Utah Republican Party v. Cox

• Decision Date: 15 April 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:16-cv-00038-DN
• Citation: 178 F.Supp.3d 1150
• Parties: Utah Republican Party, Plaintiff, Utah Democratic Party, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. Spencer J. Cox, in his Official Capacity as Lieutenant Governor of Utah, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

178 F.Supp.3d 1150

Utah Republican Party, Plaintiff,

Utah Democratic Party, Intervenor Plaintiff,

v.Spencer J. Cox, in his Official Capacity as Lieutenant Governor of Utah, Defendant.

Case No. 2:16-cv-00038-DN

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.

Signed April 15, 2016

Christ T. Troupis, Troupis Law Office PA, Eagle, ID, Marcus R. Mumford, Mumford PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff.

David N. Wolf, Parker Douglas, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

• DENYING [37] MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS;

• DENYING [38] MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS;

• DENYING [41] MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

• ENTERING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

David Nuffer

, United States District Judge

The Utah Republican Party (“URP”) claims in subparagraphs 73(b) through (g) of its Complaint¹ (mirrored in subparagraphs 79(a) through (f) of that Complaint) that the State of Utah may not require it to permit its members to seek a place on the primary election ballot through gathering signatures. The URP argued first that the plain language of the Either or Both Provision² did not require the URP to allow members the option of gathering signatures, but this argument was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.³ The URP also argues that by leaving the choice of paths to the primary election ballot in the hands of party members, the statute is unconstitutional because it abridges the rights of the party.⁴

This Memorandum Decision and Order concludes that the Either or Both Provision, which, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, allows URP members to choose to access the primary election ballot by either signature gathering, or through Utah's more traditional caucus and convention route, or both, does not impair the URP's constitutional rights but is a legitimate exercise of the state's power to regulate elections.

CONTENTS

PENDING MOTIONS...1154

STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS...1157

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT...1157

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS...1158

The First Lawsuit...1158

URP and LG Communication Following the First Lawsuit...1163

The Current Lawsuit...1164

Certified Questions...1165

Utah Supreme Court Ruling on Certified Questions...1166

URP's Constitution, Bylaws, and Rules...1167

URP's Additional Statements of Position...1168

DISCUSSION...1169

Preclusion Issues Presented...1169

Claim Preclusion Does Not Bar URP Claims in Subparagraphs 73(b) through (g)...1170

Issue Preclusion Does Not Bar URP Claims in Subparagraphs 73(b) through (g)...1173

The Issues are Ripe...1173

Standing Issues and Doctrine...1176

The URP has Standing in the Case...1176

The URP has Standing on the Motion...1177

The Either or Both Provision is Constitutional...1178

The Signature Gathering Provision and the Either or Both Provision Fulfill Important State Regulatory Interests...1179

Issue Framing is Not Determinative...1180

SB54 Provides Significant Control to the URP in the Primary Election Process...1180

None of the URP's Rights Are Severely Burdened...1181

SB54 is Not the Product of Invidious Discrimination...1187

Severability Need Not Be Considered...1187

CONCLUSION...1187

ORDER...1188

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT...1188

PENDING MOTIONS

The URP moves for partial summary judgment on subparagraphs 73(b) through (g) of its Complaint (“41 URP MPSJ”).⁵ Paragraph 73 of the Complaint asserts that:

73. The Party is entitled to a declaratory judgment establishing the unconstitutionality of the SB54 set forth above as applied to the manner in which

a. the State has taken a different position from that taken in the First Lawsuit, that the Party relied on in terminating prior litigation;

b. the State has taken away and misappropriated the Party's right to certify and endorse its nominees for elected office;

c. the State has taken away and misappropriated the Party's right to communicate its endorsement on the general election ballot and to control the use of its name and emblem on the ballot;d. the State has taken away and misappropriated the Party's right to determine for itself the candidate selection process that will produce a nominee who best represents the Party's political platform;

e. burdened the Party's associational rights by mandating changes to the Party's internal rules and procedures, at the threat of depriving the Party of its rights if it refuses to comply, that disadvantage the Party, and that the Party has rejected and that conflict with the rules the Party has determined for itself, as set forth in its Constitution and Bylaws, will produce a nominee who best represents the Party's political platform;

