Uzoukwu v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–3483–CV.,13–3483–CV.
• Citation: 805 F.3d 409
• Parties: Afam UZOUKWU, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, Michele Krawiecki, Carl Miluso, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

805 F.3d 409

Afam UZOUKWU, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, Michele Krawiecki, Carl Miluso, Defendants–Appellees.¹

No. 13–3483–CV.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: Feb. 19, 2015.

Decided: Nov. 5, 2015.

Afam Uzoukwu, Long Island City, NY, pro se.

Pamela Seider Dolgow, of counsel (Ronald E. Sternberg, of counsel, on the brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, New York, NY, for Appellees.

Before: WINTER, POOLER, and SACK, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

POOLER, Circuit Judge:

Afam Uzoukwu, proceeding pro se, appeals from the August 28, 2013 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Abrams, J. ), dismissing his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and excessive force, after a jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Halfway through deliberations, the jury sent a note asking whether “refusal to acknowledge/respond to police questions [is] considered obstruction of governmental administration.” App'x at 1094. In response, the district court equivocally answered that “[r]efusal to answer police questions alone, without more, would not constitute obstruction of governmental administration,” but that such a determination would “depend[ ] on the totality of the circumstances as you find them.” App'x at 1094–95. However, New York law unambiguously holds that one cannot obstruct governmental administration merely by refusing to answer police questions or to provide identification, both because such conduct is constitutionally protected, and because obstruction of governmental administration requires as an element a physical or independently unlawful act. Given that this prejudicial error was indisputably preserved, we vacate the verdict and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

According to defendants, the underlying incident began when the two named officers approached Uzoukwu at approximately 5 p.m. on May 15, 2008, while he was sitting on a park bench eating Jell–O, “[H]e did not have anything that” indicated he had “children in the park, such as a stroller.” App'x at 783. The posted park rules prohibited adults who were not accompanying children from being in the playground near where the bench was located. The officers testified that they told plaintiff he could not be there without children, asked him several times whether he had any children with him, and repeatedly requested his identification, but plaintiff “continued looking down, eating his jello. He did not respond.” App'x at 785. Officer Krawiecki testified that “to get his attention, I took his jello and I threw it out.” App'x at 785. According to the officers, plaintiff at that point began screaming and cursing, whereupon he was arrested. [A 785] Uzoukwu was charged with (i) disorderly conduct and (ii) obstruction of governmental administration.

Uzoukwu claimed that he was at the park with his two children, ages 3 and 5, when the police approached him, demanded identification, and accused him of being a pedophile. He asserted that he only began yelling after the police officers hit him. In addition, plaintiff alleged that he was told by Sergeant Papgiannis that officers can “hit you, punch you, assault[ ] you, because they need to subdue you before they arrest you.”

On August 21, 2009, plaintiff's criminal case was dismissed. On June 25, 2010, Uzoukwu, who was then represented by counsel, filed a complaint asserting “deprivation of rights under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ” against the named officers and “liability of the City of New York for Constitutional violations.” On October 19, 2010, plaintiff filed an amended complaint claiming, inter alia, false arrest, excessive force, deprivation of liberty, physical injury and emotional distress. While the complaint asserted that the two officers “struck plaintiff” when plaintiff “had not done anything [that] would justify an arrest,” the complaint did not assert that he was bringing claims for battery or assault.

On March 29, 2013, the parties filed a joint pretrial order in which plaintiff asserted that the “claims to be tried are (a) false arrest, (b) false imprisonment, (c) excessive force, (d) assault, (e) battery, (f) mental and emotional distress, and (g) malicious prosecution. Defendants then moved for partial summary judgment requesting that the district court dismiss with prejudice (1) plaintiff's claims against the City of New York for failure to present evidence of a municipal policy, and (2) the state law claims not previously asserted in the amended complaint. The district court issued a bench ruling granting defendants' motion.

