Utah County v. Ivie

• Decision Date: 26 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 20040846.,20040846.
• Citation: 137 P.3d 797,2006 UT 33
• Parties: UTAH COUNTY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kay J. IVIE, Devon R. Ivie, Kristine J. Lee, Edward R. Lee, Spring Canyon Limited Partnership; and Canyon Acres Limited Partnership, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

137 P.3d 797

2006 UT 33

UTAH COUNTY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kay J. IVIE, Devon R. Ivie, Kristine J. Lee, Edward R. Lee, Spring Canyon Limited Partnership; and Canyon Acres Limited Partnership, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20040846.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 26, 2006.

Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, Robert J. Moore, Provo, for plaintiff.

M. Dale Jeffs, Provo, for defendant.

DURRANT, Justice:

¶ 1 This is the second case in which Appellants (collectively "Spring Canyon") have appeared before us to challenge local governments' attempts to condemn Spring Canyon property for the construction of a road. The road would connect two Provo City streets over an island of unincorporated Utah County. In the first case, Provo City v. Ivie, we held that Provo City did not have the statutory or constitutional power necessary to condemn Spring Canyon's property because the property is located in unincorporated Utah County. 2004 UT 30, ¶ 18, 94 P.3d 206. In this case, Spring Canyon disputes Utah County's action to condemn the same property and the district court's decision to grant Utah County immediate occupancy. During the pendency of the appeal in Provo City, Utah County contracted with Provo City ("the Agreement") and agreed to condemn Spring Canyon's property if Provo City would pay the expenses.

¶ 2 In this interlocutory appeal, Spring Canyon makes three main claims: first, that the condemnation action should be dismissed because the Agreement either exceeded the contracting parties' authority or evidenced a bad faith attempt to circumvent our decision in Provo City; second, that the district court improperly granted immediate occupancy because Spring Canyon was deprived of due process when Utah County failed to give notice of its factual basis for seeking immediate occupancy and the district court refused to allow discovery of that basis; and third, that the district court improperly granted immediate occupancy because Utah County's proof of necessity was inadequate.

¶ 3 Addressing these issues in turn, we first hold that Utah County and Provo City had authority to enter the Agreement, that this authority was not abrogated by the Interlocal Cooperation Act, and that the Agreement does not demonstrate bad faith. Second, we do not consider Spring Canyon's claim under the state constitution because Spring Canyon failed to adequately brief it, and we conclude that the federal constitution is satisfied where, as here, there is an adequate mechanism for obtaining compensation. Third, we affirm the district court's order of immediate occupancy because Spring Canyon has not demonstrated that the district court abused its broad discretion in weighing the equities in this case.

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In 1970, Utah County and Provo City first planned to, at some point, build a collector street between Provo Canyon Road at 4525 North and University Avenue at 4800 North. In June of 2002, traffic congestion in the area was such that Provo City instituted a condemnation action to acquire the property needed to build the road. Although the proposed road would connect two Provo City streets, it would cross over an island of unincorporated Utah County land owned by Appellants Kay J. Ivie, Devon R. Ivie, Kristine J. Lee, Edward R. Lee, Spring Canyon Limited Partnership, and Canyon Acres Limited Partnership (collectively "Spring Canyon"). The district court in that case originally granted an order of immediate occupancy, but, following an interlocutory appeal, we reversed the order and held that Provo City did not have the power to condemn land outside its corporate boundaries because (1) Provo is not a charter city and could therefore not avail itself of the extraterritorial condemnation power granted in article XI, section 5(b) of the Utah Constitution, and (2) no other then-existing statute granted them the power to do so.¹ Provo City v. Ivie, 2004 UT 30, ¶ 18, 94 P.3d 206.

