UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Lawrence

Citation875 F.3d 539
Decision Date07 November 2017
Docket NumberNo. 16-4154,16-4154
Parties UTE INDIAN TRIBE of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, and a federally chartered corporation; Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee, Shaun Chapoose, Chairman of the Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee; Ute Energy Holdings, a Delaware LLC, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Honorable Barry G. LAWRENCE, District Judge, Utah Third Judicial District Court, in his individual and offical capacities; Lynn D. Becker, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

Frances C. Bassett (Jeffrey S. Rasmussen, Thomas W. Fredericks, Jeremy J. Patterson, and Thomasina Real Bird, with him on the briefs), Fredericks Peebles & Morgan, Louisville, Colorado, for Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah, Plaintiffs-Appellants.

David K. Isom, Isom Law Firm, PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee, Lynn D. Becker.

Brent M. Johnson and Keisa L. Williams, Utah Administrative Office of the Courts, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee, Judge Barry G. Lawrence.

Before HARTZ and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

This matter is before the court on appellee Lynn D. Becker's Petition for Panel Rehearing and Request for Rehearing En Banc. We also have a response from the appellants.

Upon consideration, that part of the petition seeking panel rehearing is granted in part and only to the limited extent of the changes made to the attached revised Opinion. The request for panel rehearing is otherwise denied. The clerk is directed to file the amended decision attached to this order effective today's date.

The Petition and the response were also circulated to all the judges of the court who are in regular active service and who are not recused. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). As no judge on the original panel or the en banc court requested that a poll be called the request for en banc rehearing is denied.

This appeal arises from a contract dispute between Lynn Becker and the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation.1 Our concern, however, is not the merits of the dispute but jurisdiction. Mr. Becker, who is not an Indian, pursued his claim against the Tribe in Utah state court. The Tribe responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, asserting, among other things, that the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. But the federal district court in turn held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Tribe's challenge to the jurisdiction of the state court. We respectfully disagree with the district court. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We hold that the Tribe's claim—that federal law precludes state-court jurisdiction over a claim against Indians arising on the reservation—presents a federal question that sustains federal jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The contract at issue is the Independent Contractor Agreement (the Contract) between the Tribe and Mr. Becker, a former manager in the Tribe's Energy and Minerals Department. Mr. Becker claims that the Tribe breached the Contract by failing to pay him 2% of net revenue distributed to Ute Energy Holdings, LLC from Ute Energy, LLC. After Mr. Becker filed suit in Utah state court, the Tribe filed this suit against him and Judge Barry Lawrence, the state judge presiding over Mr. Becker's suit, seeking declarations that (1) the state court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute, (2) the Contract is void under federal and tribal law, and (3) there is no valid waiver of the Tribe's sovereign immunity for the claims asserted in state court. The Tribe also sought a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to refrain from further action in the state-court proceedings. The Tribe invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction) and § 1362 (federal question when suit brought by an Indian tribe). Jurisdiction under § 1331 is limited to "actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"; and jurisdiction under § 1362 requires that "the matter in controversy arise[ ] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." After a hearing on the Tribe's request for a preliminary injunction, the district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the suit as moot.2

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. See Kaw Nation ex rel. McCauley v. Lujan , 378 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004).

The issue before us must be examined in light of a long history of federal law regarding Indian affairs. "[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that ... have [been] consistently described as plenary and exclusive." United States v. Lara , 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, "the policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz. , 411 U.S. 164, 168, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In Worcester v. State of Georgia , 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to Georgia's attempt to regulate activity on the Cherokee Reservation. The State sought to punish a federally licensed non-Indian missionary for his refusal to leave the Reservation. Chief Justice Marshall declared that "[t]he Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community occupying its own territory, ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force," and that "[t]he whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." Id. at 561. Although the Supreme Court has since "departed from Chief Justice Marshall's view that the laws of a State can have no force within reservation boundaries," Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S. 353, 361, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), federal supremacy over tribes has remained a constant, see Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) ("[T]he tribes are subject to plenary control by Congress."); cf. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation , 564 U.S. 162, 175, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (2011) ("Throughout the history of the Indian trust relationship, we have recognized that the organization and management of the trust is a sovereign function subject to the plenary authority of Congress.").

