Estes v. Local Union, No. 43, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1916
• Citation: 90 Conn. 426,97 A. 326
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ESTES et al. v. LOCAL UNION, NO. 43, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA.

97 A. 326

90 Conn. 426

ESTES et al.

v. LOCAL UNION, NO. 43, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 19, 1916.

Appeal from City Court of Hartford; Herbert S. Bullard, Judge.

Action by Annis Estes and others against Local Union, No. 43, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. No error.

The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America is a national organization whose membership consists of the members of a large number of local unions scattered throughout the country. These local unions have their own form of organization and officers, but they are organized under the constitution of the Brotherhood, and they, their officers and members, are subject to its authority and control. All members of the local bodies are ipso facto members of the Brotherhood. By its constitution a funeral benefit of $200 is payable from its treasury on the death of any beneficial member of one year's good standing. By a subsequent section this benefit is made payable to "his wife or legal heirs as named on his application." It is further provided that, if a member die without heirs, the local union should "see him respectably interred" at the expense of the Brotherhood. The by-laws of the defendant local union provide that upon due notice of the death of a beneficial member who had been in good standing for one year or over a funeral benefit of $100 should be paid by it through an assessment upon its members, "the same as other funeral benefits prescribed in the constitution." The local union had no constitution. The only constitution to which its members were subject is the constitution of the general body or Brotherhood.

John Bickford, who died November 30, 1909, was, and for three years or more had been, a beneficial member of the defendant union, and, by virtue of that membership, a beneficial member of the Brotherhood. It does not appear that in his application he named any person, either wife or heir, as the beneficiary of any funeral or other benefit which should become payable at his death, or that he ever otherwise than as is hereinafter stated designated or attempted to designate a beneficiary thereof. At the time of his death, and for some time previous thereto, he resided in North Adams, Mass., with the plaintiff, his sister, and her husband. She cared for him during his last illness, and paid the expenses connected with it, and it was his desire, as expressed by him, that she should provide for his funeral. On November 6, 1909, he executed under seal, acknowledged, and delivered to the plaintiff the following instrument in writing:

"Know all men by these presents, that I, John Bickford, of the town of Hoosick, county of Rensselaer, and state of New York, in consideration of the sum of one ($1.00) dollar and other good and valuable consideration to me paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, assigned, and set over, and by these presents do grant, assign, and set over, unto Annis Estes, all right, title, and interest which I may have in and to all benefits or sums of money which may accrue or become due upon my death, from the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. And I hereby expressly name and appoint said Annis Estes as beneficiary of all benefits or money which may be payable from said Brotherhood upon my death, and do hereby revoke and annul any other beneficiary or beneficiaries which may have been heretofore named by me in my original application for membership or elsewhere."

Notice of this instrument was given to the defendant by the delivery to it of a copy on December 4, 1909. Due demand was thereupon made for payment of the $100 payable by the defendant, and the same refused. Bickford left surviving him a widow, who was duly appointed administratrix of his estate. To her, as such administratrix and widow, the defendant on December 28, 1909, paid the $100.

Upon the trial one Miskill, the financial secretary of the defendant, was asked by defendant's counsel as to the defendant's custom in the matter of the payment of funeral benefits, and particularly as to the person to whom the payment, in case of the death of a member, is customarily made. This evidence was excluded. No knowledge on the part of the deceased of the alleged custom was shown.

Henry H. Hunt and Nathan A. Schatz, both of Hartford, for appellant. George O. Brott, of Hartford, for appellees.

PRENTICE, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). When John Bickford died, the defendant came under the admitted obligation to pay $100 as a funeral benefit to some one showing himself or herself entitled to receive it in conformity to the constitution, rules, and regulations governing such payment. Bickford, while living, had no property in this benefit payment, or interest in it other than the power to designate a beneficiary to receive it, and upon his death no right to it passed to his estate. During his life he had this power of designation, including that of change of designation previously made, subject to any limitation or restraint imposed upon it by statute, or the charter, constitution, by-laws, or regulations of the organization. Supreme Colony v. Towne, 87 Conn. 644, 648, 649, 89 Atl. 264; Masonic Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Tolles, 70 Conn. 537, 544, 40 Atl. 448; Md. Mut. Ben. Soc. v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 433, 22 Am. Rep. 52; Hellenberg v. Dist. No. 1, I. O. B. B., 94 N. Y. 583, 585; Carpenter v. Knapp, 101 Iowa, 712, 727, 70 N. W. 764, 38 L. R. A. 128; Delaney v. Delaney, 175 Ill. 187, 195, 51 N. E. 961; Fischer v. American Legion of Honor, 168 Pa. 279, 285, 31 Atl. 1089; Masonic Mutual Bene. Soc. v. Burkhart, 110 Ind. 189, 192, 10 N. E. 79, 11 N. E. 449; 1 Bacon on Benefit Societies, § 237; Gen. St. § 3582. No provision has been pointed out to us which imposes any such limitation or restriction, except that contained in the section of...