Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County

Decision Date16 September 1922
Docket Number3694
Citation60 Utah 491,210 P. 106
CourtUtah Supreme Court
PartiesUTAH-IDAHO SUGAR CO. v. SALT LAKE COUNTY et al

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; J Louis Brown, Judge.

Action by the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company against Salt Lake County and others. From a decree granting part of the relief asked, both parties appeal.

AFFIRMED.

King Straup, Nibley & Leatherwood and Young & Boyle, all of Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Arthur E. Moreton, Co. Atty., Geo. G. Armstrong, Asst. Co. Atty and Richards & Mitchell, all of Salt Lake City, for appellants.

FRICK J. CORFMAN, C. J., THURMAN, J., concurring. GIDEON, J. WEBER, J., dissenting in part.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, a corporation, hereinafter called plaintiff, brought this action in the district court of Salt Lake county against Salt Lake county and the individuals named as treasurer, assessor, auditor, and the three county commissioners of said county hereinafter designated defendants, to enjoin them from collecting a certain tax, which was assessed against the plaintiff and which plaintiff alleged was illegal and void. The district court enjoined the defendants from collecting a portion of the alleged illegal tax, and refused to enjoin the collection of a certain portion as will hereinafter more fully appear. The defendants appealed to this court from that part of the judgment which enjoins them from collecting the tax as aforesaid, while the plaintiff appealed from that part on which an injunction was denied. The appeal was duly submitted to this court and a decision was handed down, in which by a divided court (Mr. Justice Thurman dissenting) it was held that, while the whole of that part of the tax which the district court enjoined was a legal tax, yet that only a part thereof was legally collectible by Salt Lake county, and that that part which the court had refused to enjoin was legally collectible by said county. As to the first part, therefore, the judgment was in part reversed by this court, while as to the second part it was affirmed. The plaintiff in due time filed an elaborate petition for a rehearing. Defendants joined issue thereon, and also prayed that they be given a rehearing on the proposition that the whole tax was collectible by Salt Lake county. The different members of the court entertained serious doubts respecting the correctness of the decision as handed down, and therefore a rehearing was granted, and the whole case was reopened for argument. The case was most elaborately argued by both sides in oral arguments, and by additional briefs, and was again submitted. A majority of the court being now of the opinion that the former decision should not be adhered to, this decision is substituted therefor.

In view that the findings of the district court fully reflect the pleadings and issues, together with the evidence, we have deemed it more convenient to merely set forth the findings somewhat in detail, instead of referring to the pleadings. The assignments which assail the findings will be referred to in the course of the opinion wherever deemed necessary. In view that the findings are very lengthy and go into great detail, we shall state them in condensed form only. For more convenient reference we shall retain the original numbering of the paragraphs of the findings. The court found:

(1) That plaintiff is a corporation of the state of Utah and that it was also doing business in the states of Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada in the production, manufacture, and sale of beet sugar, and that it maintained its general office at Salt Lake City, Utah.

(2) That at all times stated in the complaint and on the 1st day of January, 1918, and prior thereto, plaintiff owned and operated sugar factories at the following places: Lehi, Payson, and Spanish Fork in Utah county; Garland, in Box Elder county; Elsinore, in Sevier county, and West Jordan, Salt Lake county, all in the state of Utah; that it also owned and operated factories at Idaho Falls, Sugar City, Blackfoot, and Shelley in the state of Idaho; also one at Grant's Pass, Or., one at Sunnyside and another at North Yakima, state of Washington. The only factory owned and operated by the plaintiff in Salt Lake county was the one at West Jordan.

(3) That at all times stated plaintiff maintained offices in all of the counties aforesaid in the state of Utah in connection with its said factories, and, also maintained offices in connection with its plants in the states of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington; that comparatively only a small part of its business and operations was carried on in Salt Lake county, and that by far the greater part of plaintiff's assets and property was in counties of the state of Utah other than Salt Lake county and in states other than the state of Utah.

