Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-3839-L |
| Parties | BINH HOA LE, Plaintiff, v. EXETER FINANCE CORP. and ENZO PARENT, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27), filed December 16, 2016; Defendants' Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert (Doc. 28), filed December 16, 2016; Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Summary Judgment Evidence and Motion to Strike (Doc. 31), filed January 6, 2017; Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance (Doc. 35), filed January 6, 2017; Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence (Doc. 39), filed January 20, 2017; Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification on Discovery Deadline, or in the Alternative, Motion for Extension of the Same (Doc. 57), filed March 13, 2017; Plaintiff's Motion to De-Designate "Highly Confidential" Documents in Defendants' Productions (Doc. 63), filed August 2, 2017; Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel (Doc. 83), filed April 13, 2018; and Plaintiff's Motion to Set Trial Date and Enter Scheduling Order (Doc. 86), filed April 17, 2018.1
After considering the motions, responses, replies, briefs, admissible summary judgment evidence, and applicable legal standard, the court denies Defendants' Motion for SummaryJudgment (Doc. 27) with respect to Plaintiff's quantum meruit claim, grants the motion in all other respects, and dismisses with prejudice all claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action, except for his quantum meruit claim; grants Defendants' Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert (Doc. 28); overrules as moot, except to the extent specifically addressed and ruled upon in this opinion, Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Summary Judgment Evidence and Motion to Strike (Doc. 31); denies Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance (Doc. 35); overrules as moot, except to the extent specifically addressed and ruled upon in this opinion, Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence (Doc. 39); grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification on Discovery Deadline, or in the Alternative, Motion for Extension of the Same (Doc. 57); denies as moot Plaintiff's Motion to De-Designate "Highly Confidential" Documents in Defendants' Productions (Doc. 63); denies as moot Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel (Doc. 83); and denies as moot Plaintiff's Motion to Set Trial Date and Enter Scheduling Order (Doc. 86).
The court also strikes all amended or supplemental submissions (Docs. 64, 64-1, 68-1, 78, 82, 82-1, 32, 77) that were filed by Plaintiff without leave of court in violation of the court's scheduling order, this district's Local Civil Rules, or both. Additionally, the court strikes the parties' submissions, arguments, or evidence (Docs. 72, 72-1, 72-2, 75) that were filed or made in response to or in support of Plaintiff's supplemental submissions.
Plaintiff Binh Hoa Le ("Plaintiff" or "Le"), the former Chief Human Resources Officer ("CHRO") and Executive Vice President of Defendant Exeter Finance Corp. ("Exeter"), originally brought this action against his former employer Exeter and Exeter's parent company Enzo Parent, LLC ("Enzo") (collectively, "Defendants") on October 2, 2015, in the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, after his employment was terminated on February 23, 2015. Le asserts claimsfor breaches of a July 25, 2013 agreement and a May 2014 Management Profits Interest Unit Agreement ("PIU Agreement"). In his First Amended Petition, dated October 16, 2015, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud, fraudulent inducement, and fraud by nondisclosure or omission; and (3) alleged violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.001, et seq. Plaintiff also seeks relief under the equitable theories of quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and money had and received.
On December 1, 2015, Defendants removed the action to federal court after Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Petition ("Complaint"), the live pleading, which includes his previously asserted claims and requests for relief under state law, in addition to new federal employment law claims for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, et seq. ("Title VII"), which are also brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA"); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 U.S.C. § 12111, et. seq. ("ADA"); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA"); and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. ("FMLA"). Plaintiff's employment law claims are based on his contention that he engaged in protected activity in opposing unlawful employment practices by Exeter involving other Exeter employees, and Exeter retaliated by firing him.
Plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages in an amount determined to have been sustained by him; exemplary damages, attorney's fees, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and costs. Plaintiff alleges entitlement to exemplary damages under Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Labor Code § 21.2585, "as well as under 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq., among others." Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 62. Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees is made pursuant to section 38.00 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; section 21.259 of the Texas Labor Code or TCHRA; section 2000e-5(k) of Title VII; section 216(b) of the ADEA;section 2617(a)(3) of the FMLA; "and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., among others." Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 63.
In accordance with the deadline set by the court for filing dispositive motions, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims on December 16, 2016 (Doc. 27). Defendants also moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Category I damages for losses allegedly sustained by him as a result of his leaving Lennox to join Exeter. On the same date, Defendants moved to exclude the opinions of Plaintiff's damages expert Karl Weisheit ("Weisheit) regarding the two categories of damages identified in Weisheit's report (Doc. 28). Regarding Plaintiff's Category I or Lennox losses, Weisheit expresses the opinion, based on Plaintiff's fraudulent inducement allegations, that Exeter's conduct in inducing Le to leave Lennox, his former employer, to work for Exeter caused Le to forgo or lose wages and the value of his Lennox equity portfolio. Weisheit opines that Plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages these Category I losses, which he concludes total $5,268,182. Regarding Category II or Exeter losses, Weisheit expresses the opinion, based on Plaintiff's wrongful termination and breach of contract allegations, that Le suffered damages totaling $6,199,344 for unpaid severance, lost wages (past and future), the unpaid value of his Enzo profits interest units ("PIUs"), and Cobra health insurance payments. Weisheit states in his report that "[a]dditional facts and data are needed to be produced by Defendants in order to complete my analysis of Mr. Le's losses" but does not specify whether additional facts or data are needed with respect to Category I or II losses or both. Defs.' App. 28 (Doc. 28-2). He also states with respect to PIUs losses that "[a]dditional information is needed and has been requested of Exeter . . . to calculate the actual PIU Mr. Le should have received." Defs.' App. 35.
Defendants contend that Weisheit's opinion regarding Plaintiff's damages should be excluded and Weisheit should not be allowed to testify regarding damages because he relies oninaccurate facts and flawed methodology. Defendants assert that Weisheit's opinion regarding Plaintiff's Category I losses should be excluded, as the evidence establishes that Le could not have been fraudulently induced to leaving Lennox to join Exeter because he was fired for cause by Lennox in April 2013 before learning of the job opportunity at Exeter in June 2013. In this regard, Defendants contend that Plaintiff testified untruthfully while under oath in his deposition that he left Lennox because he was recruited by Exeter, and Weisheit's expert report, the contents of which were verified by Le, relies on Plaintiff's false allegations regarding his fraudulent inducement claim.
On January 6, 2017, the deadline to respond to Defendants' motions for summary judgment and to exclude the expert opinion of Weisheit, Plaintiff filed: (1) his response to Defendants' summary judgment and expert motions, which included a request for continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(d) (Docs. 33, 34); (2) objections and a motion to strike Defendants' summary judgment evidence (Doc. 31); (3) a motion under Rule 56(d) to extend his deadline to respond to Defendants' summary judgment and expert motions to April 17, 2017, to give him an opportunity to conduct additional discovery, obtain a ruling on a previously filed motion to compel, and supplement or amend his expert report before responding to Defendants' summary judgment and expert motions (Doc. 35); and (4) a First Amended and Supplemental Designation of Expert Witness Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, without leave of court long after expiration of his September 6, 2016 deadline to designate experts (Doc. 32).2 Defendants opposed the requested continuance.
Thereafter, on March 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed an opposed motion (Doc. 57), requesting that the court enter an order clarifying that the discovery deadline was unexpired as of March 2, 2018, when it stayed all unexpired scheduling order deadlines. Alternatively, Plaintiff requested anextension of the discovery deadline "until 21-days prior to trial," so that he could depose three witnesses before trial.
On August 2, 2017, Plaintiff moved to change the "highly confidential attorney's eyes only"...
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