Ustick v. Ustick
| Citation | 657 P.2d 1083,104 Idaho 215 |
| Decision Date | 19 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 13890,13890 |
| Parties | Richard Leon USTICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Cross-Respondent, v. Anne Stephanie USTICK, Defendant-Respondent, and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
James C. Meservy and James T. Jones, of Seeley, Jones & Fuller, Jerome, for appellant.
Jeffrey E. Rolig, of Hepworth, Nungester & Felton, Twin Falls, for respondent.
Richard Ustick and Stephanie Harding met in August, 1978, and, after three months of courtship, were married in November. The following March, each filed for divorce against the other. Based on grounds of irreconcilable differences, the presiding magistrate entered a decree of divorce in favor of both parties on July 20, 1979, and decreed distribution of their community and separate property between them.
Central to this appeal, the magistrate determined that the sum of $53,088.89, which had been applied to the payment of the husband's delinquent Farmer's Home Administration (FmHA) debts in December, 1978, was a loan to the husband from the wife's separate property. The magistrate awarded judgment to the wife and against the husband in this amount plus interest at eight percent per annum. The judgment was appealed by the husband to the district court. The district court affirmed the judgment of the magistrate, approved a claim of homestead by the husband, and approved the satisfaction of an attorney fees lien against the husband's property. Both parties now appeal from the district court's determinations. We affirm the judgment of the magistrate but reverse the district court's determinations on the homestead and attorney's lien claims, for procedural reasons.
On this appeal, the husband contends the magistrate erred by entering the monetary judgment against him, and that the district court erred by not allowing a trial de novo in the proceeding upon appeal from the magistrate division. The wife cross-appeals, contending the district court erred by allowing the homestead claim of the husband and by allowing the husband's attorney to satisfy his lien for attorney fees from the proceeds of an execution sale of the husband's property. The sale was conducted under a writ of execution issued upon the judgment entered for the wife.
Preliminary to discussing the merits of the issues raised by the parties on this appeal, we will address two procedural inquiries posed by the wife affecting the appealability and scope of review of the issues asserted by the husband. The wife suggests that the judgment of the magistrate cannot be reviewed on this appeal for the following reasons.
First, she points out that in his notice of appeal the husband seeks review of a denial by the district court of a motion to reconsider its affirmance of the magistrate's judgment. She contends that denial of a "motion to reconsider" is not appealable, because the rules of civil procedure do not provide for "motions to reconsider." Her argument implies that if the denial of the motion to reconsider was not appealable, then the appeal from the affirmance of the judgment in this case was not timely. 1
Second, assuming the notice of appeal was timely in respect to the decision affirming the magistrate's judgment, the wife contends that our scope of review is limited to the decision of affirmance, and that the magistrate's judgment, per se, is not subject to review on appeal by this Court.
In support of her first procedural question, the wife cites Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1977), as authority for the proposition that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for motions to reconsider. In Obray a petition to reconsider a memorandum decision was presented to the trial court before that court had entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. The trial court treated the petition as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or to amend the judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld the trial court's treatment of the petition. Thus, while it was stated in Obray that the rules do not provide for a petition to reconsider a memorandum decision, 2 the result obtained in Obray indicates that if a petition is functionally the same as another motion which is recognized by the rules, it will be treated as though it had been properly labelled.
The posture of the present case, while it was before the district court, differed considerably from Obray. Here the request to reconsider was presented to the district court sitting as an appellate court, after that court had entered a decision affirming the magistrate's judgment. The request could not be treated as a rule 59(e) motion, because no judgment had been, or would be, entered by the district court. (n. 5, infra.) The request simply invited the district court to reconsider its decision affirming the trial court.
The husband's request to reconsider was, in essence, treated by the district court as a petition for rehearing, which is an application recognized and provided for by the rules of appellate procedure. 3 We note that the rules of procedure governing appeals from the magistrate division to the district court 4 do not explicitly provide for either motions to reconsider or petitions for rehearing. However, rule 83(b), I.R.C.P., specifically provides that, unless the district court orders a trial de novo, "[a]ll appeals from the magistrate's division shall be heard by the district court as an appellate proceeding." See also I.R.C.P. 83(u). Further, Rule 83(x) provides that "[a]ny appellate procedure not specified or covered by these rules shall be in accordance with the appropriate rule of the ... [Idaho Appellate Rules] to the extent the same is not contrary to this Rule 83."
Rule 42, I.A.R., allows for the filing of a petition for rehearing within twenty-one days after the filing date of the court's opinion on the appeal. Here the husband applied for reconsideration (although his application more properly should have been designated as a petition for rehearing) within twenty-one days of the district court's decision on the appeal. It was therefore timely filed and was an appropriate method for asking the district court to "reconsider" its appellate opinion.
We note also that although petitions for rehearing are not required under the present rules before seeking further appellate review by a higher court, neither is the higher review limited, under the rules, solely to the question of whether the application for rehearing should or should not have been granted. Commonly, the denial of a petition for rehearing preserves for review, by the higher appellate court, the merits of the decision entered by the lower court on appeal. See Idaho Appellate Rules 48, 116, 118, 122.
We hold that the request of the husband for reconsideration was timely filed, was properly treated by the district court as a petition for rehearing, and preserved the merits of the decision of the district court affirming the magistrate's judgment, for further appellate review.
Next, the wife contends that further review of the final judgment of the magistrate is not allowed, under the Idaho Appellate Rules, on appeal from the district court. She appears to argue that because the husband can only appeal from the "decision" of the district court, we cannot include the magistrate's judgment in our review. We do not agree with this contention.
Decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversing or remanding an appeal from the magistrate division are appealable. I.A.R. 11(a)(1). Winn v. Winn, 101 Idaho 270, 611 P.2d 1055 (1980). In Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court established a standard for further appellate review of a decision entered by a district court after it has sat as an appellate court, reviewing on the record a judgment entered following trial at the magistrate level. 5 This standard requires that the appeals court review the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id. at 561, 633 P.2d at 1139. See also Griffin v. Griffin, 102 Idaho 858, 860, 642 P.2d 949, 951 (Ct.App.1982). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then the district court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld on further appeal.
We conclude here that the judgment of the magistrate, as well as the decision of the district court affirming that judgment, are reviewable under the Nicholls standard. We turn next to discussion of the merits of the issues on this appeal.
The trial record discloses the following undisputed facts. The husband owned and operated an eighty-acre farm near Jerome, Idaho. His interest in the farm was subject to an outstanding purchase money loan from FmHA. The husband also had three other outstanding loans from FmHA for the operating expenses of the farm. In the fall of 1978, after the couple had met and had decided to marry, these debts were viewed as an impediment to the success of their relationship. The parties decided to postpone the marriage for one year so the husband could settle these debts.
However, in October, 1978, the wife underwent exploratory surgery. A malignant tumor was discovered and removed. The wife had custody of two dependent daughters by a prior marriage. She became very concerned about the future needs of her daughters--for a home and guardian--should her health problems worsen. These circumstances seem to have overridden the decision to postpone the marriage until after the husband's debts were settled, for in November the couple were wed.
Prior to meeting the husband, the wife had been a businesswoman with a home in Billings, Montana. She...
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