Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah

• Decision Date: 29 August 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. 81-1827,81-1901,s. 81-1827
• Citation: 716 F.2d 1298
• Parties: The UTE INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE OF UTAH, Defendant-Appellee, Duchesne County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Uintah County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Roosevelt City, a municipal corporation, and Duchesne City, a municipal corporation, Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, United States of America, Amicus Curiae, Paradox Production Corporation, a Utah corporation, Amicus Curiae.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1298

716 F.2d 1298

The UTE INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE OF UTAH, Defendant-Appellee,

Duchesne County, a political subdivision of the State of

Utah, Uintah County, a political subdivision of the State of

Utah, Roosevelt City, a municipal corporation, and Duchesne

City, a municipal corporation, Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

United States of America, Amicus Curiae,

Paradox Production Corporation, a Utah corporation, Amicus Curiae.

Nos. 81-1827, 81-1901.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 29, 1983.

Daniel H. Israel of Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Denver, Colo. (Martin Seneca, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for plaintiff/appellant/cross-appellee The Ute Indian Tribe.

Richard L. Dewsnup, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah (David L. Wilkinson, Utah Atty. Gen., Dallin W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy, Asst. Attys. Gen., with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant-appellee State of Utah.

Tom D. Tobin of Tobin Law Offices, P.C., Winner, S.D. (David Albert Mustone of Tobin Law Offices, P.C., Washington, D.C., Dennis L. Draney, Roosevelt City Atty., Roosevelt, Utah, Roland Uresk, Duchesne City Atty., Roosevelt, Utah, with him on the brief), for defendants/appellees/cross-appellants Counties and Cities.

Carol E. Dinkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert L. Klarquist and Martin Green, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief for amicus curiae United States of America.

Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. and Lucy J. Skiffington of Suitter, Axland & Armstrong, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief for amicus curiae Paradox Production Corp.

Before SETH, Chief Judge, DOYLE, Circuit Judge, and TEMPLAR, District Judge ^*.

SETH, Chief Judge.

These appeals concern the continued existence of the Uncompahgre and Uintah Indian reservations. The Ute Tribe in Utah fashioned a Law and Order Code which purported to exercise jurisdiction over all the lands within the original Uintah reservation created by executive order in 1861 as well as the Uncompahgre Indian reservation created in 1882, both in Utah. The State of Utah and several Utah counties and cities questioned tribal jurisdiction over much of this land arguing that a great deal of the Uintah reservation and the whole of the Uncompahgre reservation had been disestablished and was no longer "Indian Country." (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1151.)

This Ute Tribe (the Uintah, White River and Uncompahgre bands) brought suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, requesting that the present extent of the reservations and of tribal jurisdiction be determined. The trial court heard extensive testimony and performed an exhaustive study of legislative and administrative materials relating to the history of both the Uintah and Uncompahgre reservations. The transcript and the record comprise several thousand pages.

As to the Uintah reservation the trial court decided that the original reservation had been changed by several Acts of Congress directed to particular tracts. Thus Congress had removed a 7,040-acre tract known as the Gilsonite Strip in 1888, had removed 1,010,000 acres of land for National Forest purposes in 1905, and had also withdrawn 56,000 acres of land for a reclamation project in 1910. In 1948 the Uintah reservation was increased by 510,000 acres by the addition of the Hill Creek Extension. Except for these specific Acts of Congress, the trial court held that all lands within the original boundaries of the Uintah reservation remained "Indian Country." The individual allotments to Indians, the public law entries by others and some mineral locations were recognized. These were, however, within the exterior boundaries of the reservation.

The trial court concluded that the Uncompahgre reservation had been disestablished, 521 F.Supp. 1072.

The resolution of a dispute such as this involving Indian reservations turns on what Congress intended to accomplish at the time as a legal matter. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660; see Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 37 L.Ed.2d 92. The conclusions of the trial court on this point are persuasive, but are not considered to be findings of fact.

