Va.-carolina Chem. Co v. Knight
| Decision Date | 14 March 1907 |
| Citation | 56 S.E. 725,106 Va. 674 |
| Parties | VIRGINIA-CAROLINA CHEMICAL CO. v. KNIGHT. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Where an employe was injured while assisting in hoisting lumber by a rope breaking or being cut while passing through a snatch block, it was error, in an action for his injuries, to receive opinion evidence concerning the safety of the block, and as to where an experienced man performing the employe's duties would have stood in safety to himself and at the same time perform his duties.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 2189, 2190.]
Where, in an action for injuries to an employ, H. testified for defendant that he was an independent contractor, and that the employs was in his service and not defendant's, a letter written by defendant's attorneys to the clerk of the court, directing the subpœna of certain witnesses, and stating that the witnesses whose addresses were not given worked for defendant at the plant where the accident occurred, and containing H.'s name, but not giving his address, was not admissible to rebut H.'s statement that he was an independent contractor; it not appearing that II. knew of or approved the letter.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 50, Witnesses, § 1276.]
Such letter was not admissible as an admission on defendant's part that H. was an employe of defendant at the time of the accident.
Where three copies of a writing are made at the same time by the same impression of a pencil, one of the copies must be regarded as a triplicate original, and is admissible without notice to produce the original.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 561, 564, 566.]
Where there was an issue as to whether plaintiff in an action for personal injuries was the employe of defendant or of another, a report made by defendant's superintendent, pursuant to his duty to report injuries to employes, was admissible as an admission by defendant that plaintiff was an employe; it being immaterial that the superintendent had no personal knowledge of the accident.
A report of the superintendent of defendant's plant where plaintiff wag employed when injured, concerning the accident, sent to defendant's attorneys before any action had been brought or threatened, was not inadmissible as a privileged communication.
Where an employe sued for personal injuries, the fact that his employer carried accident indemnity insurance could throw no light upon the question whether defendant was negligent though the insurance might have the effect of lessening its motive to be careful.
Where there was an issue as to whether plaintiff in an action for personal injuries was the employe of defendant or not, defendant could not complain that an instruction givenfor plaintiff failed to define what in law constitutes an employ, where, when read with an instruction given for defendant, the jury was clearly informed upon the question.
Error to Circuit Court of City of Richmond.
Action by George E. Knight against the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Reversed, and remanded for new trial.
Cabell, Talley & Cabell, for plaintiff in error.
L. O. Wendenburg, for defendant in error.
The plaintiff in the court below, the defendant in error here, brought his action against the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company to recover damages for personal Injuries resulting to him by reason of the alleged failure of the defendant to furnish reasonably safe and sound appliances and instrumentalities with which to work whilst engaged, as is averred, in its service, along with others, in the construction of a warehouse.
At the time the plaintiff was injured he was assisting in raising lumber by means of a rope, which ran from the ground floor to the top of the building, there passed over or through a block, and then came down about 10 or 15 feet, to and through a snatch block, and over the wheel of the same to a piece of machinery used for winding the rope, thus raising the lumber. The duty of the plaintiff was to remain on the ground and take charge of a guy rope, used In guiding and controlling the lumber, to which the lower end of the rope was fastened, In its ascent to the upper part of the building. Whilst performing that duty, as a load of lumber was being carried up by means of the appliances above described, and when the lumber had gotten about half way up to its landing place the rope was caught over the edge of the wheel in the snatch block, as is alleged, and thereby broken or cut, causing the lumber to fall upon the plaintiff, inflicting the injuries complained of.
Upon the trial of the cause the plaintiff Introduced a witness, who was shown the snatch block and asked to tell the jury whether or not it was a safe appliance, and, if it was not, to state In what particulars it was unsafe. Another witness was shown the snatch block, the wheel of which had been broken since the accident happened, and was asked to explain to the jury how it came about that the strands of the rope which was used should separate and one strand should pass over the edge of the sheave, and, if there was anything about the snatch block that would explain that, to point it out to the jury. He was further asked where an experienced man, who had charge of the guy rope and was guiding the lumber as it was being carried up, would stand in safety to himself and at the same time perform this duty. All these questions were objected to, because, the appliance used in raising the lumber being simple, it was not a case for expert evidence, and was an effort to substitute the opinion of the witness for the opinion which the jury were to form from the facts. The court overruled the objections and permitted the witnesses to answer the questions. This action of the court is assigned as error.
"No principle of law is better settled, " as was said in the case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Mauzy, 98 Va. 692, 694, 37 S. E. 285, 286, "than that the opinion of witnesses are in general inadmissible; that witnesses can testify to facts only, and not to opinions or conclusions based upon the facts." That was a case where the plaintiff had been injured in loading car wheels, and it was held that the trial court erred in permitting certain witnesses to testify, even if they had been shown to be experts, as the question of danger or safety in loading car wheels in a particular mode is one which any person of common intelligence and observation could as readily determine as the so-called experts.
While the general rule is as above stated, there are exceptions to It; but there is nothing in the case under consideration, so far as we can see, to take it out of the general rule. When all relevant facts can be or have been introduced before the jury, and the latter are able to deduce a reasonable inference from them, no reason exists for receiving opinion evidence, and it is inadmissible. See 17 Cyc. 41; Va. Iron, etc., Co. v. Tomlinson, 104 Va. 254, 51 S. E. 362; Guarantee Co. v. Nat. Bank, 95 Va. 492, 28 S. E. 909.
Another assignment of error is to the action of the court in permitting the plaintiff to introduce in rebuttal a letter from the attorneys representing the defendant to the clerk of the court, directing him to have summoned for the defendant certain witnesses, in which it was stated that all the witnesses whose addresses were not given were working for the defendant at its plant where the accident happened. Among the witnesses named, and whose address was not given, was William Haw, who was introduced as a witness by the defendant, and who testified that he was an independent contractor to erect the warehouse for the defendant, and that the plaintiff, when injured, was in his service, and not in the service of the defendant Upon cross-examination it is claimed that he testified that he had Informed the attorneys of the defendant of this fact before the former trial of the case, in which that defense was not made nor relied on until the latter part of the trial, when Haw testified that he was an independent contractor. The admission of the letter was objected to, but the court overruled the objection and admitted it in evidence, upon the ground that It tended to rebut Haw's...
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...admissions are "made for the purpose of dispensing with the formal proof of some fact at the trial." Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Knight, 106 Va. 674, 678, 56 S.E. 725, 727 (1907). Thus, "No constitute a judicial admission, the admission must conclusively establish a fact in issue." Lupic......
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...admissions are "made for the purpose of dispensing with the formal proof of some fact at the trial." Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Knight, 106 Va. 674, 678, 56 S.E. 725, 727 (1907). Thus, "[t]o constitute a judicial admission, the admission must conclusively establish a fact in issue." Lup......
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