A.V. v. Vt. Dep't For Children & Families

• Court: Superior Court of Vermont
• Writing for the Court: Benjamin D. Battles Superior Court Judge
• Citation: A.V. v. Vt. Dep't For Children & Families, 2025 Vt Super 121702, 25-CV-00222 (Dec 17, 2025)
• Docket Number: 25-CV-00222
• Decision Date: 17 December 2025
• Parties: A. V. v. Vermont Department for Children and Families et al.

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2025 Vt Super 121702

A. V. v. Vermont Department for Children and Families et al.

No. 25-CV-00222

Superior Court of Vermont, Civil Division, Lamoille Unit

December 17, 2025

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

Benjamin D. Battles Superior Court Judge

Plaintiff A. V. has filed a thirteen-count complaint against defendants Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF), Lund, and Copley Hospital arising from defendants' allegedly unlawful surveillance and monitoring of plaintiff during her pregnancy, which led DCF to obtain an emergency care order to take plaintiffs child into state custody before the child was born. Pending before the court are DCF's Motion to Dismiss (Motion 6), Lund's Motion to Dismiss (Motion 8) and Copley's Motion to Strike or for Judgment on the Pleadings (Motion 13). For the reasons set forth below DCF's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, Lund's motion to dismiss is denied, and Copley's motion is denied.

Background

The complaint alleges the following facts. In 2021, plaintiff became pregnant with her first child. Plaintiff thereafter reached out to Lund to have a confidential conversation about her pregnancy. Lund is a not-for-profit organization in South Burlington offering treatment, education, and adoption services.

Around the beginning of her third trimester, plaintiff became unable to remain in her apartment in Elmore and temporarily relocated to a homeless shelter in Middlebury called the Charter House. The Charter House's executive director reported concerns to DCF in January 2022 about plaintiffs mental health including that plaintiff was unaware she was having a baby. Plaintiff alleges these concerns were baseless.

DCF accepted the report for an "assessment" and assigned caseworker Jennifer Stone.^[1] Under the guidance of her supervisor Karen Reynolds, Stone contacted plaintiffs case managers at Charter House, a counselor at Lund, and a social worker at Copley Hospital in Morrisville where plaintiff planned to deliver. Lund shared confidential information about plaintiff with Stone, and Copley disclosed information in plaintiff s medical records. These disclosures were made without plaintiffs knowledge or consent, or a court order. Based on this and other information collected as part of the assessment process, DCF developed concerns for plaintiffs mental health.

Plaintiff eventually returned to Elmore from the Charter house. She determined that she wanted a natural childbirth.

On the morning of February 11, 2022, Copley informed DCF that plaintiff was at the hospital and in labor, but that plaintiff was declining to push and permitting only intermittent fetal monitoring. Copley continued to provide DCF updates about plaintiffs labor throughout the day.

While plaintiff was still in labor, the Lamoille County State's Attorney filed a petition alleging that plaintiffs unborn child was a child in need of supervision (CHINS) under 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3)(B), and an ex parte motion for an emergency care order with the Lamoille Family Division, seeking to transfer temporary custody of the child to DCF. The petition was accompanied by an affidavit from Stone, detailing DCF's "significant concerns regarding plaintiffs mental state, and her ability to provide safe care for an infant." The affidavit incorrectly stated that plaintiffs child had been born on February 11, 2022, when in fact plaintiff was still in labor. The affidavit included lengthy allegations concerning plaintiffs recent history as well as "historical concerns" relating to alleged abuse plaintiff suffered as a minor.

Neither DCF nor the State's Attorney had spoken to plaintiff before the request for an emergency care order was filed. The Lamoille Family Division granted the emergency acre order on February 11, 2022, and issued an order transferring custody of plaintiff baby to DCF.

Meanwhile, plaintiff was still in labor at Copley and was unaware that the emergency care ord had been issued. She continued to insist on a natural childbirth notwithstanding Copley's recommendation that she undergo cesarean surgery. Copley reached out to the Department of Mental Health to discuss the potential of involuntary treatment for plaintiff but the department determined that pursuing that process was not appropriate under the circumstances.

