Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch, 13544

• Decision Date: 03 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 13544,13544
• Parties: UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STEELE RANCH, a Utah Corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 888

533 P.2d 888

UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STEELE RANCH, a Utah Corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. 13544.

Supreme Court of Utah.

April 3, 1975.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., John S. McAllister, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Jackson B. Howard, Provo. Eks Ayn Anderson, Salt Lake City, for defendants-respondents.

CROCKETT, Justice:

The State Road Commission sought to acquire 66.3 acres in fee, and 5.45 acres in temporary easement, for construction of the new freeway (Interstate 15) through the extensive ranch property owned by defendant Steele Ranch Corporation which lies in Juab County just south of the Utah County line. The only issues raised were as to damages. A jury returned a verdict for $96,164.50: $21,164.50 for land taken and $75,000 for severance damages. The Road Commission contends these are excessive.

The points of attack on the awards are: that they are not supported by the evidence; that the court erred in allowing evidence to be presented, and the jury to consider as an aspect of damages, the effect the construction of the highway would have on the separate home property owned by defendant Dr. John G. Steele, and not by the defendant Steele Ranch Corporation; and in disallowing plaintiff's challenges for cause to jurors who had acquaintance with and whose families had been attended by Dr. Steele.

The Steele Ranch Corporation owns about 2,500 acres of land, through which this new highway is constructed, with an underpass to connect the east and west portions. Dr. John G. Steele, a physician who has practiced at Nephi for many years, owns the capital stock of the corporation. His home, on a one-acre plot adjoining the ranch, is held in personal ownership; and the corporation leases its land back to him. (Immaterial as to legal effect here, but of interest, is the fact that it is stated that this arrangement is to acquire a tax advantage.)

At trial, September 20--21, 1973, the range of testimony concerning the market value of the land taken and the severance damages to the remaining property was:

                Victor Smith (for
                  plaintiff)
                    Land taken           $ 18,145.50
                    Severance              21,057.70
                                         -----------
                        Total            $ 39,203.20
                Wilbur Harding (for
                  defendant)
                    Land taken           $ 20,518.50
                    Severance              47,791.25
                                         -----------
                        Total            $ 68,309.75
                Dr. John G. Steele (for
                  defendant)
                    Land taken           $ 27,852.00
                    Severance             100,000.00
                                         -----------
                        Total            $127,852.00
                The jury awarded
                    Land taken           $ 21,164.50
                    Severance              75,000.00
                                         -----------
                        Total            $ 96,164.50
                

The award of $21,164.50 for the land actually taken is sufficiently close to the values placed thereon by the expert appraisers that we have no concern about disturbing that award. What does arrest our attention is the $75,000 severance damages; and the critical question is whether the $100,000 estimate of Dr. Steele should be regarded as 'substantial' evidence to support that award.

In dealing with that problem, we recognize that neither the trial court, nor this reviewing court, should trespass upon the prerogative of the jury by applying a subjective measure of our own ideas of 'reasonableness' and rejecting as not 'substantial' any evidence which fails to meet that test. Allowance should be made for the fact that there is a comparatively wide orbit through which reasonable minds may swing; and that what may be considered reasonable in the broad sense need not necessarily fit into the exact pattern of our own thought. In the time honored and universally accepted rule that a finding or verdict must be supported by substantial evidence, the modifying adjective 'substantial' has been used advisedly to indicate a higher degree of proof than just any evidence of any kind. ¹ The requirement is that the evidence must be sufficient in amount and credibility that, when considered in connection with the other evidence and circumstances shown in the case, would justify some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it to be the truth. And conversely, if when so considered, the court is convinced that it is so inconsequential, or so clearly lacking in credibility, that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could so believe, it cannot properly be regarded as substantial evidence. ²

It is in the light of the foregoing that we turn to an analysis of and make some observations concerning the estimate of $100,000 severance damages by Dr. Steele. A preliminary one is that some apprehension as to its soundness arises because it is so greatly in excess of the values placed thereon by the expert witnesses, who, with their expert knowledge, appear to have made careful analyses and computations concerning the values, including the severance damage. The estimate of $21,057 by expert Smith for the Road Commission, was more than doubled to $47,791 by Mr. Harding, the defendant's expert; and Dr. Steele more than doubled that again in reaching his estimate of $100,000, nearly five...