The method of examining legislative history and determining legislative intent in cases concerning Indian reservations has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in recent times. Four such cases are especially significant to our problem. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346, was decided in 1962 and concerned the Colville Indian reservation. The Court held that the North half of the reservation had been disestablished, but the South half remained in reservation status. The Act of Congress said to have disestablished the North half declared that it should be "vacated and restored to the public domain." 27 Stat. 62, 63. The relevant acts with regard to the South half of the reservation allotted the land pursuant to the Congressional policy expressed in the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 390, but did not contain language of vacation and restoration or the term "public domain." Seymour, at 355, 82 S.Ct. at 427. The Court also mentioned subsequent legislative and administrative history of the South half of the reservation to support its conclusion that it was still a reservation. On these grounds the Court held that the South half of the reservation retained its status as Indian Country.

In Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 37 L.Ed.2d 92, decided in 1973, the Court held that the Klamath River reservation had not been disestablished. The Court made it clear that the allotment of lands within the reservation to resident Indians was consistent with reservation status and an opening for settlement in addition did not disestablish. Thus a more explicit indication of Congressional intent was necessary to disestablish. However, the Court did not rest its decision on the fact that the unequivocal language of vacation and restoration to the public domain that had been present in Seymour was absent in Mattz. Clearly the Court was unwilling to suggest that there were any special recitations the absence of which would mean that a reservation continued. In addition to considering the historical background of the reservation and the legislative history, the Court observed that several bills which contained clear language of disestablishment passed the House of Representatives but did not pass in the Senate. The Court interpreted the repeated failure of those bills as a sign of Congressional intent that the reservation continue. Thus the crucial point was not simply that the final Allotment Act for the Klamath River reservation lacked language of disestablishment, but that Congress had never at any stage permitted such language to be passed into law. It is important that in Mattz the Court stated that an opening of a reservation for settlement did not necessarily disestablish the reservation. This was referred to in the Rosebud opinion hereinafter considered. The settlement by The Court in Mattz discussed the subsequent jurisdictional history of the reservation as an illustration for its holding of continued reservation status rather than as a foundation for that holding. No detailed analysis of legislative intent was undertaken at the time of the Acts said to constitute disestablishment for any of these cases.

Indians and non-Indians was considered to be of benefit to the Indians.

DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300, raised the question of whether the Lake Traverse Indian reservation survived a restoration to the public domain. The Court held that it did not, based also on the express Indian cession of the land. This feature of the DeCoteau case has no application to the case at bar but DeCoteau is important as to the significance of the phrase "public domain." The Court, in comparing the legislation there in question to other Indian agreements, stated, at 446, 95 S.Ct. at 1094:

"That the lands ceded in the other agreements were returned to the public domain, stripped of reservation status, can hardly be questioned, and every party here acknowledges as much. The sponsors of the legislation stated repeatedly that the ratified agreements would return the ceded lands to the 'public domain.' "

The Court speaks as if a restoration to the public domain settled the matter of disestablishment. The position of the two phrases suggests that "returned to the public domain" is synonymous with "stripped of reservation status." With regard to the question of jurisdictional history, the fact that the State of South Dakota had exercised virtually undisputed jurisdiction over the land was important to the Court's decision.

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660, is of overriding importance to the determination of the case before us because it is the most recent Supreme Court case on the subject and because it provides a detailed analysis. The facts of Rosebud are similar to those of other disestablishment cases. The language on which the Court relies in finding disestablishment of the reservation in Rosebud does not contain a phrase analogous or similar to "vacated and restored to the public domain" of Seymour. Rosebud involved unilateral action by Congress rather than cession by the Indians. Rosebud lays out what the Court terms some "well-established legal principles." One of these is the general rule that doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indians. The Court cautions that the resolution of doubt in favor of the Indians is not to be done by ignoring clear indications of Congressional intent, nor does this method of resolving doubt intrude on the Court's holding in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 23 S.Ct. 216, 47 L.Ed. 299.

In Lone Wolf the Court held that Congress possessed the authority to abrogate...