Utah Public Emp. Ass'n v. State, 16616
| Decision Date | 03 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 16616,16616 |
| Parties | UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION and Larry Fields, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of Utah and Scott M. Matheson, Governor, State of Utah, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
J. Francis Valerga, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Michael L. Deamer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
This appeal is from a summary judgment upholding a policy directive issued by the Governor of the State of Utah.
Plaintiff, Utah Public Employees' Association (hereafter "Association") challenges the ruling below on behalf of the employees of the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (hereafter "DWR"). The DWR conducts a yearly drawing for "once-in-a-lifetime" hunting permits. The drawing covers the hunts for buffalo, big horn sheep, and moose, for which a total of approximately 130 permits are issued each year.
Prior to 1978, all DWR employees (some 350 individuals) were free to participate in the permit drawings. In 1978, from among 3,181 applicants, three DWR employees obtained permits. One of these employees, in fact, managed to secure two permits one for sheep and one for buffalo.
Apparently in response to suggestions of impropriety prompted by what appears to be a disproportionate distribution of permits within the DWR, the Governor issued a policy statement, dated November 7, 1978, barring all DWR employees from participation in future drawings. In response to this directive, the Association brought action to secure injunctive and declaratory relief. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted the state's motion, and ruled that the Governor's actions fell within the constitutionally prescribed prerogatives of his office, and violated no other legal or constitutional restrictions. From that ruling the Association appeals.
The Association's principal contention on appeal is that the directive violates the DWR employees' right of equal protection of the law, in that several less burdensome alternatives exist for accomplishing the same result that the Governor was seeking in taking the policy position in question. 1
Under traditional equal protection analysis, a classification which treats one group of persons differently from the whole must be merely rationally related to a valid pubic purpose, and less burdensome alternatives need not be examined. 2 However, the Association attempts to characterize the Governor's policy decision as impinging upon a fundamental right, which would require that the classification be subjected to strict scrutiny. Under this analysis, the state must bear the additional burden of establishing the existence of a compelling state interest which justifies the classification. 3
The catalog of fundamental interests is relatively small to date, and includes such things as the rights to vote, to procreate and to travel interstate. The Association urges that for DWR employees, the opportunity to hunt wild buffalo, sheep, and moose is also a fundamental right. The argument misconstrues the nature of this special constitutional protection. A right or interest does not invoke strict scrutiny just because it is important to the aggrieved party. Only those rights which form an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society can be called fundamental. 4 We do not believe that the right to enter a hunting permit drawing rises to such a standard.
Concluding, therefore, that we are not dealing with a fundamental right and that the strict scrutiny test does not apply, the validity of the Governor's policy must be measured by the traditional rational basis test referred to supra. The principles of such analysis were stated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company 5 as follows:
1. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
The Board of Big Game Control has been given the general duty and authority to establish DWR policy in all matters relating to the harvest of big game animals. 6 The Governor, however, has a mandate to supervise the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers. 7 Clearly, the drawing conducted by the DWR is an official ministerial act 8 under the Governor's supervision. The Governor and all public employees have a responsibility to avoid all actual and potential conflicts of interest between their public duties and their private interests. 9 U.C.A., 1953, 67-16-4 specifically provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
. . . No public officer or public employee shall:
(3) Use or attempt to use his official position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others.
We are convinced that the Governor's policy was rationally related to its avowed purpose "to clear up any misunderstanding that may arise about the propriety of Wildlife personnel participating in a drawing of this kind." Although there is no evidence of impropriety, it clearly lies within the prerogative of the Governor to adopt a policy so as to avoid even the appearance thereof. If a DWR employee is not directly involved in conducting the drawing, at the very least, he has direct contact with those employees who are. Furthermore, it is arguable that DWR employees with permits could have a competitive edge over hunters given their knowledge about the habits and whereabouts of the herds...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Condemarin v. University Hosp.
...Kan. 748, 760, 408 P.2d 877, 887 (1965), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 806, 97 S.Ct. 41, 50 L.Ed.2d 67 (1976).9 Utah Pub. Employees' Ass'n v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911)); Sambs, 97 Wis.2d ......
-
State v. Bell
...259 (Okla.Ct.Crim.App.1980); Mason, 99 Misc.2d at 585, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 984; Smith, 444 S.W.2d at 943-44.54 Utah Public Employees' Ass'n v. Utah, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lindsley, 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337).55 Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-1 (1987) (emphasis added) (repealed and......
-
Gallivan v. Walker, 20020545.
...1383-84 (Colo.1994) (en banc). For decades, we have recognized that the right to vote is a fundamental right. Pub. Employees' Ass'n v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980). [n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws......
-
State v. James
...266 (Utah 1986); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-05, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).50 Utah Public Employees' Ass'n v. Utah, 610 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911)); see also......