(4) That on the 1st day of January, 1918, plaintiff owned real estate and improvements thereon in Salt Lake county; that plaintiff's said real estate and improvements in said county were assessed at the value of $ 271,575, and valuation notices of said assessment were given plaintiff, in which notices the valuation was given as stated above; that said valuation and assessment, including the real estate and plant at West Jordan, did not include the machinery, which was valued and assessed separately from the real estate and improvements; that plaintiff, for the year 1918, was also assessed for personal property in Salt Lake county, including the machinery aforesaid at West Jordan plant, at the total valuation of $ 420,505; that notices of said assessment and valuation were duly given to the plaintiff; that prior to the commencement of this action plaintiff had paid all of the taxes on the valuations and assessments aforesaid, amounting to $ 8,381.36.

(5) That after giving the valuation notices aforesaid and between the 1st day of May and the 1st day of June, 1918, the defendants, county assessor and county treasurer, gave or caused to be given the plaintiff two additional valuation notices, one for $ 10,000,000, in which the property valued and assessed was described only as "$ 10,000,000.00 personal property," and the other in the sum of $ 167,180, in which the property was described only as "intangible property at West Jordan factory"; that "no other description, enumeration or specification of property, either as to kind, character, or quality, was made or given; that upon inquiry by plaintiff of said assessor respecting said property he refused, or was unable, to give any further description except that said assessments were for "intangible property," but refused, or was unable "to give the nature or character of said intangible property."

(6) In this paragraph of the findings the facts are fully set forth with respect to the proceedings had before the Salt Lake county board of equalization. Among other things the court found that plaintiff had made timely and repeated protests to said valuations and of said $ 10,000,000 and said $ 167,180 assessments, and demanded a cancellation thereof; that the plaintiff had no such property as was thus attempted to be valued or assessed either real or personal, in Salt Lake county, and that it had no other than the two items that were valued and assessed by the county assessor, to wit, real estate and improvements, $ 271,575 and personal property, including the machinery of the value of $ 420,505, making a total in said Salt Lake county of $ 692,080, and, specifically, that plaintiff had "no such property in Salt Lake county as was sought to be assessed for $ 167,180, or any part thereof, or for said $ 10,000,000 or any part thereof."

(7) The court then found in detail the facts respecting the controversy between the parties with regard to the said two items of property and found that: The plaintiff proved before said board that it had "no tangible or intangible property of any kind in Salt Lake county on January 1, 1918, or for that taxing year," except what was contained and described in said valuation of $ 692,080, and that such was all the property plaintiff had in Salt Lake county. That the only claim upon which the defendants based the right to assess said $ 10,000,000 was "a printed annual statement of the plaintiff, which was a statement showing the financial condition of the plaintiff on the 28th day of February, 1918, and which was substantially the financial condition of the plaintiff on January 1, 1918. That a copy of said statement was admitted in evidence upon the trial, and reads as follows:

ASSETS.

Real estate, plants, canals, etc., less depreciation

$ 16,562,477 43

Railroad spurs

89,306 30

Irrigation stocks

3,255 00

Autos, horses, harness and farm equipment

98,285 58

Furniture and fixtures

27,515 84

Advance charges to operations

101,238 67

Advances on contracts and new operations

85,225 34

Cash and convertible assets:

Cash

$ 112,135 10

Bills receivable

2,106,859 08

Accounts receivable

1,221,690 75

Stocks and bonds

476,366 97

Mortgage loans

536,513 49

Unpaid contracts and agreements

538,997 44

Accrued interest receivable

32,003 47

Sugar, molasses, and pulp

3,429,860 30

Beet seed

557,515 38

Prepaid on beet seed

16,679 77

Supplies

803,329 13

9,831,950 88

$ 26,799,255 04

LIABILITIES.

Capital stock:

Authorized

$ 30,000,000 00

Unissued

6,373,650 00

23,626,350 00

Reserve for doubtful accounts

90,000 00

Current liabilities:

Bills payable

1,042,685 32

Accounts payable

151,312 70

Income taxes payable

367,823 90

Accrued interest payable

4,852 20

Unpaid pay roll

79,159 26

Freight and discount on sugar

59,949 31

Sundries

3,267 73

Total current liabilities

1,709,050 42

Surplus

1,373,824 62

Total liabilities

$ 26,799,225 04

That the assessor "through...

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