Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah

• Decision Date: 13 November 1924
• Docket Number: 4193
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: UTAH FUEL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

230 P. 681

64 Utah 328

UTAH FUEL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

No. 4193

Supreme Court of Utah

November 13, 1924

Original proceeding by the Utah Fuel Company against the Industrial Commission of Utah and John Willis, by Cora Willis, his mother, to review an award under the Workmen's Compensation Law.

AWARD AFFIRMED.

Ray &amp Rawlins and Ferdinand Erickson, all of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Robinson, Asst. Atty Gen., for defendants.

GIDEON J. WEBER, C. J., and FRICK and CHERRY, JJ., and ERICKSON, District Judge, concur. THURMAN, J., did not participate.

OPINION

GIDEON, J.

This is a proceeding to review an award made by the Industrial Commission in favour of John Willis, a boy ten years of age. The facts are not in dispute. Ed. Willis was killed in an accident on March 8, 1924, while employed by the Utah Fuel Company. Dependency in fact is not controverted.

Cora Willis, the mother of the infant, and the deceased had been living together ostensibly as husband and wife for more than six years prior to the date of the accident. They were not married. During all of the time it is without question that the mother had a husband living from whom she had not been divorced, and the deceased had a wife living from whom he had not been divorced. Cora Willis was married in the state of Missouri to a man by the name of Johnson. He was convicted of some offense and sent to prison. Thereafter she came to the town of Sego in this state, and there met the deceased, who was then living apart from his wife. At that time the two established a household. The woman kept the home and the deceased supported both the mother and child. More than six years prior to the accident they removed from that place to Castlegate, where the deceased met his death by accident while in the employ of the fuel company. During all the years they resided at Castlegate the deceased maintained a place of residence, introduced Mrs. Johnson as his wife; and they were known and reputed in the community to be man and wife. During that time the deceased supported the child as well as his mother, gave the boy his name, sent him to school where he was registered under the name of John Willis. That relationship continued until the date of the death of Willis. John Johnson, known also as John Willis, was in no way related to the deceased other than as above outlined.

Cora Johnson, known as Cora Willis, made application to the Industrial Commission for adjustment of compensation for herself and, as guardian, for her minor child. The Commission refused to award Mrs. Johnson compensation, but made an award to the child basing the same upon that provision of the statute designating as dependents members of the family at the time of the accident. That provision of the statute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 3140, subd. 5, as amended by chapter 67, Laws Utah 1921), enumerating dependents reads as follows:

"The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employe:

"(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death.

"(b) A female child or female children under the age of eighteen years and a male child or male children under the age of sixteen years (or over such ages if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning), upon the parent with whom he is living at the time of the death of such parent.

"In all other cases, the question of dependency, * * * shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such employe, but no person shall be considered as dependent unless a member of the family of the deceased employe, or bears to him the relation of husband or widow, lineal descendent, ancestor, or brother or sister. The word 'child' as used in this title shall include a posthumous child, and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and sisters shall be included in the words 'brother or sister' as above used."

The entire controversy here revolves around the question whether the boy, at the time of the death of Ed. Willis, was a member of Willis' family. Just what relationship must exist between individuals to constitute a family, or to make each individual a member of the same family, probably cannot be stated in any general or comprehensive definition. Many statements in the opinions of the courts can be found enumerating certain elements which are necessary to constitute a family. These statements are usually employed in opinions in which the courts are considering certain legislative enactments and are necessarily limited to the determination of what the lawmaking body intended by the particular statutes under consideration. It would aid little in determining the legislative intent in enacting the statute quoted above to write into this opinion the various definitions found in the authorities of what constitutes a family. It is however, in our judgment, clearly deducible from the weight of authority that the family relationship is a social status and not one necessarily founded upon contract; also that the individuals may be members of the same family without sustaining to each other any blood relationship. There must, however, be some legal or moral obligation for support existing between the individuals composing the family.

In 12 A. & E. Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 89, under the title "Exemptions," it is said

"A 'family' has been defined to be 'a collection of persons living together under one head,' but this definition is too broad. It would include collections of persons which have repeatedly been held not to constitute a family within the meaning of the exemption laws. The term, as used in these laws, means something more than this. According to the weight of authority it means a collection of persons living together under one head, under such circumstances or conditions that the head is under a legal or moral obligation to support the other members, and the other members are dependent upon him for support."

That a "member of the family," as that phrase is used in the statute quoted, may be other than a blood relative of the deceased is apparent from the wording of the statute itself. The statute provides what individuals sustaining blood relationship to the deceased shall be considered dependents and also provides in addition that persons who are members of the family of the deceased may be dependents. The statute is that "no person shall be considered as dependent unless a member of the family of the deceased employe, or bears to him" certain kinship specified. It is clear from that statute that the Legislature intended to give others than the blood relations mentioned in the section the right to claim compensation as dependents by reason of being members of the family of the deceased. Otherwise the insertion of the...