¶ 5 In May of 2003, during the pendency of its appeal, Provo City entered into an agreement with Utah County purportedly under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-13-101 to -314 (2003 & Supp. 2005) (the "ICA"). The Agreement provided that Utah County would condemn the necessary property, and Provo City would pay all expenses required to do so. In May of 2004, following the Court's decision in Provo City v. Ivie, Utah County filed the condemnation complaint and motion for order of immediate occupancy that are at issue in this case. Spring Canyon subsequently filed a motion to dismiss based on the theory that Utah County was unlawfully "lend[ing] its condemning powers to Provo City." Prior to the September 1, 2004 hearing, Spring Canyon also filed a motion to allow discovery and an objection to the district court's consolidating the hearings for the motion to dismiss and the motion for order of immediate occupancy. On September 14, 2004, the district court denied Spring Canyon's motion to dismiss and issued an order of immediate occupancy in favor of Utah County. Spring Canyon then requested and was granted leave to file this interlocutory appeal to challenge both the denial of its motion to dismiss and the order of immediate occupancy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 Whether Utah County's condemnation action should be dismissed based on the Agreement is an issue of law, so we review the district court's decision for correctness. See Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, ¶ 5, 31 P.3d 537. The issue of whether Spring Canyon received due process is also an issue of law, so we grant no deference to the district court's decision. Vigil v. Div. of Child & Family Servs., 2005 UT App 43, ¶ 7, 107 P.3d 716.

¶ 7 Although both parties to this appeal state that we should review the third issue—whether there was sufficient proof to support the order of immediate occupancy — under a clearly erroneous standard, our prior cases have recognized that weighing the equities of an order of immediate occupancy is largely a discretionary function. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984). And we have noted that "[t]he granting of a motion for immediate occupancy has been held by this court primarily to be [within] the sound discretion of the trial court, reversible only because of obvious abuse thereof." State v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 926, 927 (1958). Thus, we apply the abuse of discretion standard to the third issue in this case. We discuss each of these issues in turn.

ANALYSIS

I. UTAH COUNTY'S AGREEMENT WITH PROVO CITY DOES NOT LIMIT ITS POWER TO CONDEMN SPRING CANYON'S PROPERTY

¶ 8 Spring Canyon's appeal of the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss depends entirely on the effect, if any, that the Agreement between Utah County and Provo City has on Utah County's condemnation power.² We will first discuss the validity of the Agreement and whether it limits Utah County's condemnation power. We will then discuss whether Utah County satisfied the requirements for exercising its condemnation power under Utah Code section 78-34-4, and specifically whether the existence of the Agreement mandates a finding of bad faith that undermines Utah County's condemnation authority.

A. Utah County and Provo City Were Authorized to Enter into the Agreement Pursuant to Their General Contracting Power

¶ 9 Spring Canyon argues that because Provo City lacks the power to condemn the subject property, both the Agreement and the exercise by Utah County of its eminent domain power pursuant to the Agreement were unlawful and invalid under the ICA. Spring Canyon's primary argument is that the ICA requires that all parties to an agreement have the power to do everything contemplated by the agreement. We conclude that local governments have authority to enter into agreements pursuant to their general contracting powers so long as each entity does not exceed its individual power, and, although the ICA provides for contracting only where all parties to an interlocal agreement have the power to do all acts under the agreement, the ICA does not abrogate local governments' general contracting power.

¶ 10 We first examine the limits of local governments' general contracting power. Before the Legislature passed the ICA in 1965, local governments had the power to contract with one another under general powers granted by the state constitution and various statutes. See Bair v. Layton City Corp., 6 Utah 2d 138, 307 P.2d 895, 902 & 902 n. 8 (1957) (citing various constitutional and statutory provisions that conferred authority for Layton City to contract with North Davis County Sewer District); Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-202 (2003) ("Municipalities may . . . enter into contracts . . . ."); id. § 17-50-302(1)(b) (2005) ("A county may . . . provide services, exercise powers, and perform functions that are reasonably related to the safety, health, morals, and welfare of their inhabitants, except as limited or prohibited by statute."). The limit on these general contracting powers was presumably that no governmental party to a contract could exceed its individual powers in fulfilling its obligation under the contract. Thus, two governmental entities of unequal power could contract in their areas of inequality so long as neither exceeded its own powers in performing the contract.

¶ 11 The Agreement in this case does not require any performance by either Utah County or Provo City that is beyond the individual authority of that entity. The terms of the Agreement material to this appeal require Utah County to condemn the property for the road and Provo City to pay the expenses of condemnation, installation, and maintenance of the road. Utah County has authority to condemn property under Utah Code section 17-50-302(2)(a)(ii). Provo City has authority "to appropriate money for any purpose that, in the judgment of the municipal legislative body, provides for the safety, health, prosperity, moral well-being, peace, order, comfort, or convenience of the...