Util. Constructors, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 3:15-CV-00501-JWD-RLB
Decision Date | 25 July 2016 |
Docket Number | NO. 3:15-CV-00501-JWD-RLB,3:15-CV-00501-JWD-RLB |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Parties | UTILITY CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. |
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO TRANSFER
Before the Court is Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's § 1404(a) Motion to Transfer Venue to More Convenient Forum ("Motion to Transfer"), (Doc. 13), filed by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty," "Liberty Mutual," or "Defendant"). Utility Constructors, Inc. ("Utility" or "Plaintiff") has countered with Utility Constructor, Inc.'s Response in Opposition to Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's § 1404(a) Motion to Transfer Venue to More Convenient Forum ("Opposition"), (Doc. 16), to which Plaintiff has responded with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its § 1404(a) Motion to Transfer Venue to More Convenient Forum ("Reply"), (Doc. 17). The Motion to Transfer, Opposition, and Reply (collectively, "Motions") focus on a single issue: whether the present action, removed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana, on July 31, 2015, (Doc. 1), should now be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ("Eastern District") from the Middle District of Louisiana ("Court" or "Middle District"), pursuant to Section 1404 of the United States Code's Twenty-Eighth Title.1
Based on four incontrovertible facts—the relevant dispute arose from a levee constructed in the Eastern District; numerous pertinent witnesses and interested persons reside within its borders; the overwhelming weight of the relevant documentary evidence likely, if not surely and wholly, lies in its parishes; a closely related suit has already commenced within its borders—this matter's transfer both accords with "the interest of justice" and maximizes "the convenience of parties and witnesses" alike. As written and construed, § 1404 allows, if not compels, this result, and this Court's considerable discretion does allow deviation from such certain lodestars. For these reasons, as explained more fully below, the Motion to Transfer, (Doc. 13), is GRANTED.
The Parties' relationship began after Plaintiff subcontracted with Integrated Pro Services, LLC ("IPS") in the spring of 2012. (Doc. 13-1 at 1.) IPS is a contractor that maintained an office in New Orleans, Louisiana. (Id.; see also Doc. 1-1 at 3) On April 6, 2012, IPS entered into a contract with Plaquemines Parish Government ("Plaquemines"), as owner, whereby IPS would construct a levee in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana ("Project"). (Doc. 13-1 at 1.) Plaquemines' maintains its office in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. (Id.) The designated "Project Engineer," which is both the Project's architect and engineer, C.H. Fenstermaker & Associates, Inc. ("Fenstermaker"), has an office in New Orleans. (Id.) Like Fenstermaker, the consultant thatPlaquemines retained to assist with the completion of the Project, Barowka and Bonura Engineers and Consultants, LLC ("Plaquemines Consultant"), also maintains an office in New Orleans. (Id at 2.)
After the agreement was entered into, Defendant issued statutory payment and performance bonds (collectively, "Bonds") in connection with IPS' work on the project. (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 12.) Plaquemines was named as the obligee and IPS was named as the principal on the Bonds. (Id.) On April 29, 2012, Plaintiff and IPS entered into a subcontract ("Subcontract"). (Id ¶ 13.) Per this accord, UCI agreed to perform dirt work on and for the Project. (Id.)
Sometime after the work began a dispute between IPS and Plaintiff arose over the latter's allegedly deficient work and the amounts allegedly owed under the Subcontract by the former. (Id. ¶ 14; see also Doc. 13-1 at 2.) On February 4, 2014, Plaintiff demanded payment from IPS for the sums purportedly due. (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 14; see also Doc. 13-1 at 2.) When IPS did not pay, on February 20, 2014, Plaintiff demanded payment from Defendant under the bond it had issued ("Bond Claim"). (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 15; see also Doc. 13-1 at 2.) After placing IPS in default under the contract and terminating them from the Project, Plaquemines demanded that Defendant provide a takeover plan and complete the Project consistent with its obligation under the Bond terms. (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 15; see also Doc. 13-1 at 2.) Eventually, Defendant agreed to fulfil its Bond obligations. (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 15; see also Doc. 13-1 at 2.) In accordance therewith, Defendant entered into an agreement with Plaintiff on May 1, 2014. (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 16; see also Doc. 13-1 at 2.) Under the agreement, Plaintiff would perform emergency construction work on the Project. (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 16; see also Doc. 13-1 at 2-3.)