Uzoukwu proceeded to trial on the Section 1983 claims against the officers for false arrest and excessive force. As a defense to his claim of false arrest, the officers argued that they had probable cause to believe plaintiff had committed the crimes of (i) obstruction of governmental administration and (ii) disorderly conduct. At the close of trial, the jury was instructed that the officers could not be held liable for false arrest if they had probable cause to believe plaintiff had committed the crime of either (i) obstruction of governmental administration or (ii) disorderly conduct.

An hour after the jury retired to deliberate, it sent a note requesting the parties' stipulations and the arrest records, and asking the following questions:

1) Is refusal to acknowledge/respond to police questions considered obstruction of governmental administration?

2) Does police antagonizing/provoking emotional response weaken probable cause?

3) If police officer inappropriately approaches (e.g. due to bias) an individual, who then gives probable cause for arrest, is probable cause then eliminated?

App'x at 1033–34, 1038.

That night, the parties submitted letters to the court proposing answers to the jury questions. Uzoukwu argued that the first of these questions warranted an unequivocal answer in the negative, relying on New York state law for the proposition that an individual has a constitutional right not to respond to police questioning and mere words cannot constitute the “physical” act required for the crime of obstruction. Defendants argued that:

The relevant Park Rules should be included in response to Question No. 2 because—as this question illustrates—they are essential for the jury to make its determination whether there was probable cause to arrest for Obstruction of Governmental Administration.

App'x at 1060. Defendants also renewed their summary judgment motion for qualified immunity noting: “Indeed, based upon the questions presented by the jury, it now appears that the Court may have to decide the issue of qualified immunity.” App'x at 1062.

The next morning, the district court met with the parties before bringing in the jury and informed them that it had found a New York Court of Appeals case that it concluded confirmed that violations of park rules constitute a “a class B misdemeanor (see 56 RCNY 1–07(a); Penal Law § 70.15(2) ), the maximum penalty for which is 90 days' imprisonment and a $1,000 fine (see 56 RCNY 1–07(a)).” People v. Davis,

13 N.Y.3d 17, 21, 884 N.Y.S.2d 665, 912 N.E.2d 1044 (2009) (upholding a conviction for failing to comply with posted sign indicating city park's closing time was 9 p.m., where officer observed defendant in the park at 2:00 a.m.). The district court told the parties that it would add a supplemental instruction informing the jury that it could also find that the officers lawfully arrested plaintiff if they had probable cause to believe that he violated the park rules.

After much debate and over Uzoukwu's objection, the district court provided the following answer to the jury's first question:

Refusal to answer police questions alone, without more, would not constitute obstruction of governmental administration. Whether refusal to acknowledge or respond to police questions is considered obstruction of governmental administration depends on the totality of the circumstances as you find them. As I instructed you, a person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act .... A police officer's official function includes enforcing compliance with park and playground rules.

App'x at 1094–95 (emphases added).

The district court also answered the jury's final question about whether probable cause is eliminated where “a police officer inappropriately (e.g. due to bias) approaches an individual who then gives probable cause for arrest,” explaining:

In response to this question I will refer you to my previous instruction that “the issue in this case is not about whether plaintiff was properly stopped, but whether his arrest was unlawful.” Further, as I have instructed you, “the motive of the defendant police officers is not a factor for you to consider in determining whether there was probable cause. The only issue for you to decide is whether the was probable cause to arrest.”

App'x at 1096. The district court then charged the jury that:

In assessing probable cause to arrest, I have one further instruction to provide you.... Defendants also contend that plaintiff had violated various New York City Park Rules and Regulations and that probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff for violations of the following rules, which constitute misdemeanors:

1. No person shall fail, neglect or refuse to comply with the lawful direction or command of any Police Officer, Urban Park Ranger, Parks Enforcement Patrol Officer, or other Department employee, indicated by gesture or otherwise.

2. No person shall fail to comply with or obey any instruction, direction, regulation, warning, or prohibition, written or printed, displayed or

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