f. burdened the Party's associational rights, and the rights of disassociation, by imposing upon the Party a nominee who may not necessarily be a Party member and without guaranteeing that nominee has been selected by a majority of Party members participating in the primary election;

g. burdened the Party's associational rights and rights to free speech, by taking away the Party's right to have its nominees commit themselves to the Party Platform “as the standard by which my performance as a candidate and as an officeholder should be evaluated,” and replacing it with a process that requires only that candidates gather signatures;

h. burdened the Party's associational rights, and the rights of disassociation, by taking away the Party's convention system as its preferred way of selecting nominees and allowing a party to designate candidates in the primary election by convention only if it agrees to open that primary election, that the State now mandates, to persons unaffiliated with the Party;

i. burdened the Party's associational rights and the rights of disassociation, by imposing on candidates seeking the Party's nomination onerous signature gathering requirements beyond those ever allowed by the United States Supreme Court, and thus unconstitutionally burdens the Party's rights;

j. burdened the rights of the Party and its members by imposing on them signature-gathering requirements beyond those ever allowed by law; and

k. otherwise burdening the Party's rights of association, or depriving it of its rights of disassociation, free speech and due process as set forth above.⁶

Summary judgment was previously granted in favor of the Lieutenant Governor (“LG”) with respect to subparagraphs 73(a), (i), and (j).⁷ That order rejected the URP dclaims that the numeric signature requirements rendered the signature gathering path unconstitutional. Also, the URP acknowledged in a hearing on February 4, 2016 that subparagraph 73(h) was not at issue because it was resolved in the First Lawsuit.⁸ Further, subparagraph 73(k) is a “catch-all” which does not raise new subject matter that is not already alleged in the previous subparagraphs. Thus, this Memorandum Decision and Order resolves subparagraphs 73(b) through (g), the only remaining URP claims in its first cause of action and the only subparagraphs raised in the 41 URP MPSJ. The LG and the Utah Democratic Party (“UDP”) oppose the 41 URP MPSJ (“LG Opposition” and “UDP Opposition” respectively).⁹ For the reasons stated below, the 41 URP MPSJ is DENIED.

Furthermore, since proper notice has been given under Rule 56(f)¹⁰ that summary judgment may be granted for the LG as to the issues raised in the 41 URP MPSJ,¹¹ and the parties have had the opportunity to file responses to that notice,¹² summary judgment is granted in favor of the LG and against the URP as to the issues raised in the 41 URP MPSJ. Specifically, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the LG and against the URP with respect to subparagraphs 73(b) through (g). Further, declaratory judgment is entered that Utah Code § 20A–9–101(12)(d)

(“Either or Both Provision”) is a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate elections. The Either or Both Provision, by allowing a URP member candidate to gather signatures to obtain access to the URP primary election ballot, imposes a permissible burden on the URP and fulfills the stated purposes of the statute.¹³ Those purposes are to manage elections in a controlled manner, increase voter participation, and increase access to the ballot.¹⁴

Importantly, it is not the state that decides which candidates will be placed on the general election ballot; rather, only those voters who the URP allows to vote in the URP primary can make that decision. In the 2016 election, only members of the URP are allowed to vote in the URP primary, so the members of the URP—and the members of the URP alone—will decide who represents the URP on the general election ballot. Historically, delegates of the URP often made that decision. Under the state's new election processes, delegates share that decision with other members of the URP. While the URP claims this is a “severe” burden on the URP's rights of association and disassociation, the URP is incorrect. The burden imposed is a reasonable regulation that accomplishes the objectives of the statute.

Additionally, the LG and the UDP have moved for judgment on the pleadings.¹⁵ The UDP's motion for judgment on the pleadings (“37 UDP MJP”) and the LG's motion for judgment on the pleadings (“38 LG MJP”) were previously denied in part.¹⁶ For the reasons stated below, the remaining portions of the 37 UDP MJP and the 38 LG MJP are DENIED.

STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

is evaluated by the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.¹⁷ The factual record for such a motion is the text of the challenged pleading. The factual details supporting a claim must be great enough to make the claim plausible, rather than merely possible. That is, the factual details must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. ...”¹⁸ It must be reasonable for a court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable, based on the facts stated.¹⁹ Recitations of elements of a claim and conclusory statements lack sufficient detail, and cannot...