Utilities Co v. Northwestern Public Service Co

• Decision Date: 07 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. 77,MONTANA-DAKOTA,77
• Citation: 341 U.S. 246,95 L.Ed. 912,71 S.Ct. 692
• Parties: UTILITIES CO. v. NORTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

341 U.S. 246

71 S.Ct. 692

95 L.Ed. 912

MONTANA-DAKOTA UTILITIES CO.

v NORTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE CO.

No. 77.

Argued Nov. 27, 1950.

Decided May 7, 1951.

Mr William D. Mitchell, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Jacob M. Lashly, St. Louis, Mo., for respondent.

Mr. Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Washington, D.C., for Federal Power Commission, amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

Mr. Justice JACKSONdelivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner and respondent are public electric utilities companies engaged in interstate commerce.Petitioner's predecessor and respondent were under the same management through interlocking directorships and joint of- ficers.During that relationship the two interchanged electric energy, shared expenses, and made a number of intercompany contracts establishing rates and charges, which contracts were filed with and accepted by the Federal Power Commissoin.These contract rates and charges are at the root of this controversy.Petitioner charges that during the period 1935—1945, its predecessor paid respondent unreasonably high prices for what respondent furnished it, and that it received unreasonably low rates for what it provided respondent.That advantage, it is alleged, was fraudulent and unlawful and was due to the interlocking directorate, which prevented protest to the Commission to have reasonable rates and charges established pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Power Act. ¹

Petitioner sued in United States District Court and asserted jurisdiction on the ground that the case'arises under the Constitution, or laws of the United States'² and, more particularly, under a 'law regulating commerce,'³ specifically the Federal Power Act.

Petitioner was successful in the District Court, which found the contracts void for fraud and the rates and charges established therein unreasonable.The court also determined what would have been reasonable rates and charges for the period in question and gave judgment for the difference between its conception of reasonable charges and the actual charges, amounting to over three-quarters of a million dollars.⁴

The judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the ground that the District Court was without jurisdiction.⁵

As frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question whether the complaint states a cause of action.The Judicial Code, in vesting jurisdiction in the District Courts, does not create causes of action, but only confers jurisdiction to adjudicate those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions.Petitioner asserted a cause of action under the Power Act.To determine whether that claim is well founded, the District Court must take jurisdiction, whether its ultimate resolution is to be in the affirmative or the negative.If the complaint raises a federal question, the mere claim confers power to decide that it has no merit, as well as to decide that it has.In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, '* * * if the plaintiff really makes a substantial claim under an act of Congress there is jurisdiction whether the claim ultimately be held good or bad.'The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 412, 57 L.Ed. 716.See alsoHurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 240, 53 S.Ct. 586, 587, 77 L.Ed. 1148.Even a patently frivolous complaint might be sufficient to confer power to make a final decision that it is of that nature, binding as res judicata on the parties.

Petitioner's complaint, in substance, alleges existence of the interlocking directorship, contends that such relationship was used fraudulently to deprive it of its federally conferred right to reasonable rates and charges, and demands reparations.We think there was power in the District Court to decide whether the claims so grounded constitute a cause of action maintainable in federal court and, if so, whether it is sustained on the facts.We think a direction to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was error and that it should not stand as a precedent.

However, it is clear that the reason underlying the Court of Appeals' decision was that no federal cause of action was established.If this was correct, we should sustain the judgment of reversal, though on other grounds than those stated.

The petitioner's problem is to avoid Scylla without being drawn into Charybdis.If its cause of action arises from fraud and deceit, it is a common-law action of which a federal court has no jurisdiction, there being no diversity in citizenship of these parties.But if it arises from being charged rates in excess of those permitted by the Power Act, it is confronted with the exclusive powers of the Commission to determine what those rates are to be.Hence, it is necessary to bring the case into court, not as a fraud action, but as one to enforce the Power Act, using the allegations of fraud to escape the limitations of the Power Commission remedies.

I.

Petitioner identifies as the source of its cause of action the Federal Power Act's requirement of reasonable electric utility rates,⁶ which, it contends, creates its legal right to rates which a court may deem reasonable, even if different from those accepted by the Federal Power Commission.It is admitted, however, that a utility could not institute a suit in a federal court to recover a portion of past rates which it simply alleges were unreasonable.It would be out of court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, for, at any time in the past, it could have applied for and secured a review and, perhaps, a reduction of the rates by the Commission.⁷

Petitioner gives its case a different cast by alleging that by fraudulent abuse of the interlocking relationship its predecessor was deprived of its independence and power to resort to its administrative remedy.

But the problem is whether it is open to the courts to determine what the reasonable rates during the past should have been.The petitioner, in contending that they are so empowered, and the District Court, in undertaking to exercise that power, both regard reasonableness as a justiciable legal right rather than a criterion for administrative application in determining a lawful rate.Statutory reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a pinpoint.It allows a substantial spread between what is unreasonable because too low and what is unreasonable because too high.To reduce the abstract concept of reasonableness to concrete expression in dollars and cents is the function of the Commission.It is not the disembodied 'reasonableness' but that standard when embodied in a rate which the Commission accepts or determines that governs the rights of buyer and seller.A court may think a different level more reasonable.But the prescription of the statute is a standard for the Commission to apply and, independently of Commission action, creates no right which courts may enforce.

Petitioner cannot separate what Congress has joined together.It cannot litigate in a judicial forum its general right to a reasonable rate, ignoring the qualification that it shall be made specific only by exercise of the Commission's judgment, in which there is some considerable element of discretion.It can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other terms.

We hold that the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission files or fixes, and that except for review of the Commission's orders, the courts can assume no right to a different one on the ground that, in its opinion, it is the only or the more reasonable one.

II.

The petitioner here contends that its case is different by reason of its allegations of fraud.Those, the evidence that supports them, and the findings are exceedingly general, and it is not entirely clear whether, in addition to the claim that constructive fraud may be inferred from the intercorporate relationship, specific acts of deceit are found.Nor does it appear to have been thought that the difference between constructive and actual fraud mattered.

If the petitioner's grievance arises from active fraud and deceit, it gains nothing from the Federal Act.Such an action would have been maintainable if no Federal Power Act had been enacted.Before the Act, petitioner would have had no statutory right to a reasonable rate, but it did have a common-law right not to be defrauded into paying an excessive or unreasonable one.The Federal Act adds nothing to fraud as an actionable wrong, and, therefore, to find a cause of action of this character would only be to dismiss it for want of diversity.

But petitioner's case appears to have rested more heavily and perhaps entirely on constructive fraud presumed from the intercorporate relationship.The Act vests in the Commission power to authorize an interlocking directorate, which otherwise is prohibited, 'upon due showing * * * that neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected thereby.'⁸The relationship here concerned had received Commission approval.The effect of the approval is to exempt the relationship from the ban of the Act and remove from it any presumption of fraud that might be thought to arise from its mere existence.It would be a strange contradiction between judicial and administrative policies if a relationship which the Commission has declared will not adversely affect public or private interests were regarded by courts as enough to create a presumption of fraud.Perhaps, in the absence of the Commission's approval, such relationship would be sufficient to raise the presumption under state law, but it cannot do so where the federal supervising authority has expressly approved the arrangement.

We need not decide what action the Commission is...