Estes v. State
| Citation | 546 S.W.3d 691 |
| Decision Date | 09 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. PD–0429–16,PD–0429–16 |
| Parties | Russell Lamar ESTES, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
546 S.W.3d 691
Russell Lamar ESTES, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas
NO. PD–0429–16
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Delivered: May 9, 2018
Brian Salvant, Adam Arrington, Fort Worth, for Appellant.
Steven W. Conder, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Fort Worth, Stacey Soule, State’s Attorney, Austin, for the State.
OPINION
Keasler, J., Delivered the Opinion of the Court as To Parts I, II, III, and V, in which Keller, P.J., and Yeary, Keel, and Walker, JJ., joined, and filed an opinion as to Part IV, in which Keller, P.J., and Yeary and Keel, JJ., joined.
In enacting the current form of Penal Code Section 22.011(f),1 the Legislature apparently wished to provide higher penalties for polygamists "who sexually assault their purported spouses."2 But the resulting statute has the potentially unintended effect of punishing married offenders more harshly than unmarried offenders. Does the State have a rational interest in enforcing this scheme? We believe it does, specifically as applied to cases in which a married adult sexually abuses a child. We reverse.
I. FACTS
The opinion below adequately conveys the details of the offense.3 The essential facts are as follows.
"[O]ver the course of approximately one year," Russell Estes had an ongoing sexual relationship with K.A., a then-fourteen-year-old girl.4 "They had sexual intercourse on multiple occasions and engaged in other sexual acts with each other."5 During that span, Estes was legally married to someone else. So, in addition to charging Estes with sexual assault of a child, ordinarily a second-degree felony, the State also alleged that K.A. was a person "whom the defendant was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the defendant was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married[.]"6 This additional fact, if
proven true, would subject Estes to first-degree-felony punishment under Penal Code Section 22.011(f) :
An offense under [ Section 22.011, describing the offense of "Sexual Assault,"] is a felony of the second degree, except that [it] is a felony of the first degree if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under Section 25.01 [describing the offense of "Bigamy"].7
Estes was also charged with various counts of indecency with a child.8
A. Trial Court Proceedings
Estes filed a pre-trial motion to quash the child-sex-assault counts within the indictment, in which he objected to what he called the "[b]igamy element of this allegation[.]"9 Specifically, Estes argued that Section 22.011(f)"is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to [him] because it treats married people more harshly than ... unmarried people in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions."10 When this motion was denied, Estes asked for, and was granted, a running objection along these lines.
As relevant here, Estes was ultimately found guilty of all five counts of sexual assault of a child. In a single special issue, the jury also found "that [K.A.] was a person whom [Estes] was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom [Estes] was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married,"11 thereby triggering the Section 22.011(f) enhancement. Within the first-degree-felony punishment range, Estes was sentenced to 12 years' confinement on each count of sexual assault of a child.
B. Appeal
Before the Second Court of Appeals, Estes re-urged his contention that Section 22.011(f) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Estes primarily argued that, because this particular "application of Section 22.011(f)... impinges on his fundamental right to marry, the constitutionality of the statute should be reviewed under the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard."12 "However," Estes maintained, "even if reviewed under the more deferential rational-basis test, the law is still unconstitutional as applied" to him because the Section 22.011(f) enhancement "was intended to apply only in cases where the offense of bigamy or certain categories of bigamy are involved."13
In response to Estes's claims, the State advanced two possible rational bases for upholding the constitutionality of Section 22.011(f) in this case. The State argued that this application of Section 22.011(f) can be rationally understood as a method of "preventing the sexual exploitation of children by those who would use the ‘cloak of marriage’ " to gain access to potential victims.14 The State also proposed that this application of Section 22.011(f) advances Texas's "legitimate interest in protecting" and "nourish[ing] the union of marriage."15
The court of appeals rejected both of these rational bases. Regarding the State's "cloak of marriage" argument, the court found "nothing in the record" to support the claim "that a defendant's status of being married creates greater opportunities and access for sexually assaulting children."16 The court also declared that it could not "fathom that the legislature intend[ed] to resurrect" the notion of criminalizing adultery "through the language contained in section 22.011(f)."17 Finally, the court of appeals faulted the State for advocating a reading of the statute that, in the court of appeals' judgment, would result in an "extraordinarily broad" number of potential applications.18 The court of appeals ultimately concluded that, "under the circumstances of this case and as applied to appellant," Section 22.011(f)"violates equal protection because it penalizes him differently than a similarly situated defendant without a rational basis for doing so."19 The court went on to affirm various other aspects of his convictions for sexual assault of a child "as second-degree felonies" and remanded those charges "to the trial court for a new trial on punishment."20 Both parties petitioned this Court for discretionary review.
