Utterback v. State

Decision Date28 November 1899
Docket Number19,044
Citation55 N.E. 420,153 Ind. 545
PartiesUtterback v. The State
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

From the Lawrence Circuit Court.

Affirmed.

S. B Lowe, J. E. Boruff and J. H. Underwood, for appellant.

Wm. L Taylor, Attorney-General, J. A. Zaring, John R. East and McHenry Owen, for State.

OPINION

Dowling, J.

Appellant and one Stella Cooper were prosecuted upon affidavit and information for the crime of conspiring together to extort money from one Everett Sheeks by filing an affidavit against him before a justice of the peace of Lawrence county, in this State, feloniously accusing and charging the said Sheeks with a criminal assault upon the said Stella Cooper, with the felonious intent to extort the sum of $ 500 from the said Sheeks. Upon the trial both defendants were convicted. Utterback appealed.

A motion to quash the information having been made and overruled below, it is urged here that the information is insufficient because it charges that the defendants conspired together to commit the crime, commonly known as blackmailing by filing an affidavit against Everett Sheeks accusing him of an assault with intent to commit a felony; whereas, the statute does not extend to a case where an affidavit is filed before an officer having jurisdiction of the offense set forth in the affidavit.

The prosecution is under the following section of the criminal code: §§ 2260 Burns 1894, § 2139 Horner 1897. "Any person or persons who shall unite or combine with any other person or persons for the purpose of committing a felony; or any person or persons who shall knowingly unite with any other person or persons, or body or association or combination of persons, whose object is the commission of a felony or felonies, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined, etc."

Section 1999 Burns 1894, § 1926 Horner 1897: "Whoever, either verbally or by any letter or writing or any written or printed communication, demands of any person, with menaces of personal injury, any chattel, money, or other valuable security; or whoever accuses or threatens to accuse, or knowingly sends or delivers any letter or writing or any written or printed communication, with or without a name subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name; or with any letter, mark, or designation, accusing or threatening to accuse any person of any crime punishable by law, or of any immoral conduct, which, if true, would tend to degrade and disgrace such person, or in any way to subject him to the ridicule or contempt of society; or to do any injury to the person or property of any one, with intent to extort or gain from such person any chattel, money, or valuable security, or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever; or with any intent to compel the person threatened to do any act against his will, with the intent aforesaid, is guilty of blackmailing, and shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned," etc.

So much of the latter section as it is necessary to consider here may be stated in these words: Whoever accuses any person of any crime punishable by law, with intent to extort or gain from such person any chattel, money, or valuable security, is guilty of blackmailing, and shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned, etc.

It is said in the argument for the appellant, that, "It is not a case of threatening to accuse Sheeks of rape; it is not a case of writing any letter, or communication, with the intent to extort money from him; it is not a case of telling him that he is guilty of rape, and that if he does not pay money he will be charged with crime, or exposed in some way. * * * We think the word accuse, as used in the statute, has reference to a verbal accusation. * * * We think under this statute there are two ways of accusing or threatening to accuse; one is to verbally accuse, or threaten to accuse, and another is to accuse by letter or writing, with or without a name subscribed thereto, or fictitiously signed."

It will be observed that the several clauses of § 1999...

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25 cases
  • Donovan v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • February 26, 1908
    ...evidence, have been brought into the record by a bill of exceptions. Citing Smith v. State, 154 Ind. 107, 56 N. E. 19;Utterback v. State, 153 Ind. 545, 549, 55 N. E. 420;Miller v. State, 165 Ind. 566, 568, 76 N. E. 245, and cases cited; Stilwell v. State, 155 Ind. 552, 58 N. E. 705;Beal v. ......
  • Eacock v. The State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1907
    ... ... 378, 12 N.E. 510; ... Musgrave v. State (1893), 133 Ind. 297, ... 305, 306, 32 N.E. 885. The indictment fully complies with ... this requirement and is sufficient under the rule declared in ... Motsinger v. State (1890), 123 Ind. 498, 24 ... N.E. 342; Utterback v. State (1899), 153 ... Ind. 545, 55 N.E. 420. The court did not err in overruling ... appellant's motion to quash ...          It is ... claimed by appellant that the court erred in permitting the ... State to introduce evidence, concerning alleged conspiracies ... by appellant ... ...
  • Eacock v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1907
    ...with this requirement, and is sufficient under the rule declared in Motsinger v. State, 123 Ind. 498, 24 N. E. 342;Utterback v. State, 153 Ind. 545, 55 N. E. 420. The court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to quash. It is claimed by appellant that the court erred in permitting t......
  • Klein v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 20, 1901
    ...from the order book entry, cannot become a part of the record on appeal. Robards v. State, 152 Ind. 294, 53 N. E. 234;Utterback v. State, 153 Ind. 545, 55 N. E. 420, and cases cited; Calvert v. State, 91 Ind. 473; Ewbank, Man. § 24. We take notice that the limit of the June term, 1900, of t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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