 30th.
The hearing examiner concluded that respondent had been "discharged." The appeals examiner upheld that conclusion using the term "separated." Both these terms of necessity entail an affirmative action by the employer. No evidence of employer caused discharge is in the record. Thus, it can be said the finding of a discharge lacks substantial evidence to support it.
But more to the point, the conclusion that respondent was discharged is an error of law under the circumstances of this case. Dr. Betz fully understood that his compensation was provided by an entity separate from the employer, USAID, that the employment was tied to the task to be performed, and that upon its completion the employment relationship would simply evaporate or collapse of its own mutually agreed terms over which the employer lacked exclusive control. From the inception of the employment the departure of claimant was an "executory quit," the functional equivalent to a voluntary quit. Cf. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Reynolds Metals Co., 360 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Ky.1962)
(. ) Indeed, the record reflects that Dr. Betz acknowledged that he left voluntarily. This case is distinguishable from cases cited by the respondent. The court in Chicago Transit Auth. v. Didrickson, 276 Ill.App.3d 773, 213 Ill.Dec. 398, 659 N.E.2d 28, 32 (1995), held (Emphasis added.) In City of Lakin v. Kansas Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 19 Kan.App.2d 188, 865 P.2d 223, 225 (1993), the court states that "where a claimant had no realistic choice in determining the duration of employment, claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits at the end of the limited-term employment because he or she is out of work through no fault of his or hers" (citation omitted and emphasis added). Both cases involved situation in...
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US S. AFRICA LEADERSHIP EXCHANGE v. DOES
...Judge; TERRY, STEADMAN, SCHWELB,* FARRELL, RUIZ,*REID, GLICKMAN, and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges;* NEBEKER, Senior Judge. Prior report: 809 A.2d 1184. PER CURIAM. On consideration of respondent's petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc, and the response thereto, it is ORDERED by the me......