Hay v. Short

• Citation: 49 Mo. 139
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decision Date: 31 October 1871
• Parties: JOSEPH HAY, Respondent, v. JAMES SHORT, Appellant.^a1

49 Mo. 139

JOSEPH HAY, Respondent,

v.JAMES SHORT, Appellant.^a1

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1871.

Error to Sixth District Court.

H. C. Lackland, for appellant.

Where the amount proved on the counter-claim exceeds the sum found due plaintiff, the court may give defendant judgment for the balance. (Gen. Stat. 1865, ch. 171, § 2; id. ch. 165, §§ 12, 13; Nelson v. Johnson, 25 Mo. 430 et seq.; House v. Marshall, 18 Mo. 368-74; Grand Lodge v. Knox, 20 Mo. 433; Ogden v. Coddington, 2 E. D. Smith, 317, 323; 1 Van Santv. Pl 545, 569.)

Counter-claims embrace both set-offs and recoupments, as they were understood prior to the code. (Pattison v. Richards, 22 Barb. 146; Ramsey v. Smith, 6 How. Pr. 420; 9 Van Santv. Pl. 545.)

E. A. Lewis, for respondent.

I. Defendant's claim was not subject-matter for recoupment, since it does not appear to have grown out of the rent contract as developed in the pleadings. (Barb. Set-off, 26; Sedgw. Dam. 431; Grand Lodge v. Knox, 20 Mo. 433.)

II. Even were this a case of recoupment, defendant could not recover an excess over plaintiff's claim. (Waterm. Set-off, § 425; Grand Lodge v. Knox, supra;Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171, 174.)

BLISS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action for rents, the value of one-third of a crop of corn raised upon shares, and was tried upon a counter-claim for damages suffered by defendant from failure on the part of the plaintiff to keep up his fence as he had agreed. Defendant obtained judgment for $21, which was recovered in the District Court.

It appears that plaintiff, by a verbal demise, leased to defendant six acres of land in a field of sixty acres at a rent of one-third of the crop. A portion of the remaining part of the field was leased to another, but most of it was retained by the plaintiff. Adjoining the field was a pasture also occupied by plaintiff, in which were kept cattle, hogs, etc. The fence between the two fields was under his exclusive control, and defendant, by way of counter-claim, alleged that when he rented the land there was a good fence around the field sufficient to turn stock; that plaintiff, by the contract of rental, was to keep the fence in order, and was not to permit stock to come into the inclosure, but that he let down the fence and left it down so that his cattle and hogs came into the field, destroyed the crop, etc. Defendant upon the trial undertook to prove the contract in relation to the fence as well as the damages, and the court instructed the jury that they must find that the plaintiff, in the contract of rental upon which the suit was brought, agreed to keep up the fence and keep out the cattle, etc., in order to sustain the demand embraced in the counter-claim, and if they did so find they might give the defendant his damages, and if they amounted to more han what was due the plaintiff for rent they should give him a verdict for the balance. One of the objections to the judgment is based upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the agreement, yet there was evidence tending to prove this issue, and it is not for us to say after the verdict of a jury whether it was sufficient or not.

The other objections to the judgment go to the right of recovery, admitting the answer to be true; and first, it is claimed that defendant cannot recoup his damages, because they are charged to have arisen from a trespass by the plaintiff. It is unnecessary to say what rights the defendant would have in the premises if the fence upon which he relied for protection were around the close leased by him and were under his control, and there was no express contract in relation to it. In that case the question would arise, considered in Mayor, etc., v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151, whether the act complained of was a violation of an implied agreement for quiet enjoyment, and was a proper subject for counter-claim as “arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the petition,” or was a tort that could only be the subject of a separate action. But the answer does not charge a tort. It is true it is not full and clear as to plaintiff's possession of the fence and his agreement, and should have been reformed on motion. But the objection was merely formal, the intent of the pleader could not be misunderstood, and it should be considered sufficient after verdict. The wrong complained of was a violation of the plaintiff's agreement; it arose out of the contract upon which the suit is based, and entitled the defendant to relief by way of recoupment.

The plaintiff also objects to the judgment as rendered in favor of defendant because, whatever the damages proven, he could only reduce or extinguish the claim against him, and was not entitled to a judgment for any balance supposed to be his due. In considering this point we must see whether any (and if any, what) changes that bear upon it have been introduced by the code.

Under the old system this claim for damages would have been set up by way of recoupment, and could not have been matter of set-off. But these terms are unknown to the code, and are both embraced in the word “counter-claim.” Whenever the defendant claims that the contract upon which suit is brought has been violated by the plaintiff, and desires in the pending action to recoup the damages suffered by him in consequence, or whenever he would recover of the plaintiff a demand arising upon a contract extrinsic to that upon which the plaintiff's demand is founded, in either case the new matter set out constitutes a counter-claim. (Holzbauer...