Hay v. Somerset Area Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 31 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-229 |
| Parties | HEATHER HAY, Plaintiff, v. SOMERSET AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant, v. STEPHEN SHAFFER Third-Party Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Third-Party Defendant Stephen Shaffer's Motion to Strike, which this Court construes as a motion to dismiss.1 (ECF No. 29.) The motion has been fully briefed (see ECF Nos. 30, 32, 33, 35) and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, Third-Party Defendant Schaffer's motion will be GRANTED.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Plaintiff initiated this civil rights action by filing a complaint in this Court on November 1, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Somerset Area School District ("SASD") acted with deliberate indifference towards inappropriate sexual conduct by Stephen Shaffer, a former teacher, causing Plaintiff to be sexually abused while she was a student. Plaintiff asserts two claims against SASD: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional right of bodily integrity, and (2) a Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 claim for subjecting Plaintiff to a hostile educational environment.
Defendant filed its answer on December 13, 2016. (ECF No. 9.) On January 31, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to File Complaint to Join Third-Party Defendant Stephen Shaffer (ECF No. 14), which this Court granted. (ECF No. 15.) SASD subsequently filed a Third-Party Complaint against Shaffer. (ECF No. 23.) Shaffer now asks this Court to dismiss him as a third-party defendant. (See ECF No. 29).
A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). But detailed pleading is not generally required. Id. The Rules demand only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in order togive the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps.2 First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) . Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.; see also Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786. Ultimately, the plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Shaffer asserts four arguments for why this Court should grant his motion to dismiss SASD's Third-Party Complaint. (See ECF No. 29.)3 Shaffer argues that: (1) SASD failed to state aproper third-party claim (Id. at 6-7); (2) SASD improperly failed to seek leave of the Court before filing its Third-Party Complaint (Id. at 2)4; (3) SASD untimely filed its Third-Party Complaint (Id. at 3); and (4) SASD's Third Party Complaint confuses the issues. (Id. at 4-5.)5
As explained below, this Court agrees with Shaffer that SASD failed to state a viable third-party claim. Therefore, this Court need not address Shaffer's remaining arguments.
Shaffer argues that this Court should dismiss SASD's third-party claim for contribution. Shaffer contends that the statues that Plaintiff sued under—§ 1983 and § 1861—do not provide for contribution as a remedy. (See ECF No. 33 at 6.) Shaffer also contends that the federal common law does not permit a plaintiff to seek contribution on civil rights claims. (Id.) Shaffer further asserts that SASD has not brought a proper third-party claim because SASD's Third-Party Complaint fails to establish that Shaffer and SASD are joint tortfeasors, as is required for contribution under Pennsylvania law. (Id. at 8.)
In response, SASD argues that it has filed a proper third-party claim against Shaffer. SASD asserts that that Third Circuit recognizes a right to contribution in civil rights actions. (ECF No. 35 at 4.) According to SASD, contribution and/or indemnification is appropriate here because SASD is only liable to Plaintiff due to its relationship as Shaffer's employer; any liability against SASD is secondary because SASD cannot be held liable absent a finding that Shaffer engaged in the alleged conduct. (ECF No. 30 at 5.) Overall, SASD contends that this is the "classic" and"textbook" example of a situation where contribution and/or indemnification are appropriate. (ECF No. 30 at 5; ECF No. 35 at 4.)
District Courts in the Third Circuit disagree about whether contribution is available in civil rights cases. This disagreement stems from the Third Circuit's decision in Miller v. Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, Inc., 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981). In Miller, the plaintiffs brought racial discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Id. at 104. The plaintiffs sued several defendants, some of whom settled before trial. Id. The claims against the remaining defendants proceeded to a bench trial, where the court found for the plaintiffs and awarded damages. Id. The Third Circuit held that "in federal civil rights cases, where one or more defendants have settled with a plaintiff, the damages recoverable by that plaintiff shall be reduced by the amount of the settlement received." Id. at 110. In reaching this holding, the Miller panel relied on Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d. Cir. 1980), where the Third Circuit recognized an implied right to contribution based on "federal common law." Id. at 107. Relying on Glus, Miller recognized an implied right to contribution based on federal common law; the Miller panel stated that "[n]othing in this case suggests that a different result [from Glus] should follow in civil rights cases." Id.
In what a recent Pennsylvania District Court appropriately called "some unfortunate timing,"6 Miller was issued just two days after the Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77 (1981). In Northwest Airlines, the Courtclarified that federal courts have limited powers to create federal common law; the Court emphasized that "federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers." Id. at 95 (internal citations omitted). The Court then examined the instances where federal courts have the power to create federal common law; first, when faced with "[b]roadly worded constitutional and statutory provisions" that lack "concrete meaning" absent judicial interpretation in "the common law tradition," id., and second, in "cases raising issues of uniquely federal concern, such as the definition of the rights or duties of the United States, or the resolution of interstate controversies." Id. The Supreme Court cited admiralty law one "narrow exception to the limited lawmaking role of the federal judiciary...". Id.
In Northwestern Airlines, the Court held that the federal common law did not provide for a right of contribution in cases brought under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 94-95. In reaching this decision, the Court specifically rejected Glus as an instance of a lower federal court failing to recognize that "no such general federal right [to contribution] has been recognized" by the Supreme Court. Id. at 77. Accordingly, the Court vacated Glus and remanded the case to the Third Circuit "for further consideration in light of Northwest Airlines." Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, AFL-CIO v. G.C Murphy Co., 451 U.S. 935 (1981). "On remand, the Third Circuit recognized that Title VII did not permit contribution claims, thus removing the foundation upon which Miller relied." Bank v. City of Philadelphia, 991 F. Supp. 2d 523, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing G.C. Murphy Co., 654 F.2d 944).
While Northwest Airlines seemed to foreclose the approach to federal common law upon which the Third Circuit relied in Miller, "Miller's approach to federal common law differs evenmore markedly from Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981), a case decided about a month after Miller." Kohn, 2012 WL 3560822 at 3. In Texas Industries, Chief Justice Burger unequivocally stated "[t]here is, of course, 'no federal general common law.'" Texas Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 640 (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). The Court further stated that, "absent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases." Id. at 641. After...
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