DCF, acting through the Attorney General's Office, then filed an emergency motion in the Lamoille Civil Division for an ex parte injunction to prevent plaintiff from leaving Copley and requiring her to undergo surgery to deliver the baby. Following an emergency telephone hearing, the motion was dismissed as moot after it was determined that plaintiff had already consented to surgical intervention.

Plaintiff delivered a healthy baby girl, S.V., on February 12, 2022, following cesarian surgery. The child was immediately placed in DCF custody pursuant to the emergency care order that had been issued the previous day. Plaintiff was not allowed to have contact with her newborn child.

The CHINS petition for S.V. was litigated in the Family Division over the ensuing weeks and months. The Family Division issued orders on February 14 and July 29, 2022, continuing DCF custody. Parent-child contact was initially limited but gradually increased. The Family Division ordered reunification in the fall of 2022 pursuant to a conditional custody order with plaintiff, and DCF ultimately dismissed the petition that November.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants' conduct resulted in the unwarranted and unlawful separation of plaintiff from her newborn child and caused plaintiff extreme emotional distress.

Plaintiff further alleges that DCF's conduct in this case is part and parcel of a larger practice of DCF maintaining "a registry of pregnant Vermonters under surveillance known has the 'high-risk pregnancy docket' or 'high-risk pregnancy calendar.'" Compl. ¶ 107. According to the complaint, the women included on this list are deemed high-risk solely because DCF believes they will be unfit parents. DCF tracks the pregnancies of women included on this list and then "aggressively" investigates them to "justify its speculative concerns and eventual post-birth intervention." Compl. ¶ 110.

Plaintiff filed this complaint in January 2025, alleging thirteen causes of action against DCF, Lund, and Copley. DCF and Lund have moved to dismiss the claims against them, and Copley has moved to strike the claim against it pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1041, or in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. A hearing was held on the motions on September 2, 2025.

Analysis

1. DCF's motion to dismiss

The complaint pleads eleven causes of action against DCF, all of which DCF has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.

A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b) "only if it is beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Birchwood Land Co. v. Krizan, 2015 VT 37, ¶ 6, 198 Vt. 420 (quotation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court construes alleged facts and draws all reasonable inferences from those alleged facts in favor of the non-moving party. Id. On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court "may consider evidence outside the pleadings." Vt. Hum. Rts. Comm'n v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 2024 VT 71, ¶ 6. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must determine "whether the bare allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim," and in so doing, may consider documents relied on in the complaint and subject to judicial notice." Sutton v. Purzycki, 2022 VT 56, ¶ 20, 217 Vt. 326; Birchwood Land. Co. v. Krizan, 2015 VT 37, ¶ 6, 198 Vt. 420.

DCF makes several arguments in support of dismissal: (a) the Civil Division lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's claims, which seek to collaterally attack decisions made by the Family Division; (b) all of plaintiff's claims are precluded by the prior Family Division orders; (c) all of plaintiff's claims are barred by the State's sovereign immunity; (d) plaintiff lacks standing to challenge DCF's alleged "high risk" pregnancy calendar; and (e) plaintiff's claims fail on the merits. Each argument is addressed below.

a. Exclusive Family Division jurisdiction

DCF argues that plaintiff's complaint is an "improper collateral attack" on decisions made by the Family Division and raises claims conferred to that court's exclusive jurisdiction. Plaintiff disagrees, noting that she is not seeking to vacate or overturn any Family Division order, but is rather seeking damages and injunctive relief for harm caused by DCF's allegedly unlawful acts and practices.

The respective jurisdictions of the Civil and Family Divisions are governed by Title 4 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated. The Civil Division has "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all original civil actions, except as otherwise provided" by Title 4, and "jurisdiction to hear and dispose of any other matter . . . that is not subject to the jurisdiction of another division." 4 V.S.A. § 31. The Family Division has "exclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose" all proceedings filed pursuant to Chapter 53 of Title 33, including "all proceedings concerning a child who is or who is alleged to be ... a child in need of care or supervision brought under the authority of the juvenile judicial proceedings chapters, except as otherwise provided in such chapters." 4 V.S.A. § 33(a)(8); 33 V.S.A. § 5103(a).

At this preliminary stage, the court cannot conclude that these jurisdictional statutes require carte blanche dismissal of plaintiff's claims against DCF.^[2] Those claims, grounded in various constitutional and statutory provisions, broadly seek...