v. City of New York 8212 6425

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: v. City of New York 8212 6425, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972)
• Decision Date: 12 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71,71
• Parties: Ivan V. v. CITY OF NEW YORK. —6425

407 U.S. 203

92 S.Ct. 1951

32 L.Ed.2d 659

Ivan V.

v CITY OF NEW YORK.

No. 71—6425.

Decided June 12, 1972.

PER CURIAM.

The Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, decided March 31, 1970, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the essentials of due process and fair treatment that must be afforded at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. In this case, on January 6, 1970, before Winship was decided, petitioner was adjudged a delinquent in the Family Court of Bronx County, New York, on a finding, based on the preponderance-of-evidence standard, that, at knifepoint, he forcibly took a bicycle from another boy, an act that, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in the first degree. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed on the ground that Winship should be retroactively applied to all cases still in the appellate process, 35 A.D.2d 806, 316 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1970). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Winship was not to be applied retroactively, V. v. City of New York, 29 N.Y.2d 583, 324 N.Y.S.2d 313 272 N.E.2d 895 (1971).^* On remand, the Appellate Division thereupon affirmed the delinquency adjudication, 37 A.D.2d 822, 324 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1971), and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal from that affirmance, 29 N.Y.2d 489, 328 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 278 N.E.2d 655 (1972). We disagree with the holding of the Court of Appeals that Winship is not to be applied retroactively.

'Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.' Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971). See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 280, 92 S.Ct. 916, 918, 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1972); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 1922, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1968).

Winship expressly held that the reasonable-doubt standard 'is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law' . . . 'Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the...