C. Discretionary Review
We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to reexamine the court of appeals' conclusion that there is no rational basis for the State's applying the Section 22.011(f)"bigamy" enhancement to the conduct of a monogamous person.21
We also granted Estes's petition for discretionary review to determine whether his equal-protection claim should be "reviewed under strict scrutiny."22 However, because the court of appeals concluded that this particular application of Section 22.011(f) fails even the rational-basis test, it explicitly declined to consider Estes's arguments that strict scrutiny should apply.23 "In these circumstances, [an appellant's] arguments for heightened scrutiny are best left open for consideration by the Court of Appeals on remand."24 Especially when addressing the constitutionality of a particular statutory provision, a reviewing court should not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it"; neither should it "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied."25 Both of these canons of judicial restraint would be compromised were we to reverse the court of appeals on an issue that it expressly declined to address.26 We therefore dismiss, as improvidently granted, Estes's first issue on discretionary review.27
Furthermore, based on our resolution of the State's sole ground for review, we need not reach Estes's second issue, in which he claims that it was "error for the Court of Appeals to affirm Appellant's sexual assault convictions as second-degree felonies ... rather than order the prosecution of Appellant dismissed."28 We turn now to the State's ground for review.
II. LAW
A. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."29
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."30 Resolving a claim that some state action has resulted in the law's unequal application begins with the reviewing court deciding which of the "devised standards for determining the validity" of the complained-of state action should apply.31 The default, "general rule" or "standard" is that state action is "presumed to be valid" and will be upheld if it is but "rationally related to a legitimate state interest."32 This general rule "gives way, however," when a state action either "classifies by race, alienage, or national origin,"33 or "impinge[s] on personal rights protected by the Constitution."34 Under these circumstances, the state action is subjected to "strict scrutiny," and will be sustained only if it is "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."35
B. "[A] rational means to serve a legitimate end."36
How a reviewing court applies these constitutional standards depends upon the type of constitutional...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ex parte Lee
...of a statute must illustrate that the statute operates unconstitutionally in all of its applications. See Estes v. State , 546 S.W.3d 691, 697–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ; State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine , 330 S.W.3d 904, 908–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). To resolve such challenges, we consider the......
-
Lumsden v. State
...previously relied on Swofford in Estes v. State , 487 S.W.3d 737, 756 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016), rev'd on other grounds , 546 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).16 Like we did in issue four above, we set forth testimony from the outcry hearing even if it is repetitive of the trial testimon......
-
Ex parte Nuncio
...to hang up is not rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting Person A from harassment. See Estes v. State , 546 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ("The default, ‘general rule’ or ‘standard’ is that state action is ‘presumed to be valid’ and will be upheld if it i......
-
Latimer v. State
...law is unconstitutional "on its face," meaning it operates unconstitutionally in all potential applications. Estes v. State , 546 S.W.3d 691, 697–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ; see also U.S. v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ; Santikos v. State , 836 S.W.2d ......
-
Punishment phase
...marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under the bigamy statute. Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under the facts of this case, there is no equal protection violation because the State’s use of this enhancement sch......
-
Child Sexual Abuse
...marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under the bigamy statute. Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under the facts of this case, there is no equal protection violation because the State’s use of this enhancement sch......
-
Child sexual abuse
...marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under the bigamy statute. Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under the facts of this case, there is no equal protection violation because the State’s use of this enhancement sch......
-
Child Sexual Abuse
...marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under the bigamy statute. Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under the facts of this case, there is no equal protection violation because the State’s use of this enhancement sch......