Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah

• Decision Date: 11 March 1925
• Docket Number: 4215
• Citation: 65 Utah 100,234 P. 697
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: UTAH FUEL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

234 P. 697

65 Utah 100

UTAH FUEL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

No. 4215

Supreme Court of Utah

March 11, 1925

Action by the Utah Fuel Company against the Industrial Commission of Utah and another to annul an award of compensation in favor of John Doe Saris (since named Bertram S. Saris) by the Industrial Commission.

AWARD AFFIRMED.

Ferdinand Erickson, and H. J. Binch, both of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Robinson, Asst. Atty Gen., for defendants.

FRICK J. GIDEON, C. J., and THURMAN, CHERRY, and STRAUP, JJ concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

The Utah Fuel Company, a corporation, hereinafter called plaintiff, makes this application to annul a certain award made in favor of one John Doe Saris (since named Bertram S. Saris), by the Industrial Commission of Utah hereinafter called Commission, upon the ground that in making said award the Commission acted in excess of its powers and jurisdiction.

The record shows that, pursuant to the Industrial Act of this state (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 3061-3165), one Eliza Clark Saris, hereinafter called applicant, on the 15th day of March, 1924, made application to the Commission for compensation "for herself and for and in behalf of her unborn child," called John Doe Saris in the application, and who will hereinafter be designated as beneficiary; that compensation was asked on account of the death of the applicant's husband, Sam Saris, who was killed while in the employ of the plaintiff in its coal mine at Castle Gate, Utah, on the 8th day of March, 1924; that a hearing was duly had upon the application, at which hearing it was shown that the applicant was married to Sam Saris, hereinafter called the deceased, on the 16th day of June, 1923; that they lived together as husband and wife until his death; that the deceased, before marrying the applicant, had been married to one Ruby Saris, a sister of the applicant, and that a divorce had been duly granted in the district court of Carbon county, Utah, on the 25th day of April, 1923, dissolving the marriage relation existing between deceased and said Ruby Saris; that the divorce was granted less than two months prior to the marriage of the deceased to the applicant; that on the 8th day of March, 1924, the deceased was accidentally killed in the course of his employment while working in plaintiff's coal mine at Castle Gate, Utah; that on the 15th day of June, 1924, the applicant filed her application for compensation as aforesaid; that the wages earned by the deceased at the time of his death were sufficient to entitle those dependent upon him to the maximum amount allowed under the Industrial Act, to wit, $ 16 per week; that said applicant was pregnant when she made her application for compensation, and that thereafter, on the 28th day of August, 1924, she gave birth to the beneficiary herein; that the beneficiary is the child of the deceased, and is the fruit of the marriage between him and the applicant. The Commission found all the other jurisdictional and material facts. The foregoing, however, are sufficient for the purposes of this review.

The Commission decided and held that, in view that the applicant and the deceased were married prior to the time that the divorce granted to the deceased had become final, that for that reason the marriage between the applicant and the deceased was null and void, and hence the applicant was not the legal widow of the deceased, and that she was not legally a dependent under the Industrial Act. Her claim for compensation for and on her own behalf was, therefore, disallowed. The Commission, however, decided and held that by virtue of the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6413, the beneficiary was the legitimate posthumous child of the deceased, and was dependent upon him for support, and therefore was entitled to compensation.

The Commission accordingly made an award of $ 16 per week, for a period of not exceeding 312 weeks, in favor of the beneficiary. The plaintiff duly filed its application for a rehearing before the Commission, which was denied, and this proceeding followed.

Plaintiff's first contention is that the application for compensation in this case was not made by a person authorized by law to make the application, and that therefore the Commission was without authority or jurisdiction to entertain the application. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 3141, as amended by chapter 67, Laws Utah 1921, so far as material here, provides:

"* * * In all cases of death where the dependents are a widow and one or more minor children, it shall be sufficient for the widow to make application to the commission on behalf of herself and minor children; and in cases where all of the dependents are minors, the application shall be made by the guardian or next friend of such minor dependents. * * *"

Section 3140 of that compilation, as amended by chapter 67 aforesaid, provides that a female child under the age of 18 years and a male child under the age of 16 years shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employe, and shall be presumed to be so dependent upon the parent with whom such child is living at the time of the death of such parent. The section further provides that the word child "shall include a posthumous child," etc. If, therefore, the applicant had been legally married to the deceased, there could be no question respecting her legal right to make the application on behalf of her unborn child. Does the fact that it developed at the hearing that her marriage was void affect the jurisdiction of the Commission? The applicant clearly had a right to make an application for compensation on her own behalf, and the Commission had jurisdiction to hear and determine her application either for or against her. True it is that in view that she was not the legal wife of the deceased she was not legally entitled to compensation. The Commission, however, could not decide in advance of her application whether she was legally entitled to compensation or not. That could only be determined after the facts respecting her relationship to the deceased had been legally established. The Commission, therefore, had jurisdiction of the application when it was made, and it had the power under the Industrial Act to decide, just as it did decide, that the applicant was not the legal wife of the deceased and therefore not entitled to compensation. Upon the other hand, the Commission also had the power to determine and decide whether or not, the beneficiary was the child of and legally dependent upon the deceased, and whether as such child he was entitled to compensation. The mere fact that the Commission may make an erroneous decision does not affect its jurisdiction to hear and decide. Moreover, in view that no objection was made to the application before the Commission, either on the original hearing or on the rehearing, the objection comes too late. We, however, prefer to base our decision upon the broad ground that the applicant, as the mother of the beneficiary, had the legal right under the statute to make the application. There is, therefore, no merit in this contention, and it is overruled.

It is further insisted that the award in favor of the beneficiary is contrary to law, for the reason that under the law he is merely the illegitimate child of the deceased, and hence is not protected by our Industrial Act. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6413, reads as follows:

"Every illegitimate child is an heir of the person who acknowledges himself to be the father of such child; and in all cases is an heir of his mother; and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock. The issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved by divorce, are legitimate."

It is strenuously urged by plaintiff's counsel that the provisions of that sec...