Uthman v. Obama, 10–5235.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–5235.,10–5235.
• Citation: 637 F.3d 400
• Parties: Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed UTHMAN, Detainee, Camp Delta, Appelleev.Barack OBAMA, President of the United States, et al., Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

637 F.3d 400

394 U.S.App.D.C. 466

Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed UTHMAN, Detainee, Camp Delta, Appellee

v.Barack OBAMA, President of the United States, et al., Appellants.

No. 10–5235.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Feb. 11, 2011.Decided March 29, 2011.Rehearing En Banc Denied May 31, 2011.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:04–cv–01254).Dana Kaervsang, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Ian Heath Gershengorn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Douglas N. Letter and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.Anthony J. Phillips argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were S. William Livingston, Roger A. Ford, and David H. Remes. Brian E. Foster entered an appearance.Before: GARLAND, GRIFFITH, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge:

In response to al Qaeda's attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force. The AUMF provides:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

Pub.L. No. 107–40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001); see U.S. Const. art. I. § 8. The AUMF, among other things, authorizes the Executive Branch to detain for the duration of hostilities those individuals who are part of al Qaeda or the Taliban. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004).

Under the AUMF, the U.S. military currently holds Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Exercising his right under the U.S. Constitution to judicial review of the basis for his detention, Uthman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008). Uthman contended that he was not part of al Qaeda and therefore was not properly detained. Applying a “command structure test,” the District Court ruled that the Government had not proved that Uthman was part of al Qaeda. The District Court therefore granted the petition and ordered Uthman released from U.S. custody.

In decisions issued since the District Court's judgment in this case, this Court has rejected “command structure” as the test for determining whether someone is part of al Qaeda. Our cases have held that the “determination of whether an individual is ‘part of’ al-Qaida ‘must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.’ ” Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 751–52 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C.Cir.2010)).

Applying the functional standard mandated by our precedents, we conclude that the facts found by the District Court, along with uncontested facts in the record, demonstrate that Uthman more likely than not was part of al Qaeda. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with instructions to deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I

Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman, a Yemeni man, was captured at the Afghan–Pakistani border near Tora Bora on December 15, 2001. He was captured in a small group that included two al Qaeda members who were Osama bin Laden bodyguards and another man who was a Taliban fighter.¹ Tora Bora is a cave complex in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Al Qaeda forces gathered there in December 2001 to wage a major battle against the United States and its allies.

Soon after his capture, Uthman was transferred to the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He has been detained at Guantanamo since January 2002.

In 2004, Uthman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the basis for his detention. The Government asserted that Uthman was part of al Qaeda and therefore may be detained for the duration of the war against al Qaeda pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724–25 (D.C.Cir.2010).²

The District Court stated that “the key question” in determining someone's membership in al Qaeda “is whether an individual receives and executes orders from the enemy force's combat apparatus.” Abdah v. Obama, 708 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The District Court derived that test from two previous district court opinions applying this “command structure test.” See id. at 12–13 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C.2009), and Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C.2009)). After examining the evidence, the District Court concluded that the Government did “not convince the Court by a preponderance of the evidence that Uthman received and executed orders from Al Qaeda.” Id. at 22. On that basis, the District Court granted Uthman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 23.

Several of this Court's cases—all decided after the District Court granted Uthman's petition—have held that the “command structure test” does not reflect the full scope of the Executive's detention authority under the AUMF. “These decisions make clear that the determination of whether an individual is ‘part of’ al-Qaida ‘must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.’ ” Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 751–52 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725); see also Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.Cir.2010) (“Nowhere in the AUMF is there a mention of command structure.”). To be sure, demonstrating that someone is part of al Qaeda's command structure is sufficient to show that person is part of al Qaeda. But it is not necessary. See, e.g., Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. Indicia other than the receipt and execution of al Qaeda's orders may prove “that a particular individual is sufficiently involved with the organization to be deemed part of it.” Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725 (citing Awad, 608 F.3d at 11). It is thus possible that someone may “properly be considered ‘part of’ al-Qaida even if he never formally received or executed any orders.” Salahi, 625 F.3d at 752 (citing Awad, 608 F.3d at 3–4, 11).

In this case, the question therefore is whether, under the functional test mandated by our precedents, the established facts—that is, those facts found by the District Court or otherwise uncontested—show that Uthman more likely than not was part of al Qaeda.³ Our analysis of that question is de novo. See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C.Cir.2010).

II

In analyzing whether Uthman more likely than not was part of al Qaeda, we consider the following facts, which were found by the District Court or are otherwise uncontested:

• Uthman was captured in December 2001 in the vicinity of Tora Bora, an isolated, mountainous area where al Qaeda forces had gathered to fight the United States and its allies.

• When captured, Uthman was traveling with a small group of men, two of whom were al Qaeda members and bodyguards for Osama bin Laden and one of whom was a Taliban fighter.

• Leading up to his capture, Uthman's journey began at a religious school in Yemen where al Qaeda had successfully recruited fighters. The two al Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden bodyguards who were later captured with Uthman, as well as the Taliban fighter captured with Uthman, also attended the Furqan Institute.

• Uthman traveled to Afghanistan along a route used by al Qaeda recruits.

• Uthman lied to hide the fact that someone else paid for his travel to Afghanistan.

• While in Afghanistan, Uthman was seen at an al Qaeda guesthouse.

• Uthman's explanation of why he went to Afghanistan and why he was traveling in a small group that included al Qaeda members and a Taliban fighter near Tora Bora during the battle there involves a host of unlikely coincidences.

Uthman argues that those facts do not add up to his being part of al Qaeda. ⁴ As we will explain, we conclude that those facts, taken together, are more than sufficient to show that Uthman more likely than not was part of al Qaeda.⁵

First, Uthman was captured on December 15, 2001, “in the vicinity of Tora Bora.” Abdah v. Obama, 708 F.Supp.2d 9, 22 (D.D.C.2010). As the District Court noted, it was “widely known” that Tora Bora was a battleground between al Qaeda and the United States and “few, if any noncombatants would have been in the vicinity during this time.” Id. at 19 n. 11. Because “few, if any” non-combatants were near Tora Bora, it follows that most, if not all, of those in the vicinity of Tora Bora on December 15, 2001, were combatants. In a prior case, we found it significant that a detainee was captured near Tora Bora in late 2001. See Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 11, 16 (D.C.Cir.2010). In short, the fact that Uthman was captured in December 2001 near Tora Bora suggests that he was affiliated with al Qaeda.

Second, the company Uthman was keeping when he was captured near Tora Bora in December 2001 makes it even more likely that he was part of al Qaeda. See Abdah, 708 F.Supp.2d at 22 (Uthman “was with Al Qaeda members in the vicinity of Tora Bora”). Uthman admits that, when captured, he was part of a small group including at least five other Yemeni men. Two of those men were al Qaeda members and have since...