v.

• Decision Date: 17 April 2017
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 15SA330
• Parties: Plaintiff-Appellant: The People of the State of Colorado, v. Defendant-Appellee: William Paul Simpson.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

2017 CO 25

Plaintiff-Appellant: The People of the State of Colorado, v. Defendant-Appellee: William Paul Simpson.

Supreme Court Case No. 15SA330

Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

April 17, 2017

Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch's homepage at http://www.courts.state.co.us. Opinions are also posted on the Colorado Bar Association's homepage at http://www.cobar.org.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

Searches and Seizures—Warrantless Blood Draw—Consent to Search.

Colorado's Expressed Consent Statute ("the Statute"), section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016), provides that any motorist who drives on the roads of the state has consented to take a blood or breath test when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer with probable cause to suspect the motorist of driving under the influence.

In this interlocutory appeal, the supreme court reviews the trial court's ruling that an advisement accurately informing the defendant of the Statute amounted to coercion that rendered his consent to a blood test involuntary and required suppression of the test result. The supreme court explains that by driving in Colorado, the defendant consented to the terms of the Statute, including its requirement that he submit to a blood draw under the circumstances present in this case. The supreme court concludes that the defendant's prior statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, the blood test conducted in this case was constitutional. Consequently, the supreme court reverses the trial court's suppression of the test result.

Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court

Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 15CR212

Honorable F. Stephen Collins, Judge

Order Reversed

en banc

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant:

George H. Brauchler, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District

Jennifer Gilbert, Deputy District Attorney

Richard Orman, Senior Deputy District Attorney

Centennial, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee:

Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender

Elsa Archambault

Lucienne Ohanian

Centennial, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Denver District Attorney's Office and Colorado District Attorneys' Council:

Mitchell R. Morrissey, District Attorney, Second Judicial District

Katherine A. Hansen, Deputy District Attorney

Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE EID concurs in the judgment, and CHIEF JUSTICE RICE and JUSTICE COATS join in the concurrence in the judgment.

¶1 Colorado's Expressed Consent Statute provides that any motorist who drives on the roads of the state has consented to take a blood or breath test when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer with probable cause to suspect the motorist of driving under the influence. In this interlocutory appeal, we review the trial court's ruling that an advisement accurately informing the defendant, William Paul Simpson, of this law amounted to coercion that rendered his consent to a blood test involuntary and required suppression of the test result.

¶2 By driving in Colorado, Simpson consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to a blood draw under the circumstances present here. That prior statutory consent eliminated the need for the trial court to assess the voluntariness of Simpson's consent at the time of his interaction with law enforcement. Simpson's prior statutory consent satisfies the consent exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the blood draw at issue here was constitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's suppression of the blood-draw evidence.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 On January 25, 2015, Officer Mason MacDonald saw a pickup truck bounce off a curb four times, turn across a median, and then oversteer into oncoming traffic while entering an apartment complex parking lot. Officer MacDonald turned on his overhead lights and followed the truck into the parking lot. The truck initially stopped but then slowly crept forward.

¶4 Eventually, the truck came to a full stop. Officer MacDonald approached and found Simpson in the driver's seat. Officer MacDonald immediately smelled alcohol on Simpson's breath and saw that Simpson's eyes were red and watery. He asked Simpson whether he had been drinking, and Simpson replied in the affirmative. He asked Simpson to get out of the truck, but Simpson was unable to comply without assistance. Simpson was ultimately transported to the hospital for medical attention.

¶5 At the hospital, Officer MacDonald read Simpson an expressed consent advisement form titled "Colorado Express Consent Law Information." In relevant part, the form stated:

1. By driving a motor vehicle in Colorado, you have agreed to submit to a blood or breath test to determine the alcohol content of your blood or breath if a police officer has probable cause to believe you have been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol.

. . . .

5. A refusal to sign any release or consent forms required by a person authorized to take or withdraw specimens is a refusal to submit to the required tests.

6. The results of the test, or your refusal to take the test, can be used against you in court.

7. If you refuse to submit to a test, your driving privilege will be revoked for one year. This revocation would be in addition to any penalties resulting from the charges filed against you.

The bottom of the form asked, "Which test do you choose to submit to?" and instructed the reader to initial the appropriate line, with one line for blood and one for breath.

¶6 Officer MacDonald explained that because breath tests were unavailable in the hospital, he would be able to offer Simpson a blood test only. He gave Simpson theexpressed consent form to read. Simpson reviewed the form and then initialed it on the line labeled "BLOOD." Simpson also signed the "Officer's signature" line, instead of the line designated for the test-taker's signature. A nurse completed the blood draw, which revealed that Simpson had a blood-alcohol content of 0.448, more than five times the level necessary by statute to permit an inference of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), § 42-4-1301(6)(a)(III), C.R.S. (2016).

¶7 Simpson was charged with DUI, among other offenses related to the incident. Before trial, he filed a suppression motion claiming that the blood draw was an unconstitutional search. In support of that motion, Simpson claimed he was too drunk to give valid consent to a search and that at his level of intoxication, even the slightest police direction amounted to coercion.

¶8 At a motions hearing, the trial court found that the reading of the expressed consent advisement, due to its "express threats and statements that [the driver has] already consented to submit to a blood and breath test to determine alcohol content," was coercive. The court concluded that any consent given after the reading of this advisement could not be voluntary, so it determined that Simpson's consent was invalid and the search was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed the blood-draw evidence.

¶9 The next day, supplementing its oral ruling, the trial court published a written order concerning Simpson's motion to suppress the blood test results. First, the court revisited its voluntariness determination, explaining that the expressed consent form and Officer MacDonald's statement that only a blood test was available "would causeany reasonable person (and certainly a person in Defendant's highly inebriated condition) to conclude that they had no choice but to submit to the blood test and, thus, . . . rise to the level of undue influence exercised against Defendant which renders his alleged consent involuntary."

¶10 The court later expressed concern that it had neglected to address all issues related to the constitutionality of the search at the hearing and examined whether, despite the absence of voluntary consent, the blood draw might nevertheless be justified as reasonable due to exigent circumstances. The court concluded that no such circumstances existed. It therefore reaffirmed its suppression ruling.

¶11 The People filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2016), and C.A.R. 4.1.

II. Standard of Review

¶12 Review of a trial court's suppression order presents a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Munoz-Gutierrez, 2015 CO 9, ¶ 14, 342 P.3d 439, 443. We defer to the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by the record, but we assess the legal effect of those facts de novo. Id.; see also People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66, ¶¶ 33-35, 379 P.3d 330, 338 (examining the standards of review this court has historically applied to questions of voluntariness); People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 459 (Colo. 2002) ("[W]hen a constitutional right is implicated . . . appellate courts should not defer to a lower court's judgment when applying legal standards to the facts found by the trial court.").

III. Analysis

¶13 We begin by describing Colorado's Expressed Consent Statute. Next, we review relevant Fourth Amendment principles, including the consent exception to the warrant requirement. We then explain that by choosing to drive in Colorado, Simpson consented to the terms of the Expressed Consent Statute, including its requirement that he submit to a blood draw under the circumstances present here. We conclude that this statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, the blood draw was constitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's suppression order.

A. Colorado's Expressed Consent Statute

¶14 Colorado's Expressed Consent Statute ("the Statute"), section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. (2016), provides that "[a]ny person who drives any motor vehicle . . . throughout [the] state shall be deemed to have expressed such person's consent to the...