Subsequently, on October 8, 2014, Plaintiff and Defendant supplemented their May 1 agreement. Briefly, in the addendum, Plaintiff agreed to make certain repairs to the emergency construction work that it had commenced (collectively, "Emergency Agreement"). (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 16; see also Doc. 13-1 at 3.) Plaintiff later filed suit claiming Defendant owes Plaintiff for work it performed under the Subcontract and Emergency Agreement. (Doc. 13-2 ¶ 16; see also Doc. 13-1 at 3.)
Even before this case's removal in the summer of 2015, the foregoing events had spawned two other suits. Defendant filed the first case ("Indemnity Suit"), seeking indemnity for losses and expenses Defendant has incurred by virtue of its execution of the Bond and in completing the Project from IPS and other non-party indemnitors. (Doc. 13-1 at 13.) Meanwhile, Plaintiff inaugurated the second action ("Declaratory Judgment Action"), a suit against would-be suppliers of required materials for the Project requesting that the Eastern District find Plaintiff is not liable under a contract where Plaintiff was required to purchase would-be suppliers' materials for use on the Project. (Id.)
On July 31, 2015, Liberty removed this originally filed state court action to this Court. (Doc. 1 at 1.) It filed an answer ("Answer") on August 11, 2015, (Doc. 3), and an amended notice of removal ("Amended Notice") on October 8, 2015, (Doc. 8). The Honorable Richard L. Bourgeois, Jr., issued a scheduling order in this matter on October 29, 2015. (Doc. 12.) On November 10, 2015, Liberty tendered the Motion to Transfer, (Doc. 13), and a briefing schedule was issued two days later, (Doc. 14). Liberty's amended answer arrived on November 30, 2015. (Doc. 15.) On December 1, 2015, Utility filed the Opposition. (Doc. 16.) Liberty countered withthe Reply on December 15, 2015. (Doc. 17.) On January 4, 2016, Utility submitted its own answer to the counterclaim made by Liberty. (Doc. 18.) Having given the Parties notice on May 3, 2016, (Doc. 19), this Court heard argument on June 15, 2016, (Doc. 20).
In the Motion to Transfer, Defendant insists that Plaintiff's action should be transferred to the Eastern District pursuant to § 1404(a) for one main reason: "[T]he Eastern District is clearly more convenient for the parties and witnesses and transfer serves the interest of justice." (Doc. 13 at 1.) In support of its position, Defendant relies on the following set of facts: (1) relevant physical evidence and documents are located in the Eastern District; (2) some key, non-party and other potential witnesses reside and/or are employed in the Eastern District; (3) two lawsuits arising out of the same construction project currently at issue have been filed in the Eastern District; and (4) the Eastern District, along with its residents have a localized interest in the adjudication of this case because the underlying facts are so closely connected to the Eastern District. (Id.) Conversely, Defendant denies that this Court has any substantial connection to the parties or causes of action; in fact, nothing but the barest of connections can be remotely articulated. (Id.) In light of these facts and considering the public and private interest factors2 precedent requires transfer of the instant case to the Eastern District.
Plaintiff offers up a number of counters. First, according to Plaintiff, Liberty Mutual failed to meet its significant burden of proof under § 1404, as Defendant cannot show that the Eastern District is clearly more convenient or easier than litigating in the Middle District. (See Doc. 16 at 1.) Second, courts typically deny motions to transfer venue when the proposed venueis a relatively short distance from the current venue, as here. In support, Plaintiff cites to several cases that denied a defendant's motion to transfer venue even where the current and proposed venues were more than 100 miles apart. (Id at 1-2.) Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the public and private interest factors do not favor transfer of Plaintiff's action to the Eastern District. Rather than directly responding to Defendant's contentions that the Eastern District enjoyed original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action pursuant to § 1391(b)(2), Plaintiff confines its Opposition to attacking Defendant's application of the private interest factors as "conclusory" and "not well-taken" and application of the public interest factors as incomplete due to Defendant's stress on one factor. (Id at 4-5.)
Taking first the only public interest factor addressed in the memorandum supporting the Motion to Transfer, Plaintiff argues that the impact of the local interest factor is mitigated by the fact that both the Middle and Eastern District courthouses are located "away from but close to" the Project. (Id at 5.) Plaintiff also rebuts Defendant's final argument by asserting that the Fifth Circuit holds that a plaintiff's choice of venue is entitled to deference. (Id.)
Addressing next the factor—the relative ease of access to sources of proof—Plaintiff faults Defendant for failing to consider modern technology. (Id.) Hence, while much documentary evidence is located in the Eastern District, Defendant has...
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