Thus, federal law regulates a tribe's right to exercise authority over non-Indians. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians , 471 U.S. 845, 851–52, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985) (on "questions concerning the extent to which Indian tribes have retained the power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians ..., the governing rule of decision has been provided by federal law."). With respect to tribal-court jurisdiction in particular, "whether a tribal court has adjudicative authority over nonmembers is a federal question." Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. , 554 U.S. 316, 324, 128 S.Ct. 2709, 171 L.Ed.2d 457 (2008). When parties challenge tribal jurisdiction, "it is federal law on which they rely as a basis for the asserted right of freedom from Tribal Court interference." Nat'l Farmers Union , 471 U.S. at 853, 105 S.Ct. 2447.

Similarly, the Supreme Court has made clear that state adjudicative authority over Indians for on-reservation conduct is greatly limited by federal law. (The Tribe contends that Mr. Becker's contract claim arose on the reservation.) The leading decision on the matter in the civil context is Williams v. Lee , 358 U.S. 217, 217–18, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), which held that an Arizona state court could not exercise civil jurisdiction over a suit brought by a non-Indian store operator against a Navajo couple to collect on a debt incurred at a store located on the reservation. To rule otherwise, the Court said, "would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." Id.

Of particular relevance are decisions under a federal statutePublic Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 ; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321 – 1326 ; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 )—that, for most states, grants state-court jurisdiction over litigation arising in Indian country in which an Indian is a party only when certain actions are taken by a state or tribe. When passed in 1953 it "delegated civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations to certain States [and] provided a means whereby other States could assume jurisdiction over Indian reservations without the consent of the tribe affected." McClanahan , 411 U.S. at 177 n.17, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (citations omitted). But the Indian Civil Rights Act, passed in 1968, "changed the prior procedure to require the consent of the Indians involved before a State was permitted to assume jurisdiction." Id. ; see United States v. Burch , 169 F.3d 666, 669 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[The statute] was amended in 1968 to omit the requirement of affirmative [state] legislative action and to require the consent of the Indian tribe by special election before a state could assume jurisdiction.").

The statute has been strictly enforced. In Kennerly v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District of Montana , 400 U.S. 423, 426–29, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that Montana courts could not exercise jurisdiction over a civil claim against Indians arising on the Blackfeet reservation—despite tribal legislation granting jurisdiction to the Montana courts—because the grant did not comply with either...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Lawrence
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Utah
    • 30 Abril 2018
    ...suggested by Kennerly —is the other side of the same coin. Both are necessary. This view is consistent with the Tenth Circuit's statement in Lawrence that the two concepts are "different animals." 875 F.3d at 545. In Kiowa , the state of Oklahoma, which is not a PL–280 mandatory jurisdictio......
  • Ansley v. Banner Health Network
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • 9 Marzo 2020
    ...871 (2002) ; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) ; Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence , 875 F.3d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 2017) ; Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland , 695 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) ; Tohono O’odham Nation v. Ducey , 130......
  • Navajo Nation v. Dalley
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 24 Julio 2018
    ...pure state-law claims. Since this briefing, that jurisdictional issue has been resolved by a panel of our court in Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence , 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 2017), which ruled that federal courts do have jurisdiction in circumstances like those presented here.Specifically, in L......
  • World Fuel Services v. Nambe Pueblo Development
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • 23 Enero 2019
    ...is non-waivable and, therefore, under Tenth Circuit law, not properly considered an affirmative defense.25 See Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence, 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 2017) (discussing Tribal exhaustion doctrine argument raised in motion for an injunction to halt state court proceedings until......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT