La. v. Rowan Companies Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-08-1682
• Citation: 728 F.Supp.2d 896
• Parties: State of LOUISIANA, Plaintiff, v. ROWAN COMPANIES INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

728 F.Supp.2d 896

State of LOUISIANA, Plaintiff,

v.ROWAN COMPANIES INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. H-08-1682.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

July 28, 2010.

Francis I. Spagnoletti, David S. Toy, Spagnoletti & Co. Anthony G. Buzbee, The Buzbee Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Steven L. Roberts, John Daniel Johnson, Rachel Giesber Clingman, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

MELINDA HARMON, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are Defendant Rowan Companies, Inc.'s ("Rowan") Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 48, 67), as well as Plaintiff State of Louisiana's ("Louisiana") responses (Docs. 55, 73), Rowan's replies (Docs. 60, 74), and Louisiana's surreply (Doc. 77). Upon review and consideration of these motions, the responses, replies, and surreply thereto, the relevant legal authority, and for the reasons explained below, the Court finds Defendant Rowan's motions for summary judgment should be granted.

I. Background and Relevant Facts

This is a tort action in federal court pursuant to admiralty jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Defendant Rowan is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. (Doc. 41 at 3.) Rowan drills offshore oil and gas wells. (Doc. 48 at 1.) On December 2, 2003, Robert D. Marcy ("Marcy"), an employee of Rowan, filed a qui tam action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging violations of federal environmental regulations on the Rowan Midland ("Midland") drilling rig. (Doc. 48, exh. A.) In his qui tam complaint, Marcy alleged that the crew on the Midland concealed violations of federal environmental regulations. ( Id. at ¶ 2.)

Federal authorities investigated the allegations, revealing that the Midland's crew conducted abrasive blasting activities to clean the rig while in Port Fourchon, Louisiana from January to May 2004. (Doc. 55, exh. 5 at 16.) During the blasting activities, the Midland's crew failed to take containment measures to minimize the discharge of spent blast media into the navigable waters of the United States in violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(a). ( Id.) Similar blasting also occurred at a terminal in Sabine Pass, Texas on several occasions in 2002 and 2004, causing pollutants to leak into the Sabine River. ( Id., exhs. 7-9.)

The government's investigation further revealed that the Midland's crew had, on multiple occasions from 2002 through 2004, discharged a mixture of hydraulic oil and water into U.S waters. ( Id., exh. 5 at 16.) The crew failed to report the discharge to the appropriate federal agency in violation of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5). ( Id.) The government learned that crew membersdischarged the oil and water mixture into the Gulf of Mexico at night to avoid detection. ( Id., exhs. 1-4, 6.) Moreover, the Midland's crew discharged garbage in violation of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships ("APPS"), 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a). (Doc. 55, exh. 5 at 16.)

On August 16, 2007, the government prosecuted Rowan. (Doc. 48, exh. 11.) Rowan subsequently admitted to violations of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319 and 1321, APPS, 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a), and pleaded guilty to Failing to Notify of Waste Discharge into U.S. Waters, Discharging Garbage into U.S. Waters, and Knowingly Discharging a Pollutant into U.S. Waters. (Doc. 48 at 2-3, exh. C.) On November 19, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas entered judgment against Rowan. ( Id.) The judgment indicated that Rowan's last offense ended on December 31, 2004. ( Id.) Rowan paid $7,000,000 in criminal fines, $1,000,000 to five state government organizations for environmental training concerning CWA violations, and $1,000,000 to the National Marine Sanctuaries Foundation for preservation projects off the coasts of Louisiana and Texas. (Doc. 55, exh. 14.)

On January 3, 2008, the State of Louisiana, acting in its sovereign capacity and as parens patriae on behalf of the general welfare and economy of her citizens, initiated this suit against Rowan. (Doc. 1.) Louisiana sues for damages on Rowan's admitted violations of federal environmental laws that ended in 2004. (Doc. 41 at ¶ 1.1.) Specifically, Louisiana brings claims for negligence, trespass, public nuisance, and unjust enrichment arising from Rowan's commission of maritime torts and violations of federal environmental regulations. Rowan moves for summary judgment.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A party moving for summary judgment must inform the court of the basis for the motion and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The substantive law governing the suit identifies the essential elements of the claims at issue and therefore indicates which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The initial burden falls on the movant to identify areas essential to the nonmovant's claim in which there is an "absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.2005). If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the adequacy of any response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) ( en banc ). Moreover, if the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proof on an issue, either as a plaintiff or as a defendant asserting an affirmative defense, then that party must establish that no dispute of material fact exists regarding all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor. Fontenot v. Upjohn, 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986) (the movant with the burden of proof "must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor" (emphasis in original)).

Once the movant meets its burden, the nonmovant must direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient toestablish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)). Instead, the non-moving party must produce evidence upon which a jury could reasonably base a verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.2005). To do so, the nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial." Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc. of N. Tex., P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.1998). Unsubstantiated and subjective beliefs and conclusory allegations and opinions of fact are not competent summary judgment evidence. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.1998); Grimes v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir.1996); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992). Nor are pleadings summary judgment evidence. Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).

The nonmovant cannot discharge his burden by offering vague allegations and legal conclusions. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir.1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Nor is the court required by Rule 56 to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n. 7 (5th Cir.1992)). Nevertheless, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also, Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir.2003). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment does not need to present additional evidence, but may identify genuine issues of fact extant in the summary judgment evidence produced by the moving party. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 198-200 (5th Cir.1988). The nonmoving party may also identify evidentiary documents already in the record that establish specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990).

III. Discussion

A. Laches and the Statute of Limitations

Rowan argues that the doctrine of laches bars Louisiana's maritime negligence claim. (Doc. 48 at 5-8.) Laches is an equitable doctrine that, once proved, serves as a complete defense to an action irrespective of whether the analogous state statute of limitations has run. Mecom v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 622 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir.1980). A laches defense consists of three elements: (1) delay on the part of the plaintiff in filing suit; (2) that is not excused; and (3) that results in undue prejudice to the defendant's ability to present an adequate defense. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Texas, 40 F.3d 698, 708 (5th...