Utah Dept. of Transp. v. 6200 South Associates

• Decision Date: 23 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 920268-CA,920268-CA
• Parties: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. 6200 SOUTH ASSOCIATES, a General Partnership; H. Roger Boyer; Kem C. Gardner; and Valley Mortgage Corporation, Beneficiary, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 462

872 P.2d 462

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. 6200 SOUTH ASSOCIATES, a General Partnership; H. Roger

Boyer; Kem C. Gardner; and Valley Mortgage

Corporation, Beneficiary, Defendants and

Appellants.

No. 920268-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 23, 1994.

Robert S. Campbell (argued), Kevin Egan Anderson, Mark A. Larsen, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.

Jan Graham, State Atty. Gen., Donald S. Coleman, Chief Physical Resources Div. (argued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.

Before BILLINGS, DAVIS and GREENWOOD, JJ.

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Appellant, 6200 South Associates (Associates), appeals the trial court's Judgment of Just Compensation determining the fair market value of a portion of Associates's land condemned by the State and severance damages to the remaining property. Associates claims the trial court made erroneous rulings with respect to the scope of cross-examination and the admissibility of certain evidence and that both the individual and cumulative effects of these errors warrant reversal for a new trial. We affirm.

FACTS

On February 5, 1988, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) filed a complaint in this action to condemn 1.73 acres of a 21.23 acre unimproved parcel of land (the property) owned by Associates, for construction of a freeway interchange and connecting road to Wasatch Boulevard in Salt Lake City. The property, roughly rectangular in shape, is located in what is now the southeast quadrant of the I-215 freeway interchange (commonly referred to as the Knudsen's Corner Interchange) located just east of Holladay Boulevard and south of 6200 South. This was the third condemnation action brought by UDOT or its predecessor, the Utah State Road Commission, to condemn parcels of and access rights to the property.

The first two condemnation actions occurred in 1963 and 1973. At that time, the State intended to construct a "diamond" ¹ interchange at the same location as the current interchange. Plans for the diamond interchange included construction of a frontage road along the western edge of the property, and relocation and widening of a portion of 6200 South so that it would align with the interchange. If the diamond interchange had been constructed as planned, the property would have been accessible from the west by the frontage road, from the north by 6200 South, and from the east by 3000 East.

In 1986, the Federal Highway Administration approved a design change sought by UDOT for the Knudsen's Corner Interchange. UDOT was concerned about the capacity and accompanying safety problems of a diamond interchange due to revisions in traffic volume estimates for future years and determined that an "urban" interchange ² would be better suited to handle traffic anticipated on this interchange. An urban interchange permits smoother and freer movement of traffic in peak hours.

The change in plans resulted in this third condemnation action in which UDOT acquired three parcels of land totalling 1.73 acres, along with all access rights to the property from the west and north. The new urban design interchange plans eliminated the frontage road and extended the nonaccess line along 6200 South along the full length of the property. As a result, the property is currently accessible only from 3000 East.

At trial, the sole matter before the jury was the appropriate compensation due Associates for the condemned property. The amount of compensation included two separate, but related, components--the value of the taken property itself and severance compensation for the effect of the loss of access rights on the remaining parcel of land. This determination was made by comparing the value of the property before and after the taking. At an in limine hearing, the trial court ruled that the property's appraisal in its "before" condition should assume that the diamond interchange was in existence, and therefore that there was access to the property from the north, west, and east. The basis for this in limine order was that the plans for the diamond interchange had been finalized, and Associates was thus entitled to rely on this fact at the time it purchased the property in 1980.

At trial, Associates's experts claimed that the fair market value of the land taken was between $294,069 and $324,230, while UDOT's experts placed the condemned land's fair market value at between $233,746 and $282,800. The main point of contention, however, concerned the value of Associates's lost access to the remaining property. Associates's experts alleged that the value of the loss of access to the remaining property was between $1,189,127 and $1,316,534. UDOT, on the other hand, argued that the property actually benefitted by the changed design of the interchange due to the smoother flow of traffic and the intersection created at 3000 East. Accordingly, UDOT asserted that damages for lost access rights to the property should be measured by the cost to improve access roads from 3000 East. The State estimated this cost at between $28,800 and $30,870. The jury found the fair market value of the taken property to be $271,447.20 and damage to the remaining property caused by the loss of access to be $144,607.60.

At the conclusion of the trial, Associates filed a Motion for Additur or in the Alternative a New Trial. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Associates has framed the four issues on appeal as follows: (1) Did the trial court err when it refused to strike impermissible testimony concerning an alleged offer to purchase a portion of the property? (2) Did the trial court err when it permitted UDOT's expert to testify about access to other freeway interchange properties without establishing the requisite foundation of comparability? (3) Are hypothetical questions to expert witnesses on cross-examination limited to facts in evidence in the case? (4) Did the trial court err by permitting UDOT to introduce evidence--allegedly inconsistent with the in limine ruling--regarding the flaws of the approved diamond interchange?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, we employ two standards of review. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). With respect to the trial court's selection, interpretation, and application of a particular rule of evidence, we apply a correction of error standard. Id. (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-72 (Utah 1993)). When the rule of evidence requires the trial court to balance specified factors to determine admissibility, "[a]buse of discretion or reasonability is the appropriate standard." Id. (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270 n. 11). Further, even where error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all of the evidence presented at trial, it appears that " 'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached.' " Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Utah App.1988) (quoting State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1988)); accord Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hosp., 7 Utah 2d 39, 44, 318 P.2d 330, 333 (1957).

ANALYSIS

Admissibility of Offers to Purchase

John C. Brown, an appraisal witness for Associates, stated that "all of the developable access to the subject property [has] been acquired by the government in the action.... It is a piece of property that no longer has any commercial development potential." UDOT rebutted this testimony with testimony by its expert appraisal witness, David VanDrimmelen, who claimed that there were other comparable properties that had been developed commercially. Further, he said that he knew this property could be used for commercial purposes because one of Associates's partners had told him that Chevron was interested in purchasing some of the property in the northeast corner of the site for a convenience store. VanDrimmelen stated that Chevron had offered to purchase the land for $18 per square foot if there were access to the property from 6200 South, and for $10-12 per square foot if the access were via 3000 East. These figures were from 250% to 450% higher than any appraisal of the property presented during trial.

Associates promptly objected to VanDrimmelen's testimony as an inadmissible offer to purchase, ³ and the trial court sustained the objection, ruling that "the portion of the answer that related to a negotiated offer will be stricken from the record." Associates renewed the objection outside the presence of the jury a short while later, arguing that "the entire area ought to go out, not just the area with regard to the offers, but--specifically, as to those, it ought to--but also the entire area of examination ought to go out." The court declined to strike all of VanDrimmelen's testimony regarding commercial development of comparable properties, and instructed the jury:

THE COURT: There has been some testimony given by the witness now on the stand regarding statements made by a Mr. Jacobsen, and confirmed by Chevron Oil, regarding the value of the questioned property per square foot. Specifically, there was a reference of $18 per square foot with access, $12 per square foot without access. Supposedly, that value was confirmed by a representative of Chevron Oil. Disregard the portion of the expert witness' testimony that referred to that subject matter.

(Emphasis added.)

Associates asserts that the trial court only ordered the dollar amount of the offer to be stricken, arguing that if the alleged offering price is inadmissible, then the fact of the offer, and related evidence, is equally inadmissible. Associates has not cited any authority for this position and there appears to be at least some contrary case law. In City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.1960), the court distinguished between inquiries and offers to purchase...