v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc, 82-1301
Decision Date | 20 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-1301,82-1301 |
Citation | 103 S.Ct. 3124,462 U.S. 1137,77 L.Ed.2d 1375 |
Parties | . v. CONSUMERS UNION OF the UNITED STATES, INC., et al Supreme Court of the United States |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
This petition marks the third occasion this case has been before us. The case arose in 1975 when respondent brought a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that particular provisions of the State Bar Code promulgated by the Virginia Supreme Court violated respondent's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Having prevailed in its § 1983 suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Virginia Supreme Court and its Chief Justice (together, the "Virginia Court"), the issue now is whether respondent is entitled to attorney's fees from that court 1 under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This was also the issue we addressed the last time this case came before us, when we vacated an award of attorney's fees against the Virginia Court on the ground that it "was premised on acts or omissions for which [the Virginia Court] enjoyed absolute legislative immunity." Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 738, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1977, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) (Consumers Union ).
Justice POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
On remand, a divided three-judge District Court reinstated the award of attorney's fees against the Virginia court, 505 F.Supp. 822 (ED Va.1981), and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. 688 F.2d 218 (CA4 1982). Because I believe that the District Court misinterpreted our opinion in Consumers Union and erred in reinstating the fee award, I would grant certiorari.
It is unnecessary to review here at length the prior history of this case, which is set out in detail in Consumers Union. There, two basic issues faced the Court:
"[W]hether the Supreme Court of Virginia (Virgi ia Court) and its chief justice are officially immune from suit in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the Virginia Court's disciplinary rules governing the conduct of attorneys and whether attorney's fees were properly awarded under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, against the Virginia Court and its chief justice in his official capacity." 446 U.S., at 721, 100 S.Ct., at 1969.
With respect to the first issue, we held that the Virginia Court was not subject to suit under § 1983 for its legislative acts—such as promulgating disciplinary rules—any more than state legislators could be sued for their legislative acts: "[T]he Virginia Court and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative capacity." Id., at 734, 100 S.Ct., at 1975. However, the Court went on to hold that the Virginia Court was a proper defendant in a coercive action brought under § 1983 because it possessed enforcement powers. Id., at 736, 100 S.Ct., at 1977.
Turning to the second issue, we vacated the award of attorney's fees against the Virginia Court. The District Court had awarded fees against the Virginia Court because "it was the very authority that had propounded and failed to amend the challenged provisions of the Bar Code." Id., at 738, 100 S.Ct., at 1977. This was error because the Virginia Supreme Court had legislative immunity for its acts in promulgating disciplinary rules:
We explained that nothing in the legislative history of § 1988 indicated that Congress "intended to permit an award of attorney's fees to be premised on acts for which the defendants would enjoy absolute immunity." Ibid.
We then vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded, presumably to permit the District Court to determine whether the role of the Virginia State Bar—the Virginia Court's codefendant in the case—in enforcing the challenged rules justified an award of attorney's fees against it.
On remand, the District Court interpreted Consumers Union as holding that an award of attorney's fees against the Virginia Court would be appropriate on the existing record "based solely on the Virginia Court's enforcement role. . . ." 505 F.Supp., at 823. The District Court reasoned that because the Virginia Court's enforcement role rendered it liable to a coercive suit under § 1983, it was also liable for attorney's fees under § 1988:
"It seems clear that 'in the circumstances of this case, a sufficiently concrete dispute is made out against the Virginia Court as an enforcer,' . . . not only for amenability to suit, but also for the purpose of a fee award to [respondent], the prevailing party." Id., at 823-824, quoting Consumers Union, 446 U.S., at 737, n. 15, 100 S.Ct., at 1977, n. 15.
The District Court quoted Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968), in arguing that § 1988 ordinarily requires an award of attorney's fees against a party properly sued under § 1983 " 'unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' " 505 F.Supp., at 824. It concluded that o such circumstances existed here and so awarded fees against the Virginia Court.
One judge dissented, arguing that the Virginia Court's "enforcement role" was not established by the record and hence could not serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees.
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the award of attorney's fees against the Virginia Court was not an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals interpreted Consumers Union as holding that an award of attorney's fees would be justified on this record.2
The immunity of judges from monetary judgments for their actions as judges is deeply embedded in our legal system. E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871); Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. (5 Hans.) 131, 139-140 (1885). In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217-1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), we refused, in the absence of specific statutory language, to presume that Congress intended by enacting Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to displace the historic rule of judicial immunity; we held that the doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits for damages under that section. The principles of Pierson apply with full force to suits for attorney's fees under § 1988. Nothing in the language or legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 specifically indicates Congress' intent to sweep away the historic immunity of judges from monetary judgments. In Pierson, the Court explained that the purpose of judicial immunity
386 U.S., at 554, 87 S.Ct., at 1218 (citations omitted).
See also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31, 101 S.Ct. 183, 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). I fail to see how an award of attorney's fees is any less of a threat to judicial independence than an award of damages. An independent judiciary, uncowed by fears of financial liability for its official acts, is an integral aspect of state sovereignty and critical to the security of our freedoms. I would not presume that Congress cast this fundamental rule to the winds in the absence of specific statutory language rendering judges liable for attorney's fees. No such language is found in § 1988.
Although judges are immune from monetary damages under § 1983 for their official acts, see, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, supra, they are nonetheless subject to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief in their administrative capacities. E.g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F.Supp. 117, 123-124 (SDNY 1969) (three-judge district court) (Friendly, J.), aff'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 154, 91 S.Ct. 720, 27 L.Ed.2d 749 (1971). However, it is beyond peradventure that the...
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