Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman

• Decision Date: 06 October 1915
• Docket Number: 2731
• Citation: 47 Utah 165,152 P. 178
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: UTAH COPPER CO. v. ECKMAN

152 P. 178

47 Utah 165

UTAH COPPER CO. v. ECKMAN

No. 2731

Supreme Court of Utah

October 6, 1915

Appeal from District Court, Third District; Hon. T. D. Lewis, Judge.

Action by the Utah Copper Company against Victor Eckman.

Judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

Parsons & Parsons for appellant.

Willard Hanson for respondent.

FRICK J. STRAUP, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

This was an action in ejectment to recover possession of a small parcel of ground about 5,665 square feet of the surface area of what is called the Copper Cent lode mining claim, and also another still smaller area of the Mirror lode mining claim located in the town of Bingham Canyon, Salt Lake county Utah. The area of the first-mentioned claim, if it were placed in rectangular form, would make a parcel of ground about 56x100 feet, and the smaller area, if carved into the same shape, would approximately make a parcel about 11x100 feet. The plaintiff alleged ownership in fee, that it was entitled to the immediate possession of said ground as part of the mining claims aforesaid, and that the defendant was wrongfully in possession of the particular areas before stated. The defendant admitted his possession of the parcels of ground in question, and alleged as a counterclaim that:

"On the 30th day of September, A. D. 1900, one R. S. Julian was the owner in fee simple, in the possession, and entitled to the possession of said premises, and that by virtue of mesne conveyances from said R. S. Julian and his successors in interest defendant has, since the 24th day of June, 1906, been the owner, in the possession, and entitled to the possession of said premises, asserting title thereto in good faith and in the full belief that he and his predecessors in interest by virtue of said different conveyances had good title and still continue to hold and possess said premises."

It is further alleged that he had made permanent improvements on said premises of the value of $ 3,000, that the value of said parcels of ground is $ 4,000, and that "he and his predecessors in interest for more than ten years have paid taxes and all other assessments against said property." The defendant prayed judgment:

That plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, and that the defendant "be given a decree awarding him the right of possession of said premises, or, if the plaintiff be adjudged entitled to recover possession of said premises, that defendant's claim for improvements be tried, and that he recover the same as provided by law, and for such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and equitable."

We remark that we have set forth the allegations of defendant's counterclaim and his prayer in full, for the reason that the allegations respecting the character of his title--that is, whether he claims it to be a title in fee from the original source or one by adverse possession and payment of taxes --are somewhat obscure, and so is his prayer. It will be observed that, if the defendant claims title in fee from the original source of title, then his defense is purely legal; but if he claims title by adverse possession and payment of taxes under our statute, his defense would be equitable. Of course, his claim for the value of improvements is equitable, but that is not a defense to the action.

After a hearing upon the foregoing issues the court found the facts as follows:

"That on or about the 30th day of September, 1900, and for a long time prior thereto, one R. S. Julian was the owner, in the possession, and entitled to the possession of the premises hereinafter described, and on said day duly conveyed the same to defendant's grantors, and ever since said 30th day of September, 1900, and for a long time prior thereto, defendant and his grantors have been in the possession of said premises, have erected dwellings thereon, and have made other substantial improvements, and have paid all taxes assessed against said premises during all of said time, and have for more than ten years openly and notoriously claimed and held possession adverse to plaintiff and its grantors."

No other material finding of fact was made by the court.

The court also made the following conclusions of law upon the facts:

"As a conclusion from the foregoing facts the court finds that the defendant is entitled to a decree awarding him the possession and right to possession of said premises."

Upon the facts and conclusion of law aforesaid judgment was entered by which it is adjudged that the defendant "be given the possession, the right to possession, and the title to said property," which is fully described as it is described in plaintiff's complaint. It was also adjudged "that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed." The plaintiff appeals from the judgment.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment are assailed. The evidence, without dispute, was to the effect that title to the Mirror lode claim passed from the United States by patent on December 18, 1901, and that the Copper Cent lode claim went to patent on May 21, 1907. At the trial plaintiff traced its title to the original source--that is, back to the United States--while defendant, for the purpose of establishing his title, relied exclusively on adverse possession and payment of taxes as required by our statute. In view that this action was commenced July 1, 1911, and that it is undisputed that the title to the Copper Cent lode mining claim did not pass from the United States until May 21, 1907, we cannot see how, under the decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court of the United States, the defendant can sustain his title by adverse possession to the area in question so far as it relates to the claim last mentioned. The rule which is applicable to a case like the one at bar is very clearly stated by Mr. Justice Field in Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 20 L.Ed. 534, in the following words:

"But neither in a separate suit in a federal court nor in an answer to an action of ejectment in a state court can the mere occupation of the demanded premises by plaintiffs or defendants for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations of the state be held to constitute a sufficient equity in their favor to control the legal title subsequently conveyed to others by the patent of the United States, without trenching upon the power of Congress in the disposition of the public lands. That power cannot be defeated or obstructed by any occupation of the premises before the issue of the patent, under state legislation, in whatever form or tribunal such occupation be asserted.

That case was followed in Redfield v. Parks, 132 U.S. 239, 249, 10 S.Ct. 83, 33 L.Ed. 327, and in Hays v. United States, 175 U.S. 248, 20 S.Ct. 80, 44 L.Ed. 150. This court, as it was bound to do, followed the doctrine laid down in the foregoing cases in Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah 64, 24 P. 755, Toltec Ranch Co. v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876, and in Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33, although in the latter case only an easement was in question. The principle which is applicable to the case at bar must, however, not be confounded or confused with the doctrine of adverse possession laid down in the following cases: Blumer v. Iowa etc., Land Co., 129 Iowa 32, 105 N.W. 342, 113 Am. St. Rep. 444; Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Wiese, 208 U.S. 234, 28 S.Ct. 294, 52 L.Ed. 466; Boe v. Arnold, 54 Ore. 52, 102 P. 290, 20 Ann. Cas. 533, and note. The doctrine that prevailed in those cases is stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Boe v. Arnold, supra, in the following words:

"One claiming title to land by adverse possession for (the statutory period) as against all persons, but recognizing the superior title of the United States government, and seeking in good faith to acquire that title, may assert such adverse possession as against any person claiming to be the owner under a prior...